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ABSTRACT 
DOING TIME BY CONCEIVING SPACE:   
THE RHETORICAL CARTOGRAPHIES OF IMPRISONED WRITERS 
 
Benjamin Bogart 
August 11, 2015 
 This dissertation is a theoretical analysis of rhetorical constructions of identity as 
they are impacted by spatiality, with specific regard to the writing of incarcerated 
persons.  It begins with an exploration of prison as “rhetorical space”—that is, the 
specific geography of communicative events, which includes both the material conditions 
of the environment as well as the cultural, abstracted conditions which offer persuasive 
potential.  Proposing then a framework for analysis along these lines—a concept called 
“rhetorical cartography”—it then turns its attention, in the latter half, to analysis of actual 
texts authored by American prisoners. 
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters, covering prison space, rhetorical 
cartography, and extended analyses of two subject groups.  Chapter One considers the 
historical and theoretical dimensions of the modern prison as it works with accounts of 
the prison’s spatiality from guards and inmates alike.  Drawing on these texts, Chapter 
One suggests that prison space and the prisoner identity are dialectically linked, resulting 
in a conception of the prison that results from its prisoners, as well as ideas about 
individual prisoner identities that emerge from the environment of the prison.  Chapter 
Two attends to relevant spatial and postmodern theory in order to propose a framework 
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for studying this linkage of space and identity:  “rhetorical cartography.”  Chapter Two 
then elaborates on this framework via explorations of texts that draw attention to this 
linkage, resulting in the identification of a two-step pattern of rhetorical action:  “spatial 
inventory” and “recalibration.”  
 While Chapters One and Two serve to theorize the rationale and framework 
behind “rhetorical cartography,” Chapters Three and Four turn more heavily to analysis 
of prison texts.  Chapter Three considers the cartographic rhetoric of African-American 
males writing in the context of the civil rights era; Chapter Four enters a modern context 
by exploring the increasingly visible texts of female prisoners.  While Chapter Three 
focuses more heavily on the shared rhetorical moves of its subjects as a group, Chapter 
Four looks to explore the moves of prisoners who are less aware of each other’s work, 










	   vi	  




LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………...vii 
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...1 
CHAPTER ONE: The Place of the Prison and the Identity of the Prisoner………….….15 
CHAPTER TWO:  Rhetorical Cartography and Prison Writers……………………..….53 
CHAPTER THREE:  Race, Space, and Distance………………………………….…...100 













	   vii	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE                                 PAGE 
2.1.  The Binary Logic of the Prison, in “Mama Tried”…………………………………56 
2.2.  King’s “Letter” as Thirdspatial Map……………………………………………….75 
2.3.  A Chronological Mapping of Malcolm X’s Identities……………………………...81 
2.4.  A Thematic Rendering of X’s Locational Inventory……………………………….83 
3.1.  The Binary Logic of Racism………………………………………………………116 
3.2.  Carter’s Alienation as Exetastic Buildup………………………………………….128 
4.1.  Nancy Birkla’s “Alienation Via Disappointment”………………………………..154 
4.2.  Birkla’s Conception of Marriage:  A Location as Product of Alienation…………157 
4.3.  Brenda Medina’s Quest for Fulfillment…………………………………………...166 
4.4.  Medina’s Exploration of Gang Space……………………………………………..167 
4.5.  The Spatiality of Fulfillment/Disappointment…………………………………….173 
4.6.  Piper Kerman’s Mapping of Prison Acceptance…………………………………..179 
4.7.  The Tribalism of FCI Danbury……………………………………………………181 
4.8.  Overlapping Maps of Feminine Obsessions, with Attention to Institutions………183 










This sense of dead and heavy-hanging time probably explains the premium placed on 
what might be called removal activities, namely, voluntary unserious pursuits which are 
sufficiently engrossing and exciting to lift the participant out of himself, making him 
oblivious for the time being to his actual situation.  If the ordinary activities in total 
institutions can be said to torture time, these activities mercifully kill it. 
       -Erving Goffman, Asylums 68-9 
 Why is it that we so often refer to prisoners “doing time”?  We might ascribe this 
preoccupation with temporality to the terms of prison sentences themselves, which 
commonly get used mainly to indicate the length a prisoner will be incarcerated:  “five 
years good time,” “20 years without possibility of parole,” and the more ambiguous 
(though certainly temporally-preoccupied) “life.”  But I would like to posit that such 
preoccupations speak more to the understanding of prison on the outside—what those of 
us who haven’t been incarcerated think of a prison bid.   
 In fact, as the quote that leads this section reveals, it might be more appropriate to 
think of this time as “dead,” rather than being actively spent.  We may conjure up images 
of Steve McQueen thumping his baseball against the “cooler” walls in The Great Escape, 
or Tim Robbins crafting his intricate chess pieces of soapstone in The Shawshank 
Redemption, and expect we know something about how prison requires one to “pass 
time.”  But if, as Goffman claims, such activities are meant to “mercifully kill” that time 
so as to render one “oblivious” to the experiences around them, then the phrase we find 
so ubiquitous to discussion of prisoners and penality may be missing a larger point:  no 
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one “does time.”  Time, in prison, may not exist; certainly not in the way we think of it 
on the outside. 
 Although, maybe this effect is more widely-felt than by prisoners alone.  Nedra 
Reynolds, in her essay “Composition’s Imagined Geographies: The Politics of Space in 
the Frontier, City, and Cyberspace,” makes it a point, in theorizing the locations 
important to our field, to address the concept of “time-space compression”—a chiefly 
postmodern concern in which “space flattens out” and “time becomes both harder to 
notice and more important” (Reynolds, “Imagined Geographies” 18, original emphasis).  
A product of the duel influence of technology and capitalism, Reynolds’ vision of time-
space compression considers the work of critical geographers such as David Harvey, 
Edward Soja, and Henri Lefebvre to suggest a danger in allowing the modern world to 
present itself as absent a concern for space:  “Time-space compression masks the politics 
of space by producing the illusion that, for example, electronic gadgets can overcome 
space and create more time” (Reynolds, “Imagined Geographies” 18).  Insofar as such 
masking can be detrimental to our understanding of the world around us, Reynolds 
connects her preoccupation of space to the world of critical geographers and spatial 
theorists, whose term transparent space serves to call attention to the threat of believing 
that space does not matter; that it is inert or without agency of its own.   
 Certainly important to our field’s ongoing discussions of spatiality as regards the 
production of writing, I’d like to suggest this threat of “transparent space” is reflected 
quite clearly in the predominance of temporal metaphors concerning prison and 
prisoners—metaphors which do not allow us any purchase on the reality of a prison 
sentence.  A focus on time might help you understand prison in terms of absence from 
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society, but it does not immediately offer up any understanding of what prison does as 
felt by those inside it; by those whose identities are not merely aged, but changed 
outright.  Prison, as we on the outside often think of it, is an institution promising 
“corrections,” and in looking to understand prison in these terms, we may be left 
dissatisfied with the predominant focus on temporality. 
 As Michel Foucault reveals in his landmark analysis of penal institutions, 
Discipline and Punish, the institution of prison is one founded upon society’s quest for 
order; it is about instilling a control over those who find themselves unable (or unwilling) 
to self-order as valued by a mainstream society.  Rather than punishment for a specific 
crime, Foucault posits that a 19th century shift in social attitudes towards incarceration 
has left us with a system intent on punishing the “soul” of criminals—a process which 
requires extensive investigation into the nature of the person under study  Set as we are, 
as a nation, on the idea of “corrections,” Foucault’s argument provides us with a clear 
though troubling goal for prisons:  perhaps not to punish crime outright, but to force those 
who pass through its gates into a period of prolonged “recalculation” of identity.   
 Erving Goffman, in his book Asylums, considers this same function as it relates to 
what he terms total institutions1—a process of “disculturation” and “untraining” in which 
the inmate is stripped of personal possessions,  style, communicational channels, and 
even his/her own name.  This process Goffman refers to as mortification, in which the 
total institution seeks to effectively destroy the inmate’s sense of self in order to promote 
its own unique mission.  It is worth noting that despite the language used by Goffman, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  A	  “total	  institution,”	  according	  to	  Goffman,	  is	  one	  in	  which	  symbolic	  and	  concrete	  barriers	  are	  put	  in	  place	  
between	  inmates	  and	  the	  outside	  world	  (Goffman	  4).	  
2	  Here,	  let	  us	  consider	  the	  typical	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ethos,	  as	  we	  might	  find	  it	  presented	  in	  a	  freshman	  
composition	  classroom.	  	  In	  the	  popular	  textbook	  Writing	  Arguments	  by	  John	  D.	  Ramage,	  John	  C.	  Bean,	  and	  June	  
Johnson,	  ethos	  is	  described	  thusly:	  	  “Ethos	  (Greek	  for	  “character”)	  focuses	  attention	  on	  the	  writer’s	  (or	  speaker’s)	  
character	  as	  it	  is	  projected	  in	  the	  message.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  writer”	  (Ramage	  et	  al.	  62,	  emphasis	  
in	  original).	  	  Such	  a	  definition—seemingly	  targeting	  only	  the	  writer/speaker	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity—is	  not	  
	   4	  
process of mortification is not to be seen as outright vindictive or necessarily of a 
punitive nature:  “total institutions do not really look for cultural victory.  They create and 
sustain a particular kind of tension between the home world and the institutional world 
and use this persistent tension as a strategic leverage in the management of men” 
(Goffman 13).  So whether the institution in question is a maximum-security prison or a 
TB ward, the “mortification” of inmate selves is rather utilitarian, and not always 
vindictive. 
 Though admittedly reductive for the sake of hypothesizing the prison early on, we 
might think of prison as a machine existing as an extension of a hierarchical society, with 
the goal of “correcting” those whose self-defined identities cause problems for the 
hierarchy.  Let us consider an example of this:  In his 2014 article “Order Through 
Honor:  Masculinity and the Use of Temporary Release in a Greek Prison,” criminologist 
Leonidas K. Cheliotis considers the incentives offered by the carceral system in Greece 
designed to intersect with the Greek concept of philotimo, or, simply translated, “honor.”  
Associated with “manliness” and “honor of the family name,” Cheliotis focuses on the 
former as a means of investigating how the prison system makes use of archetypal 
identity and behavior as a means of instilling what we refer to as “corrections” (Cheliotis 
539).  The issue at hand for Cheliotis is the promise of temporary release—a reward 
commonly utilized throughout the prisons of the Western world as a means of 
incentivizing what is commonly referred to in the American system as “good behavior.”  
While that concept may influence some prisoners to play nice in our prisons in the States, 
Cheliotis observes that in Greece, the cultural firmness of philotimo works by targeting 
prisoners’ conceptions of their “manliness.”  That is, the reward of temporary furlough is 
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not simply based on one’s avoidance of bad behavior, but on an adherence to masculine 
virtues found in mainstream Greek culture. 
 For Cheliotis, such incentives work quite well for the carceral institution, as they 
create a cultural impetus for prisoners to begin the process of “recalculating” their 
identity, based not solely on what the prison itself orders (such as we might see in 
American prisons), but on what the culture at large has to say about order and hierarchy.  
If prison is a mechanism for “re-ordering” those who are unable to order themselves, 
then, Greek prisons have a built-in layer of support in the form of philotimo, which offers 
external support. 
 But interesting to me, and important for an argument seeking to explore the 
influence of space in prison, is the language in which Cheliotis expounds upon this 
phenomenon.  In discussing the work of philotimo to encourage “self-ordering,” the 
author states:  “Although officers recognized prisoners’ capacity to distinguish 
themselves as individuals, such distinction was defined as divergence from a typified 
category of deviants, and indeed as alignment of one’s conduct with the pattern of an 
alternative, honorable collectivity” (Cheliotis 541-2, emphasis added).  In other words, 
Cheliotis theorizes that a focus on philotimo works because it encourages prisoners to 
distance themselves from one archetype (the prisoner, or “bad man”), and to align 
themselves with a group of people who form another (the men of Greek society, who, in 
their resolve to embody the concept of “manliness,” commit themselves to a type of 
masculine “honor,” which extends to their families).   
 Greek prison is quite obviously distinct from American prisons, and it is not my 
goal to create a false equivalency here between the two.  But for our purposes, the 
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language used by Cheliotis to explore Greek incarceration reveals what I suspect is true 
of many modern prisons:  they are not oriented towards a vision of temporality, but of 
spatiality.  In presenting the limited successes of the Greek prison to us in terms of 
philotimo, Cheliotis finds himself unable to escape the language of distance, using both 
“divergence” and “alignment” as descriptors of the corrections made.   
 There is something overtly rhetorical about such terms, and to make this point I 
would like to turn back to Nedra Reynolds and fellow rhetorical theorist Michael 
Halloran—both of whom, in considering a historical recovery of the term ethos, reveal 
rhetoric to be very spatially-concerned.  In his 1982 article “Aristotle’s Concept of Ethos, 
or If Not His Somebody Else’s,” theorist Michael Halloran explores the concept of ethos 
by focusing on an element of the appeal he believes history has largely forgotten:  that of 
space.  Typically taught in our college freshmen composition courses as a kind of 
personal credibility2, Halloran suggests that a classical notion of ethos (possibly that of 
Aristotle) is more interested in establishing the virtues that a rhetor shares with his/her 
community.  Not overtly spatial in an of itself, Halloran’s argument takes an etymological 
turn as he considers the term ethos itself:  “The most concrete meaning given for [ethos] 
in the Greek lexicon is ‘a habitual gathering place,’ and I suspect that it is upon this 
image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas, that 
its meaning as character rests” (Halloran 60, emphasis added). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Here,	  let	  us	  consider	  the	  typical	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ethos,	  as	  we	  might	  find	  it	  presented	  in	  a	  freshman	  
composition	  classroom.	  	  In	  the	  popular	  textbook	  Writing	  Arguments	  by	  John	  D.	  Ramage,	  John	  C.	  Bean,	  and	  June	  
Johnson,	  ethos	  is	  described	  thusly:	  	  “Ethos	  (Greek	  for	  “character”)	  focuses	  attention	  on	  the	  writer’s	  (or	  speaker’s)	  
character	  as	  it	  is	  projected	  in	  the	  message.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  writer”	  (Ramage	  et	  al.	  62,	  emphasis	  
in	  original).	  	  Such	  a	  definition—seemingly	  targeting	  only	  the	  writer/speaker	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity—is	  not	  
dissimilar	  to	  those	  found	  in	  other	  such	  textbooks.	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 Extending Halloran’s argument further in her article “Ethos as Location:  New 
Sites for Understanding Discursive Authority,” Reynolds comments on the concept of 
ethos as a rhetorical move clearly predicated upon location: 
 The idea of ethos as a social construction, in which subjects are formed by the 
 habits of their culture, belies the charges that ethos can be “faked” or 
 manipulated [ . . .] When ethos is, as in the Nicomanchean Ethics, a result of 
 experience and instruction, it becomes a shared enterprise among members 
 of the community, and the community decides, in turn, what constitutes justice, 
 temperance, bravery, or ethics.  (Reynolds, “Ethos” 328) 
 
To Reynolds’ list of values, let us add “criminality,” for it is this concept that will create 
for us a simple binary which prison seems to encourage in its inhabitants:  you can either 
be ethical, and thus of society, or you can be criminal, and thus of no use to society.   
 Admittedly simple, it is this binary which will drive much of the exploration in 
this thesis, as it is, in terms literal and abstract, our “starting place.”  Understanding ethos 
to be an inherently spatial concept (as least as it was originally devised), and also largely 
synonymous with the goals of the modern prison itself (to encourage an adherence to the 
values of a larger society), then prison itself becomes a distinctly rhetorical space: a 
spatiality expounded upon by rhetorician Roxanne Mountford in her 2001 analysis of the 
space of the pulpit in both literature and reality.  According to Mountford:  “Rhetorical 
space is the geography of a communicative event, and, like all landscapes, may include 
both the cultural and material arrangement, whether intended or fortuitous, of space” 
(Mountford 42).  In my reading, then, the true influence of prison (along the lines of 
“corrections”) lies not in its control of the temporal, but in its control of space—
rhetorical space—which opens up to us a host of real and imagined places for analysis. 
 Interested in instilling order upon its inhabitants, prison seeks to “correct” these 
prisoners by alignment with culturally-firm values.  But in order to do that, it must first 
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cast its prisoners as “deviant.”  So it is that, regardless of a convict’s moral character as 
he or she enters the prison, once inside, that character will be rendered harshly as a true 
“outsider”—one who simply does not belong in an ordered, mainstream society.  As 
Goffman puts it, they undergo a process of mortification from the second they enter the 
prison environment:  losing mobility to the architecture of bars and concrete; losing 
possessions and autonomy to the officers in the “intake room”; losing connection to the 
outside world, except through the careful surveillance of “visitation rooms” and censored 
mail; and losing privacy through the need for surveillance over the entire institution.  
 For most prisoners, this reconfiguration of identity is uncomfortable at best, and 
when it intersects with political or social identities that the prison does not condone (for 
example, African-Americans writing during the period of the American Civil Rights era; 
considered in chapter three), this reconfiguration often feels deliberately oppressive.  As 
the next chapter will reveal, this process of mortification operates not only upon the 
prisoner inhabitants in the institution, but, as a testament to the prison’s power of 
location, upon the guards assigned to watch them as well.  We know this to be true when 
considering cases like the Stanford University Prison Experiment or the unwarranted 
abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib (see Zimbardo). It doesn’t matter which side of the bars 
you’re on—prison wants to rhetorically “put you in your place.” 
 And yet as the prison locates its inhabitants rhetorically, so too does it encourage 
them to engage with the identities that such locations enforce. Mortification should, as 
reinforced by prison architecture, lead the individuals who pass though to shed their 
identities and adopt the state-sanctioned image that corresponds to his/her inhabited 
space.  My interest is in examining those who resist. 
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 Historian H. Bruce Franklin comments on the value of prison literature in his 
book The Victim as Criminal and Artist, and as it is an evaluation predicated on subject 
identity, I feel it to be an important one to share here.  Writing in his introductory chapter, 
Franklin claims:  
 [I]n societies divided into social classes much of the most significant art has come 
from the misery of the oppressed classes, whether created by the oppressed people 
themselves or by socially conscious individual artists drawn from the more 
privileged classes.  Such art remains, and will remain, important because it 
expresses truth, not about ‘the human situation’ in the abstract, but about real 
living situations broadly representative of life during the epochs of class rule and 
class struggle.  (Franklin 30) 
 
Though this project holds no stake in definitions of “art” as such, Franklin’s dictum does 
remind us of an inherent value in prison literature as a reflection of lived experience 
during specific historical eras—often necessarily a reflection representing the minority 
point of view.  As the field of Rhetoric and Composition continues to hold its focus upon 
underprivileged subjects (who very often get termed as “othered” in our field)  and their 
connection to writing, the archive of text that constitutes “prison literature” becomes an 
important one to consider.  Here we will find the surest instances of “others” engaging 
with their newly-gifted identities (sometimes of their own choosing, but more often not) 
as they consider the spaces that have led to such evaluations, as well as the desired 
identities that they can construct out of alternative readings of space and location.  In 
plain terms:  prisons seek to erase identity, and in so doing, they may lead inmates to 
fight back in order to protect or memorialize their own sense of person.   
 Studying the rhetorical power of such resistance is the goal of this project.  In 
focusing our attention on selected American prison texts (texts which are authored during 
periods of long-term incarceration), I hope to reveal a host of spatial considerations at 
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play as writers attempt to redress or “recalibrate” their identity.  Often working against 
the rhetorical power of the state itself, these writers find themselves easily marginalized 
and relocated to a position of nearly absolute powerlessness.  The texts chosen for 
analysis in this volume have been selected because they represent successful efforts at 
constructing, textually, new and alternative identities which locate their writers in a more 
positive light.  Occasionally, they even help relocate, at the literal level, their authors 
(chapter three concerns itself with the memoir of Rubin “Hurricane” Carter, a book which 
would lead directly to its author’s release from prison).   
 A major premise of this volume is that it deals in rhetorical space (as defined by 
Mountford above), and a few words on this must be shared.  As “rhetorical space,” we 
must understand concrete spaces and metaphorical spaces to be of equal value.  I admire 
Mountford’s elaboration of the term, in which she states: “Rhetorical spaces carry the 
residue of history upon them, but also, perhaps, something else:  a physical representation 
of relationships and ideas” (Mountford 42).  So it is that in rhetorically analyzing the 
spaces described in this volume, we may occasionally swing between a concrete space 
described literally, and those metaphorical spaces that may be suggested by the concrete, 
or otherwise abstracted for the purposes of gesturing towards relationships.  Important to 
me is that we deal in the political implications of space, and along these lines I am 
indebted to the rhetoricians who have paved the way for such discussions—rhetoricians 
such as Ellen Cushman, who in describing the concrete structure of “the Approach” at 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (connecting RPI to the community of Troy, New York) 
cannot avoid discussing as well the “deeply rooted sociological distances” between the 
school and the town (Cushman 8; see also Reynolds “Imagined Geographies”; Endres 
	   11	  
and Senda Cook).  Locations, then, are important to this project, but we must remember it 
is their rhetorical potential which is of main concern here. 
 The first chapter of this volume will explore the ways prison commonly gets 
spatialized, and how it, in turn, acts upon its inhabitants.  As a somewhat unlikely place 
to begin, Chapter One will start with an analysis of the book Newjack, in which the 
author, Ted Conover, shares the experience of serving for one year as a prison guard.  
While we expect (and this introduction has expounded upon this premise) prison to be of 
influence with regard its prisoners, an analysis of Newjack offers us a wealth of rhetorical 
spaces to consider, accessible through their impact upon a prison guard.  As we will see, 
a large part of prison’s identity-ordering potential comes from its reliance on binary logic 
(the most basic example being “good/bad”). Chapter One will explore how the structure 
of the prison itself results in a constant mindfulness of this binary, and suggest a power of 
the institution to replicate such binary thinking in its prisoners (and guards). 
 Chapter Two turns to the rhetorical actions of writers to redress their cultural 
evaluations (intimately tied, as they are, with location), and to begin a reclamation of 
their identity by playing the same spatial game.  It is a theory I call rhetorical 
cartography—a process by which location becomes rendered as text, and then used to 
suggest alternative identity.  In thinking through these two steps, we will explore the 
processes of spatial inventory, in which the author collects spaces to turn into text, and 
recalculation, in which the author grafts a new narrative (or identity) onto the spaces that 
define him/her.  Looking at the construction of identity created by Merle Haggard in his 
hit song “Mama Tried,” we will explore what it looks like when a prisoner engages in 
rhetorical cartography in order to justify the logic of the prison (a display of prison’s 
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logic internalized).  We will then move to efforts by Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm 
X, who in drawing attention to the inconsistencies of prison logic (and indeed, the logic 
of the nation itself), work to do the opposite. 
 Chapter Three extends the analyses of King and X to focus more specifically on 
African-American male prisoners writing during the American civil rights movement.  In 
particular, we will examine the work of Rubin “Hurricane” Carter, who—through a 
process of spatial inventory and recalculation—uses his memoir The 16th Round to refute 
the identity given him by the prison, and in so doing, earns himself a pardon.  This 
chapter will make the case for Carter’s use of rhetorical cartography, and explore both 
the successes and the limitations of his spatial instincts, which are intimately tied to his 
use of enthymeme, and his reliance on the works of his predecessors.  This example 
reveals the tendency of spatial arguments to gain weight as social movements, suggesting 
that a reclamation of identity may also serve as the invention of a group identity. 
 Chapter Four moves away from the African-American experience to take a look at 
the gendered experience of rhetorical cartography—specifically, that of incarcerated 
American females writing during the late years of the U.S. “war on drugs.”  A 
counterpoint to our examination of Carter, this chapter works with the feminist theories 
of Laurent Berlant to explore a cartographic awareness that is not driven by existing 
arguments, but by another binary:  that of fulfillment/disappointment.  Drawing on trends 
and themes in popular women’s literature, this chapter explores how rhetorical 
cartography can function in the absence of clearly-defined argumentative threads; yet 
still towards the recovery of the author’s own identity.   
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 This introduction began by questioning why it is time which gets so much 
attention in issues of incarceration when space is so often a focal point of those who live 
and work “inside.”  This thesis will work to give the space of the institution its due. 
Such a distinction may be somewhat invisible to us in modern times, but in concluding 
this introduction, let us consider two important spatial metaphors connected with prison:  
that of going “up the river,” and of going “to the big house.”  
 Both are rhetorical spaces, for they refer to the literal (specifically, the Ossining 
Correction Facility, more commonly known as “Sing Sing”), and the metaphorical (since 
these terms can be applied to any prison).  Important to me here is that we understand 
these terms to be labels of identity just as much as they are directions for movement:  
One who is going “up the river” is understood to be a criminal without ever invoking the 
word prison or the act that has put the individual in transit.  Moreover, we know that 
prisons involve many different types of people beyond merely criminals—the staff, the 
guards, the administrators.  And yet, we know someone going “to the big house” is not 
going there for work.  The identity suggested by these two spatial metaphors is firm. 
 The same is likely not true of one said to be “doing time,” and it is precisely 
because the location is left uncertain.  A child in time-out could be said to be “doing 
time,” as could the bored student, the tired civil servant, or the professional athlete 
waiting for his/her contract to expire.  Anyone can “do time,” and I suspect that we all 
self-identify in that way from time to time.  The temporal metaphor is largely malleable. 
 I present this comparison merely to get us thinking in terms of rhetorical space 
and its potential to write, re-write, or perhaps delete those who pass through it.  It can be 
dangerous, just as it can be opportune.  But above all, rhetorical space causes us to 
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become rhetorical actors when we interact with it, and it is this function that intrigues me 
the most.  In focusing on the prison, my aim is not to demonize rhetorical space, but to 

























THE PLACE OF THE PRISON AND THE IDENTITY OF THE PRISONER 
 
“What happened to me isn’t as bad as what happened to the [the prison guard who 
abused me], because this system has turned him into a beast, and it will turn his children 
into beasts.” 
         -Clyde Kennard 
 
 In conceiving of the space of the prison, we would do well to begin with a look at 
the book Newjack:  Guarding Sing Sing, whose narrator begins to spatialize the prison 
even before he has set foot within it: 
In one sense, Turner said, prisons were like little towns—with infirmaries their 
hospitals, commissaries their department stores, chapels their churches, exercise 
yards their parks, gyms their health club, mess halls their restaurants, and we a 
special sort of police department.  If our job title, “correction officer,” suggested a 
role in setting people straight, though, Turner suggested we think again.  Because 
in reality, he said, “rehabilitation is not our job.  The truth of it is that we are 
warehousers of human beings.”  And the prison was, above all, a storage unit.  
(Conover 41, emphasis added) 
 
So it is that author Ted Conover—a journalist-turned-prison-guard, for the sake of 
reporting on the experience of watching some of New York’s toughest prisoners—begins 
to spatialize the Ossining Correctional Facility, the prison which sits right “up the river”3 
from New York City, and which is more popularly referred to by its nickname “Sing 
Sing.”  And at this point, it is entirely mediated through his training instructor, “Turner.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Both	  of	  our	  spatial	  metaphors	  from	  the	  introduction	  (going	  “up	  the	  river”	  or	  “to	  the	  big	  house”)	  were	  coined	  in	  
reference	  to	  Sing	  Sing.	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 We might notice immediately the inventory of outside-world spaces used to give 
form to the prison as a whole:  hospitals, department stores, churches, parks, health clubs, 
and restaurants.  When these become rendered a “little town,” the prison itself becomes 
more understandable to Conover and his fellow cadets, just as Conover’s account allows 
some purchase on the institution, though we can note the way these spaces must be 
rendered abstractly before they can be realized as concrete—almost as  though the literal 
space would come as too much of a shock to the uninitiated.   
 And yet, I think starting with the abstract serves another purpose for Conover—it 
allows him to consider not just architecture, but those housed inside.  Notice too the way 
these comparisons offer some description of the people prison orders:  whether serving as 
“warehouser” or “warehoused,” the conception of the prison as warehouse offers very 
little in terms of evaluating these inhabitants (although it does an excellent job of 
characterizing Turner).  What we imagine is not a place crowded with violence or 
exploitation or oppression (all concepts we might ordinarily deploy for the image of a 
prison), but more of a docile, idle facility used simply for storage.  For a warehouse may 
be a place of movement as things to be stored come in and out, but its main purpose is to 
organize its contents and give them a place to sit undisturbed until needed. 
 Though this spatial conceit used by Conover (via Turner) may feel somewhat 
anticlimactic to those of us familiar with more sensational depictions of prison, we must 
understand even this early description of Sing Sing to be inherently focused on revising 
the existing (mis)conceptions of the prison:  this is not a place for working towards 
second chances or redemption; rather, it is a soul-less way station (a “storage unit”) for 
those who cannot be placed anywhere else.  If we as readers consider our own 
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connections to the analogues that make up our own “little town,” and our understanding 
of the warehouse, we arrive at a fairly basic understanding of the prison space. 
 Until, of course, that understanding is challenged by another.  For the sake of 
comparison, let us examine another description of prison authored by someone on the 
opposite side of the bars.  In the following passage, former Black Panther and accused 
murderer Mumia Abu-Jamal comments on the treatment of a former cellmate, “Rabbani,” 
who had been released after two decades spent in prison.  Using the same concept of 
prison as warehouse, we see Abu-Jamal paint a very different picture of the prison for the 
purposes of advocating reform: 
 For those critical years in the life of a male, from age fifteen to thirty, which 
 mark the transition from boy to man, Rabbani was entombed in a juridical, 
 psychic, temporal box branded with the false promise of “corrections.”  Like 
 tens of thousands of his generation, his time in hell equipped him with no skills 
 of value to either himself or his community.  He has been “corrected” in 
 precisely the same way that hundreds of thousands of others have been, that 
 is to say, warehoused in a vat that sears the very soul.  (Abu-Jamal 42, 
 emphasis added) 
 
The difference, quite obviously, is emotional.  Conover’s use of the same metaphor is 
somewhat disinterested, and lacking the first-hand experience that might allow for 
qualifiers.  Abu-Jamal signals his rage not only through loaded descriptors, but by way of 
mixed metaphors as well (“warehouses” and “vats”), as though a combination of 
imperfectly fitting images might get closer to the truth than one alone.   
 Of interest to me is that both Abu-Jamal and Turner share a similar metaphor as 
they begin to describe the prison, but for such drastically different purposes.  The 
comparison suggests what will be a major premise of this project:  that prison space is 
eternally a site of discourse, and as such, becomes arguably as valuable once abstracted 
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as it ever has been in the literal.  Prison is rhetorical space—it is the site of constant 
communicative events, whose geography is inscribed by many and concretized by none.  
Prison is multiple, being a space ensnared in dialectic; it is singular as well, as the 
abstracted, rhetorical space of prison is constant, whether one sits in Sing Sing, in New 
York, or Chino, in California.   
 As rhetorical space, then, prison affords us an unique insight into the agency of 
those who inhabit it; without whom, it would be meaningless.  The goal of this chapter is 
to examine what the prison space is, and how it acts upon its inhabitants (who then act 
upon it, which will be the domain of subsequent chapters).  In so doing, we should be 
ever mindful that prison is merely a site of opportunity—it is a location that affords us the 
ability to observe the interweaving of environment and inhabitant as place and identity 
are constructed.  As Thomas Rickert says of his ambient rhetoric:  “it dissolves the 
assumed separation between what is (privileged) human doing and what is passively 
material” (Rickert 3), allowing for a vision of rhetoric that is the result of unified 
environment and inhabitants.   So too does the prison dissolve such barriers, allowing us 
to explore intriguing examples of human agency as located in material confines. 
 
Part One: “And the prison was . . .” 
 Some of Conover’s earliest descriptions of the prison come, as we have seen, 
before he was assigned to duty at an actual prison.  But as these descriptions serve to 
orient him to the location mentally, once Conover begins his narrative of experience 
inside Sing Sing, he is often unable to escape the references to the way that his instructor, 
the ever-sardonic Turner, had explained it to him and his fellow trainees: 
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At the academy, prison had been likened to a village—a self-contained world with 
its own school, workshops, hospital, and so forth.  But what they didn’t say was 
that prison was also a microcosm of a totalitarian society, a nearly pure example 
of the police state.  The military provided the model for the chain of command; 
enlisted men and women were marshaled daily by their superior officers into a 
battle of wills with the mass of angry and resentful prisoners.  We who were in 
uniform controlled nearly every aspect of their lives.  And prison, more than any 
place I’d ever been, was about rules.  (Conover 95-6, emphasis added) 
 
Immediately notable is the way in which Conover here begins to redesign a terrain that 
had already been, though perhaps incompletely, mapped before: already known to 
Conover as something like a village, once on the job, the prison space becomes more.  
We might even note the way this paragraph itself is built on the structure of the excerpt 
that began this chapter:  beginning with the conceit of prison as town, and adding the 
inhabitants who move within this town, each passage then ends with an emphasis on 
some description-rendered-as-axiom (“And the prison was . . .”) that might offer a 
reductive (Turner-like) understanding of the prison. 
 But what is the difference?  Quite obviously, between these two paragraphs, 
Conover’s rendering of the space as text (his attempt to redesign the prison as he 
experiences it) has already been altered by his experiences with those inside.  The 
tranquil, perhaps innocuous “small town warehouse” of training has been replaced by a 
much less neutral comparison to the “totalitarian society” of the “police state.”  The 
prison itself is no longer made meaningful simply by its proximal relation to a “small 
town.”  In effect, the prison has been upgraded via this redesign to the extent that we now 
understand a crucial difference between Sing Sing and a “small town”:  authority is more 
pronounced here, and while it may smack of “totalitarianism” when applied to a 
municipality, in prison it is merely the natural order.  This space is heavily ordered, and 
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its inhabitants are defined by that order (you can either be on the controlling side—that of 
the guard—or you can be on the controlled side, where you are a prisoner). 
 Totalitarianism aside, Conover reveals what I suspect is a very common motivator 
among all inhabitants of prison:  once spatiality has been so convincingly arranged so as 
to ascribe a sense of definition to the people inside, those same people realize a kind of 
fluidity to their characters, and seek to carry on redesigning what has been subjected to 
order.  Thinking through this in another way:  once the rhetorical power/potential of 
space is revealed to these insiders (perhaps as simple as the realization that one has been 
placed in a “police state,” and is now subject to the surveillance that goes along with 
suspicion) they become converted into spatial agents eager to redefine that space, 
rhetorically, as they experience it.  If Conover feels the “small town” to need necessary 
adjustment via the “police state” image, it is likely a correction made in conjunction with 
his realization of himself as guard—in other words, it is not incidental that such re-
designing occurs once Conover has started working as a correctional officer. 
 Moreover, the quote above suggests an important facet to my argument thus far:  
it is not only the inmates who feel themselves ordered (identified) by the spatial logic of 
the prison.  The guards, too, feel such a change, and these new identities find themselves 
intimately connected to the spaces they seek to describe.  Our goal now should be to look 
at how Conover’s efforts to describe the place of the prison—Sing Sing, specifically—
reveal a desire to identify his own self.  In my reading of Conover, an exploration of the 
prison is very much an exploration of its inhabitants’ identities. 
 Let us look to Conover’s Newjack as a sort of “guided tour” through the prison—
one perhaps less interested, ultimately, in the discrete location of Sing Sing itself than it 
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is with a type of “essential” concept of prison as a space of rigid order and rich with 
rhetorical potential.  Important to my argument here is that we see prison—the 
conceptual, rhetorical space of prison—as a location which encourages those it orders to 
consider their own identities:  a kind of self-imposed order built around a very binary 
logic.   
On “The Block”:  Encouraging Order (and Ordering) 
 In describing the prison facility at Sing Sing, the first space Conover turns to is 
perhaps the most obvious:  that of the cellblock.  Broken up between two buildings, A-
block and B-block, the cellblock is the most basic (and perhaps most easily identified by 
outsiders, suggesting it as a kind of archetypal structure) location of the prison:  the main 
living quarters for most of the institution’s inmates.  Conover describes the cellblocks in 
terms that instantly familiar to anyone who has seen prison depicted in popular media:  
consisting of four or five levels of individual cells4 , each level is divided into two 
“galleries,” which are merely sections of cells set apart from each other by locked gates.  
Each floor contains, in addition to the inmates’ cells, an office for the guard on duty and a 
few open cells that feature shower facilities, which must be shared by the inmates on that 
particular gallery. 
 At the beginning of Newjack, Conover describes the cellblocks as, “the most 
impressive buildings in Sing Sing, and in a totally negative sense.  A large cathedral will 
inspire awe; a large cellblock, in my experience, will mainly horrify” (Conover 8, 
emphasis added).  Still working, then, with spatial metaphors that will allow his readers 
some purchase on the space, Conover focuses attention on the issue of size.  What is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  B-­‐block,	  the	  newer	  of	  the	  two	  structures,	  has	  five	  levels,	  where	  A-­‐block	  only	  has	  four.	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established immediately is the emotional reaction to large structures, and unspoken is the 
connection between architecture and intent5.  We know cathedrals to be intentionally 
large; that they will instill in viewers the insignificance of their own bodies and 
communicate the magnitude—the “awe,” as Conover puts it—of the divine, as well as the 
insignificance of the individual.  
 If the connection works, it will communicate to readers the intention of the 
architecture of the prison6.  Stunned by the sheer size of these buildings, Conover’s 
description feels right in line with the type of prison settings frequently depicted in films 
such as The Shawshank Redemption, The Green Mile, Down by Law, or even the HBO 
series Oz—frequently large, symmetrical structures of iron bars and walkways which 
afford inmates a view only of the cells across the building from them.  Sing Sing’s 
galleries are described as having floor space in the middle of each gallery, with lines 
painted on the flow to suggest a pattern for the flow of traffic. 
 Rigid control, then, becomes the work of the prison architecture, as it seeks to 
isolate inmates from guards and each other.  More important than separation, perhaps, is 
the way such fragmentation of inhabitants necessarily leads them to bend to the will of 
the state, physically and mentally7.  Separating prisoners into galleries means that an 
officer must be present to unlock routes to the rest of the prison, and those painted lines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Goethe,	  in	  his	  On	  German	  Architecture,	  makes	  this	  connection	  plain—indeed,	  in	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  
cathedrals	  to	  “oppress	  the	  soul,”	  Goethe	  seems	  to	  be	  suggesting	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  interchangeability	  between	  the	  
architecture	  of	  the	  cathedral,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  prison	  (see	  von	  Mücke	  10).	  
6	  For	  more	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  prison	  architecture,	  see	  Smith	  and	  Bergman,	  whose	  work	  on	  the	  “memory	  
space”	  of	  Alcatraz	  Prison	  is	  rich	  with	  descriptions	  of	  sensory	  details	  worked	  into	  public	  tours	  of	  the	  space.	  	  As	  
the	  authors	  claim,	  such	  details	  work	  to	  constantly	  remind	  visitors	  of	  the	  “freedom/incarceration	  dichotomy”	  
that	  is	  made	  physical	  by	  Alcatraz	  (Smith	  and	  Bergman	  180).	  
7	  Such	  connection	  between	  the	  architecture	  of	  prison	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  human	  lives	  sounds	  quite	  
sensational.	  	  It	  is	  not.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  has	  been	  part	  of	  the	  philosophy	  behind	  prison	  architecture	  since	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  
modern	  prison.	  	  As	  Elam	  Lynds,	  tyrannical	  warden	  of	  Auburn,	  and	  later	  Sing-­‐Sing,	  made	  clear	  upon	  his	  original	  
design	  of	  the	  prison	  in	  1830:	  	  “reformation	  of	  the	  criminal	  [can]	  not	  possibly	  be	  effected,	  until	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  
criminal	  [is]	  broken”	  (Gill	  313).	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on the floor mean that even the footsteps that fall upon concrete must be rigorously 
controlled.  We might compare such lines to those painted on a street or highway, and 
when we consider the function of those lines (to prevent the dangerous collisions of 
individual cars), we realize something horrifying indeed about the inhabitants of this 
place. 
 Importantly, these buildings are always understood as old—for comparison sake, 
consider the prison shown in The Shawshank Redemption8, which, even allowing for its 
setting in the 1950s and 60s, would appear very similar to Conover’s Sing Sing of the late 
1990s.  For Conover, who uses the occasion of the prison’s age to discuss its operational 
legacy, the visual markers of age seem to connect the inhabitants of the prison to the 
ongoing debate over how best to control crime and rehabilitate offenders. 
 
Elam Lynds and the Legacy of Arbitrary Order 
 In criminal justice conversations, Sing Sing is referred to as a prison following the 
“Auburn Model” of incarceration, a reference to New York’s second modern prison, 
Auburn (now referred to as “Auburn Correctional Facility”).  The “Auburn Model” is one 
half of 19th century America’s desire to solve the newfound social problems of 
modernization and industrialization, rivaling the “Pennsylvania Model” (or “separate 
system”), which sought to keep all prisoners in perpetual silence and penitent reflection.  
Both models form the basis for correctional facilities still in use today (many of which 
take a hybrid stance, using components of both systems), but the distinction between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  Shawshank	  Redemption’s	  prison	  scenes	  were	  filmed	  largely	  at	  The	  Ohio	  State	  Reformatory,	  a	  prison	  first	  
opened	  in	  1896.	  	  Though	  Sing	  Sing	  itself	  was	  first	  opened	  seventy	  years	  prior,	  in	  1826,	  the	  cellblock	  layout,	  
especially	  A-­‐block,	  would	  not	  be	  entirely	  different	  from	  that	  seen	  in	  the	  film.	  	  Conover	  notes	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
his	  assignment,	  the	  original	  blockhouse,	  built	  in	  1825,	  was	  unused.	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Auburn and Pennsylvania models underscores a very spatial way of thinking about the 
issue of crime, and such distinctions need to be understood here before continuing with 
Conover. 
 Though ostensibly in search of the same goal—“reformation” of inmates, or in 
more lofty terms, the solution to the problem of crime—these two competing models 
sought two contrasting ideas about how best to use space as rehabilitation.  As such, they 
reflect fundamentally different ideas about the causes of crime inherent to the young 
American nation, as well as different expectations for the institution that would be born 
(Rothman 82). 
 According to historian David Rothman, both systems encouraged silent reflection 
on the part of criminals (a focus on “penitence” would lead to these institutions being 
deemed “penitentiaries”), and sought to cultivate a work ethic that would better server the 
emerging industrial economy.  Where they differed was simply in the underlying ideas on 
how best to encourage that penitence in an effort to establish a disciplined routine.  
Speaking of the Auburn (alternatively known as the “congregate”) model, Rothman 
writes: 
Under the Auburn scheme, prisoners were to sleep alone in a cell at night and 
labor together in a workshop during the day for the course of their fixed sentences 
in the penitentiary.  They were forbidden to converse with fellow inmates or even 
exchange glances while on the job, at meals, or in their cells.  (Rothman 82) 
 
So serious was the prison’s dedication to isolation and anonymity, in fact, that those 
incarcerated in prisons built under the Pennsylvania model were often made to wear 
restrictive masks when in transit from place to place, so that knowledge of their identities 
would not disrupt the inmates’ penitent reflection. 
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 It was under this system as well that prisons first saw the use of striped uniforms 
and the “lockstep” march, in which prisoners held the shoulder of the man in front of 
them as they marched, in unison, through the prison facility9.  Predicated on instilling 
work ethic and depriving inmates of the opportunity to fraternize as criminals, the 
congregate model seems to have followed the prevailing logic of the newly-industrialized 
America, treating inmates as pieces of an industrial machinery and bracing them against 
their inclinations toward criminality.  More than anything, this model stressed a work 
routine and absolute conformity with rules and regulations—a philosophy that 
underscores the then-widespread belief that the root of all crime came from idleness, or 
poor work ethic. 
 That these innovations in control occurred largely under the tenure of one man—
the warden Elam Lynds—is mentioned so frequently in Conover’s discussion of the 
cellblocks suggests that at least part of the “horror” Conover ascribes to the environment 
is its direct connection to the practices of a more brutal time.  As Lynds’ actions are 
frequently referred to in the same narrative spaces in which Conover takes time to 
describe the prison, we might be tempted to see Lynds’ presence (whether specter or 
story) as part of the architecture itself. 
 For in the late years of the 20th century, such ideas were still alive in institutions 
that have adapted from the Auburn model10.  Elam Lynds may have been railroaded out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Innovations	  which	  were	  developed	  under	  the	  tenure	  of	  Elam	  Lynds,	  first	  at	  Auburn	  (1821-­‐1825)	  and	  then	  at	  
Sing	  Sing	  (1825-­‐1830).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Lynds,	  a	  strict	  disciplinarian,	  ruled	  both	  Auburn	  and	  Sing	  
Sing	  by	  threat	  of	  violence	  to	  inmates—specifically	  favoring	  lashings	  with	  the	  “cat-­‐‘o-­‐nine-­‐tails”—and	  fell	  out	  of	  
favor	  in	  American	  penality	  when	  his	  brutal	  methods	  of	  punishment,	  reported	  by	  visitors	  to	  the	  new	  institutions,	  
became	  seen	  as	  barbaric	  and	  largely	  ineffective	  (see	  Conover	  171-­‐81).	  
10	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  “Auburn	  Model”	  eventually	  won	  out	  over	  the	  Pennsylvania/Separate	  model,	  though	  
what	  we	  see	  in	  modern	  prisons	  is	  very	  much	  a	  mutation	  of	  both.	  	  Though	  overcrowding	  concerns	  would	  make	  
the	  isolation	  of	  prisoners	  at	  night	  time	  impossible,	  modern	  prisons	  still	  function	  largely	  like	  those	  belonging	  to	  
the	  Auburn	  camp	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century;	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Pennsylvania	  model	  can	  still	  be	  seen	  in	  isolated	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of prison administration when Americans became aware of his tyrannical obsession with 
order and punishment, but as Conover shows in his walk through the cellblocks, such 
obsessions are still quite evident in the Sing Sing of the 1990s. 
 According to Conover’s narrative, guards assigned to the cellblocks are typically 
given a floor, consisting of two “galleries,” to oversee for their shift.  These guards, 
during a day shift, are tasked with unlocking the correct cells at the correct time (porters, 
for example, are released earlier in the day to begin their work; those on disciplinary 
“keeplock” status are released much later in the day, usually only for long enough to eat 
or shower).  In addition, each officer is tasked with making sure inmates get to the mess 
hall, the showers, the exercise yard, or to their jobs on time, and with issuing reports or 
complaints to the administrators in different parts of the prison complex should any of 
this go awry (from Conover’s narrative, we understand that something typically does). 
 While the construction of the cellblocks seems to have been guided by a sense of 
order and semi-isolation (as befitting of the original Auburn system), in Conover’s 
account the A- and B-blocks feel more like a chaotic circus of arbitrary rules, which get 
applied in arbitrary ways.  In part, this arbitrariness feels a product of the overwhelming 
task put before these guards, who must not only work to control and order a large block 
of cells (usually consisting of two or three inmates a piece), but must do so across the 
barred barrier that divides the two galleries (an incident in one gallery requires a guard 
like Conover to unlock the barrier between the two, move in, and relock that barrier 
before he or she might actually get to the conflict).  In this very important instance, the 
arbitrariness seems to be the combination of design flaw and limited financial resources:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
housing	  assignments,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  “solitary”	  in	  popular	  media,	  and	  the	  “SHU”	  (segregated	  housing	  
units)	  by	  those	  who	  have	  been	  there.	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the task is simply too large for a single officer to manage successfully, and there just 
aren’t the resources to give each officer his or her own gallery. 
 But to the extent that such arbitrariness is endemic across all prisons, we might 
question the underlying logic keeping it in place, and such an investigation inevitably 
leads us back to Elam Lynds and his legacy of dehumanizing inmates.   Abu-Jamal 
speaks of inhabiting prison as being “’on tilt’ [mentally off-balance] by state design” 
(Abu-Jamal 24-5), a characteristic which Goffman explains actually  helps to keep 
institutions in order:  
 Given echelon authority and regulations that are diffuse, novel, and strictly 
 enforced, we may expect inmates, especially new ones, to live with chronic 
 anxiety about breaking the rules and the consequence of breaking them [ . . .] 
 total institutions disrupt or defile precisely those actions that in civil society 
 have the role of attesting to the actor and those in his presence that he has   
 some command over his world [ . . .] (Goffman 42-3, emphasis added) 
 
In short, by being both ambiguous about regulations, and at the same time emphatic about 
the consequences should they be broken, the total institution gains a measure of 
compliance.  But it does so at the expense of the inmate’s understanding of his or her self.  
 
Part Two:  “On the Block” and “In the SHU”:  The Effects of Prison’s Space 
 Let us explore this in regards to “contraband,” which Conover discusses often in 
Newjack.  In writing of contraband, Conover relates incidents in which inmates flaunt 
possessions such as an illegal radio antenna extension than juts out into the gallery11,  and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Inmates	  in	  Sing	  Sing	  are	  restricted	  from	  having	  telescoping	  antennas,	  which	  can	  be	  turned	  into	  “zip	  guns.”	  	  
They	  are	  allowed	  instead	  to	  use	  wire	  dipole	  antennas,	  which	  the	  inmates	  drape	  around	  their	  cells	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  pick	  up	  radio	  signals	  through	  the	  thick	  walls	  of	  the	  cellblock	  (Conover	  97).	  	  The	  inmate	  referenced	  above	  was	  
found	  to	  have	  a	  very	  long	  telescoping	  antenna,	  of	  the	  contraband	  sort,	  which	  he	  had	  extended	  well	  out	  into	  the	  
gallery	  (beyond	  the	  bars	  of	  his	  cell)	  in	  order	  to	  pick	  up	  radio	  signals.	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a stolen heating element from a kitchen stove12.  Technically, the list of what inmates are 
allowed to have in their cells is very short—remember, as Goffman has made clear, 
removal of personal possessions is an important first step in mortification (Goffman 18-
9).  Most items an inmate is likely to have in his or her cell could be considered 
contraband, and even seemingly innocuous items like newspapers can be deemed 
contraband if the inmate begins a collection13.   
 However, allowances are constantly made for these items on a very arbitrary 
basis.  Conover himself allows an inmate to keep his contraband radio antenna, as long as 
the inmate agrees to retract it back within the confines of the cell (a compromise as much 
about keeping it out of view of the other inmates as it is about preventing accidents as 
people walk around it; Conover 97).  In another instance, the author seizes a contraband 
heating element with plans to turn it over to the administration and issue disciplinary 
action.  But when another guard discovers the heating element at the gallery guard’s 
station, he quickly returns it, telling Conover that the inmate is a “good guy.” 
 In Conover’s account, guards’ and administrators’ discretion is constantly being 
used in this arbitrary way—some guards have closer relationships with the inmates on 
their galleries, and thus allow more flexibility in those inmates’ day-to-day activities.  We 
might see this as a small reprieve from the heavy-handed rules that govern the institution, 
but in Conover’s view, it tends to only exacerbate disorder when new or temporary 
guards are brought in to the gallery for a shift and must—not unlike a substitute 
teacher—encounter demands from their inmates based on familiarity with the previous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Such	  contraband	  would	  be	  used	  by	  inmates	  for	  cooking	  in	  their	  cells:	  	  an	  illegal	  action	  at	  Sing	  Sing,	  as	  it	  can	  be	  
a	  fire	  hazard	  (Conover	  105).	  
13	  At	  Sing	  Sing,	  an	  inmate	  is	  allowed	  to	  have	  no	  more	  than	  14	  newspapers	  at	  a	  time	  (Conover	  100).	  	  Conover	  
seems	  perplexed	  by	  the	  number,	  though	  I	  think	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  this	  as	  yet	  another	  arbitrary	  rule	  aimed	  at	  
keeping	  prisoners	  “on	  tilt.”	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guard; demands which frequently run contrary to the official rules.  If the temporary 
guard is firm in his or her refusal to accommodate, the prisoners act out, sometimes 
violently.  If the guard should give in, he or she could face serious punishment from the 
administration if discovered.  In short, someone is going to be subject to the arbitrary 
rules and/or arbitrary punishment of the prison—the guards, as inhabitants themselves, do 
not escape this order. 
 Inter-guard communications seem to be lacking as well, and when a guard on a 
previous shift forgets to alert an incoming guard of special privileges (a porter might need 
an early shower before reporting to work) or punishments (the list of “keeplocks,” who 
are rarely let out of their cells, changes nearly every day) for an inmate on his or her 
gallery, that next guard frequently finds a fight waiting as he or she works to discern the 
truth from the inmates themselves—and this even as the guard tries to maintain the 
normal schedule of the block.  Thus, in a very literal sense to Conover, description of the 
cellblocks is quite incomplete without some account of the arbitrariness that resides over 
all. 
 Such hardships are not uncommon, and certainly part of the expected workload of 
a guard such as Conover.  What is of note to us in these instances of chaos amid supposed 
order is the way it keeps prisoners and guards alike “on tilt.”  No matter what side of the 
bars you’re on, the environment of the cellblock keeps one constantly alert for changing 
rules and situations, and never knowing exactly what to expect from their supposedly 
“ordered” society.  I believe such confusion works in two important ways to set up the 
need for engagement with identity among those inside. 
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 First, such arbitrariness allows just enough doubt into one’s postionality within 
the prison space:  Am I a “keeplock” today because I did something wrong, or did 
someone just not tell the guard I could be let out?  This makes the notion of improving 
one’s position seem possible, which is surely what “corrections” must aim for:  the 
understanding that one can become better.  And if a prisoner does desire to improve his 
or her position, what better way than by playing along with the rules? 
 But even more importantly, though perhaps a bi-product of this first feature 
described above, the location itself can been seen as a motivating factor for the prisoner 
looking to reclaim his or her identity.  For if you don’t know where you are, it becomes 
hard to know who you are, and thus as the prison takes away possessions and enforces an 
arbitrary system of rules to keep prisoners “on tilt,” so too does it encourage these 
prisoners to fight to reclaim the scraps of humanity not destroyed by mortification.  The 
service the prison seems to offer most readily is to call order perpetually into question, 
which is certainly disorder by any definition.  And yet against such contradictory 
operations, inhabitants of prison—even the guards themselves—seem to exhibit a desire 
to order themselves. 
 The point here is important enough to be restated plainly:  the architecture itself 
suggests a quest for order that goes all the way back to Lynds’ uniforms and “lockstep” 
marches; however, the lived experience of those on the inside reveals that order (and with 
it, a firmness of identity) seems to be constantly, and intentionally disrupted14.  Thus, an 
institution which constructs itself around the simply binary of “order/disorder,” for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  In	  keeping	  with	  our	  focus	  on	  rhetorical	  space,	  I	  have	  a	  host	  of	  things	  in	  mind	  when	  I	  invoke	  the	  word	  
“architecture”:	  	  not	  only	  the	  bars	  and	  concrete,	  but	  the	  guards	  inside	  who	  figure	  into	  the	  enforcement	  of	  order,	  
and	  even	  the	  symbolic	  gestures	  like	  lines	  painted	  on	  the	  floor	  to	  direct	  traffic	  flow.	  	  As	  Mountford	  herself	  notes,	  
history	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  with	  rhetorical	  space	  (Mountford42),	  so	  we	  can	  add	  to	  this	  list	  the	  
“Auburn”	  model	  of	  incarceration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ghostly	  figure	  of	  Elam	  Lynds.	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stated purpose of encouraging the former, only ends up shuttling inmates and guards alike 
back and forth between the two.   
 What we arrive at, ultimately, is a place where the identity that order can provide 
is rendered nearly unknowable.  An inmate may find himself daily locked behind bars, 
which should suggest to him or her a fairly static identity.  But the marriage of 
arbitrariness with the pursuit of order creates a cognitive hurdle for those affected.  Their 
terrain, while visible, is rendered: unmappable:  a postmodern condition famously 
proposed by theorist Fredric Jameson. 
 
Castles and Klan Meetings:  “Cognitive Mapping” on “the Block” 
 Let us consider an exchange, already mentioned above, in which Conover, newly-
minted as prison guard, is put in a position in which he has to enforce a rule which calls 
into sharp relief the arbitrariness of prison.  It takes place upon Conover discovering an 
inmate in his gallery has somehow come in possession of a telescoping radio antenna (see 
footnote 6), which he has extended through the bars of his cell and out into the gallery 
itself: 
“You’re gonna have to take this down,” I advised him the first time I brushed 
against it. 
 “Why’s that?” 
 “Because it’s in my space.” 
 “But I can’t hear if it’s in my cell.” 
 “Sorry.  Try stringing it up higher on your bars.” 
“Sorry?  You ain’t sorry.  Why say you sorry if you ain’t sorry?  And where’d you 
get to be an authority on antennas?  They teach you that in the Academy?” 
“Look, you know the rule.  No antenna at all outside the cell.  I could just take it if 
I wanted.  I’m not taking it.  I’m just telling you to bring it in.” 
 “You didn’t tell that guy down there to bring his in, did you?  The white guy?” 
I looked in the direction he indicated.  There were no other antennas in tubes, and 
I said so. 
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“You’re just picking on the black man, aren’t you?  Well, have a good time at 
your Klan meeting tonight,” he spat out.  “Have a pleasant afternoon.  You’ve 
ruined mine.”  (Conover 98, emphasis added) 
 
I think we see some interesting spatial moves at play here, and they revolve around 
Conover’s inability to justify the rule he’s trying to enforce.  In essence, the rule being 
violated is one of the antenna itself, not the space it occupies.  Telescoping antennas can 
be turned into “zip guns” by inmates, by which a quickly retracted antenna frame can be 
used to fire a small caliber projectile.   
 But when challenged to justify the rule, Conover moves into a spatial (which 
quickly becomes racial) argument:  “Because it’s in my space.”  In the author’s mind, the 
space that belongs to him is really no more than the common space of the gallery floor.  
His job is to make sure that space is clear at all times, and an antenna extending out into 
the gallery is not only illegal in its own right (a violation Conover is not prepared to 
enforce), but is potentially hazardous, should someone walk into it. 
 But that’s not the “my space” that the inmate reads.  By the time the conversation 
concludes with a gesture towards a “Klan meeting,” the space has become something 
quite different.  Notice, so does Conover.  No longer is he merely a guard performing his 
duty; he is now a racist “picking on the black man,” and this transformation is due largely 
to the inmate’s quick “remapping” of the binary terrain he occupies:  no longer a 
“convict/guard” distinction, the space becomes a “white/black” one. 
 In truth, I think such mapping is fictive for the prisoner, whose suggestion that 
Conover will be going to a Klan meeting later that night really signals the fact that his 
efforts are rhetorical.  But to the degree that this largely powerless individual has 
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rhetorically reconfigured the “my space” Conover mentions, it is worth further 
exploration here. 
 According to Fredric Jameson, who describes modern spatiality for its impact on 
identity in his article “Cognitive Mapping,” the postmodern condition—supposing, as it 
does, a fragmentation of society based in actual and perceived locations—has interrupted 
the way individuals have traditionally defined themselves.  As Jameson describes it, the 
birth of industrialization and the emerging cityscapes that grew in its wake form the basis 
of this postmodern condition, and work to create an uncertainty in the minds of citizens 
regarding the spaces they inhabit.  In other terms, this industrialization created a 
“redrawing,” via the circulation of capital, of the knowable places to which people 
belong. 
 Such theory becomes clearer through descriptive analogy:  imagine, in a feudal 
setting, the serf/monarch relationship in regards to power.  A serf, likely living on the 
fringes of the monarch’s castle grounds, could understand his figurative place in the 
economy—that is, his rank and status—easily enough by perceiving the distance between 
him and the king he served.  That distance could be physical, as in the actual barriers 
between himself and the monarch (gates and walls); it could also be cultural, as the king 
would have enjoyed economic benefits that set him apart from his subjects, as the serf, 
handing over portions of his efforts to the king, largely struggled to survive.  For 
Jameson, that ability to map oneself into part of an economy is essential, and is insured 
largely by an ability to understand the economy to which each individual belonged:  “[. . 
.] In the early stages of market capital the immediate and limited experience of 
individuals is still able to encompass and coincide with the true economic and social form 
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that governs that experience” (Jameson 158).  In other words, understanding the economy 
itself makes it possible for one to understand his/her relationship with power:  that is, his 
or her space. 
 In large part, this same ability to know one’s rank and status by understanding the 
economy—the process Jameson labels “cognitive mapping”—remained more or less 
constant through the ages, until the point of industrialization.  An individual’s 
understanding of his/her role within economies was, until industrialization, not 
challenged by an unknowable or abstracted dimension of that economy.  Let us consider 
farmers in a young, primarily agrarian America:  though they might be separated by 
considerable distance from the bankers and politicians who stood at the top of their 
economy, the farmers themselves could at least intuit how that economy played out, 
giving them the ability to know their role in it.  This was not remarkably different from 
much earlier economic systems (our fictional serf and monarch, for example), even as 
technology improved and actual distances grew larger.   
 But at the advent of industrialization, spatial considerations seemed to change 
drastically:  people became more mobile in their work, and cities began to sprout in order 
to house them all in close proximity to one another (and, importantly, to those they 
worked for).  Moreover, local economies became abstracted as they began intersecting 
with other, distant economies.  Jameson explains: 
At this point the phenomenological experience of the individual subject—
traditionally, the supreme raw materials of the work of art—becomes limited to a 
tiny corner of the social world, a fixed-camera view of a certain section of 
London or the countryside or whatever.  But the truth of that experience no longer 
coincides with the place in which it takes place.  The truth of that limited daily 
experience of London lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong Kong; it is bound 
up with the whole colonial system of the British Empire that determines the very 
quality of the individual’s subjective life.  Yet those structures are no longer 
	   35	  
accessible to immediate lived experience and are often not even conceptualizable 
for most people.  (Jameson 158) 
 
So it is that at this point, Jameson suggests, economies simply become too intricate and 
complex—and let us not forget, too distant—to allow one to “cognitively map” one’s self 
within it.  This inability, as Jameson sees it, leads to a fragmentation of the individual 
from the society that was once so simply defined; as a result, he or she becomes less able 
to define his or her self.  The effort at “cognitive mapping” becomes nearly impossible.  
How does one keep track of one’s connection to power when that power may exist in a 
different hemisphere?  Roles become less clear as distances become incalculable.  From 
the viewpoint of Jameson, this postmodern uncertainty amounts to a fracture in the way 
individuals create themselves in accordance with the world around them, and this fracture 
occurs at precisely the junction of spatiality and identity. 
 With such challenges to identity in mind, I think we begin to see the exchange 
between Conover and inmate with the antenna as more than a simple bout of rhetorical 
sparring.  For what is most challenging to the inmate is his inability to connect with (or 
even fathom) the logic of the prison economy, which is so often driven by the 
arbitrariness described above that its status as logic is strained.  What could possibly be 
the reason for taking issue with a radio antenna?  If the administration tried to explain 
such reasoning to him (that is, if they tried to reduce the distance between the inmate and 
the economy of prison rules), the jump to proclaiming Conover a racist might never have 
happened.  As it stands, though, the inmate is unable to conceive of any rationale behind 
the offense other than his own skin color, and so Conover becomes simply a racist 
looking to give him a hard time. 
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 And Conover doesn’t help that effort at cognitive mapping much himself.  He 
doesn’t explain the rule to the inmate.  He doesn’t even follow the rule, which would 
require him to confiscate the antenna immediately.  Perhaps too far removed from the 
economy of prison rules himself, all he is able to do is resort to a territorial “my space” 
kind of logic that makes the jump to racist accusations all the more likely.  Important to 
my argument is that both of the agents in this exchange are kept at a distance from the 
true power structure of the prison—that which decides the rules—and so neither of them 
are able to understand their “place” within it.  In large part, the identities they fall back 
upon are merely roles that the prison seems to suggest—that of strict authoritarian and the 
ever-resistant ward.   
 
Rigidity and Reproduction in “the SHU” 
 Such adherence to rules becomes amplified even more when the stakes are driven 
higher.  The Special Housing Unit (referred alternatively throughout works of prison 
literature as the SHU, the “shoe,” the “hole,” or simply “the box”) is perhaps the most 
common focal point of prison studies and fiction.  The descriptions Conover offers of this 
environment feel in many ways to represent the actual status of the SHU itself—it is set 
up much like a small cellblock, with two floors of two galleries each (still using barred 
gates to separate inmates from the cellblock floor, rather than the solid steel doors so 
often portrayed in popular culture); the top floor is reserved for those placed in the SHU 
for protective custody (where a proximity to the general population may be life-
threatening), and the bottom floor is reserved for the most offensive and violent of 
offenders.  The SHU, then, reveals through design what its main function is to become:  
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if we have a tendency to map prisons out as small towns, then the SHU is the prison’s 
prison. 
 Conover’s first descriptions of the SHU reveal the way that it serves to amplify 
the already restrictive environment of the prison: 
What made it fundamentally different from the other housing units of Sing Sing 
was that its inmates did not, as a rule, leave the building; in fact, they barely left 
their cells.  Meals were delivered in the Styrofoam “clamshells” that restaurants 
use for take-out orders; library books, for those granted access to them, were 
wheeled in on a cart; inmate barbers were brought in to clip Box inmates one at a 
time at the end of the short galleries; even disciplinary hearings were conducted in 
the individual cells.  (Conover 127, emphasis added) 
 
 Solitary confinement tends to conjure up images of monsters inhabiting dark 
dungeons—likely a product of Hollywood’s reverie for the space—and it is surprising in 
this regard to find Conover verifying such fantasies in his discussion of the SHU.  In 
sharing the details of his first visit, Conover quickly sets his experience against one of 
film’s more enduring images:  “I thought of Clarice Starling approaching Hannibal 
Lecter’s cell in The Silence of the Lambs” (Conover 128).  As if calibrating himself to 
such standards, the author then continues on with a list of infamous figures to have 
occupied Sing Sing’s SHU15, as though this rogue’s gallery serves as sufficient 
explanation for modern society’s best approximation of the medieval dungeon.  Read 
another way:  the identities of these “monsters” warrants a space equally as monstrous. 
 But the most interesting part of Conover’s experience is watching the way the 
“author Conover” and the “guard Conover” do battle over with each other against 
assumptions.  Opening the section with a quote from Jack Henry Abbott’s In the Belly of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Including	  “Son	  of	  Sam”	  killer	  David	  Berkowitz	  and	  an	  inmate	  named	  Lemuel	  Smith,	  infamous	  among	  Sing	  Sing	  
guards	  for	  his	  tricking	  of	  a	  female	  correctional	  officer	  at	  Elmira	  Prison	  (in	  upstate	  New	  York).	  	  Smith	  lured	  the	  
officer	  into	  a	  meeting	  with	  him	  in	  an	  empty	  chaplain’s	  office,	  only	  to	  rape	  and	  strangle	  her	  (Conover	  128).	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the Beast (which compares solitary confinement to death), we understand right away that 
the journalist finds the environment troubling, and that even the guard may find his 
heartstrings being tugged at.  We are presented with images of cockroaches and filth 
found within a SHU inmate’s cell, and set against this the “homemade” chess sets that 
prisons frequently create from found items (toothpaste caps, cardboard, etc.) just to help 
pass the time.  Conover, the author, seems to be troubled by a society that would treat 
men in this way. 
 But Conover the guard is unable to dwell on such ideas.  When the author is 
tagged for a cell search duty in the SHU, he finds himself almost instantly transformed by 
the donning of riot gear, in a very visible sign of the power of “roles” mentioned earlier: 
A dozen of us marched purposefully downstairs to the Box.  There was action 
ahead, and I felt suddenly excited to have been included.  Despite the ominous 
tone, and my better instincts, I’d encountered enough inmate misbehavior and 
disrespect to feel invigorated by the thought that this is where it all stops.  This is 
where we draw the line.  We were going to follow the rules, and we were going to 
have our way.  (Conover 131, emphasis in original) 
 
In rather stark terms, there is a clear sense of unity brought about by the act of “suiting 
up” and filing down into the lower galleries of the SHU.  It is interesting to note that as 
prison itself inscribes some firm binaries upon its inhabitants (the “criminal/lawman” 
binary, or, reduced even further, the “good/bad”), Conover himself treats such binarism 
fairly critically throughout the pages of Newjack.  As a journalist, the author has a clear 
penchant for questioning such binaries, showing us the truly “bad” correctional officers 
he must work with, as well as the respectful, startlingly civil prisoners that he encounters 
daily.  As investigative journalism, Newjack seems to be an invitation to question 
prison’s binaries, and hence, the legitimacy of the carceral system itself. 
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 But in the SHU, at least as he gets ready to search the cells with his paramilitary 
brothers, all bets are off.  Almost instantly, Conover becomes supportive of the 
established “good/bad” binary logic of the prison, going so far as to “draw a line” 
between himself and the inmates.  Missing are the “I”s that populate most of Conover’s 
shared experiences; in their place, the suspicious “we”:  “This is where we draw the line.  
We were going to follow the rules, and we were going to have our way.”  Without much 
narrative prompting then, Conover becomes multiple, and focused like a laser beam on 
the rules—a questionable edict handed down from a similarly plural (and largely 
unknowable) administration, which he has not shown much interest in previously 
(compare this to the event of the contraband antenna).  The prison—here, the SHU—has 
asked Conover to play a role, and he seems to jump into it without much thought. 
 This is not to speak harshly of Conover, though, for just as easily as he dons the 
vestments and attitudes of the disciplinarian, the inmates of the SHU are quick to fall into 
their prescribed roles too.  One particular inmate, referred to by Conover as “Lincoln 
George,” stubbornly refuses to consent to a visual strip search.  Conover assures the 
inmate that they just need to take a look at him; that no one is interested in checking body 
cavities on that day.  Still, George refuses, arousing suspicion among Conover’s fellow 
guards until they decide to forcibly remove George from his cell, knock him violently to 
the floor, and haul him into the less hostile upper floors to proceed with their inspection. 
 That they find nothing on George comes as little surprise to the reader, for what 
does an inmate have to conceal when he is locked behind steel bars for nearly every hour 
of the day?  But Lincoln George’s stubborn refusal to consent to the search, even 
knowing that his actions would be more detrimental than the results of the search itself, 
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serves to confirm our ongoing ideas about the space of the prison and the roles that it 
enforces among its inhabitants.  George wasn’t hiding anything.  He had simply refused 
to comply because it was his position to play.  Just as Conover’s “team” had decided to 
“draw a line,” George was more than happy to pick the side he was expected to stand on.  
Another way to think this through:  the prison not only suggests a very rhetorical space 
to its inhabitants, but it instructs them as to where they should locate themselves within 
that space.  As Conover later questions the incident, his earlier motives appear shaken 
when he considers the breakdown of this space: 
By refusing this small violation of his [George’s] privacy, he’d earned himself a 
big violation.  What could account for an action so apparently contrary to his best 
interests?  My idea of his best interests, I later concluded, was colored by the 
team I was on.  Eventually, it occurred to me that self-respect had required him to 
refuse.  His stupidity began to look principled.  He was renouncing his 
imprisonment, our authority, and the entire system that had placed him there.  
(Conover 135, emphasis added) 
 
Thinking through this event with an eye for rhetorical space, I think we, as readers, are 
less surprised than Conover at the outcome, as we see that the inmate is merely acting in 
a manner consistent with the role his immediate location has provided for him.  What 
Conover sees as “stupidity” is colored largely by the “side” Conover has been assigned, 
and interestingly, once he is “despatialized” (via the act of writing about the event, as 
objectively as he can), the same behavior exhibited by George tends to look “principled,” 
and an act of “self-respect.” 
 I think Conover may give George a bit too much credit in this regard.  We as 
readers have no way of knowing more about George—the narrative does not revisit him, 
as Conover himself is only temporarily assigned to the SHU—but the little information 
we are presented with here does offer enough to consider George’s move not as one of 
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“renouncing his imprisonment” or even Conover’s authority.  In much the same way that 
Conover himself moved quickly into the guard “team” without much pause for 
consideration, George’s stubbornness strikes me as a behavior more based in binary 
reaction than in principled protest.  I tend to doubt that George conceived as his refusal as 
a type of protest.  More likely, his behavior was simply dictated by the postionality he 
found himself placed within—one not only influenced by the bars he is locked behind, 
but by the side of the “line” that he found himself on.  In a spatial way—rhetorically 
spatial, that is—George is perhaps less responsible for his behavior than the guards who 
decided to place him on an opposing team all by himself, rending the entire episode as 
one we can attribute more to environmental stimulus than conscious decision. 
 So what is more surprising to this investigation is Conover’s behavior, not 
George’s.  How could such an evidently liberal actor become so clearly moved into a 
reactionary binarism so quickly?  And why was the transformation not more obvious to 
him? 
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault traces the origin of the penal institution to 
arrive at the conclusions that its emergence is inseparably linked to exactly the type of 
postmodern “unmappability” suggested by Jameson:  The prison, as a modern form of 
discipline, exists as it does to help order a society that is becoming increasingly less able 
to order itself.  In his chapter “Complete and Austere Institutions,” Foucault examines the 
way that modern prisons arose in tandem with the changing ways in which we 
characterize, and thus order, criminals.  Prior to the advent of postmodern economies and 
a reliance on incarceration as the discipline par excellence, criminals in need of 
punishment were more frequently labeled (and thus, conceived of as) “offenders,” 
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placing an emphasis on the specific infraction that created the need for their punishment.  
Rothman agrees, pointing out that this focus on specific crimes and correction (or 
punishment) of them was handled in a much more communal—what I read as spatially 
firm—way in Colonial America (Rothman 40-5).  Towns and municipalities seeking to 
remedy their own problems did so as discrete communities.  An “offender” needed to be 
corrected or punished, because he or she was still, at the end of the day, a member of that 
community.  Exile was reserved for the most heinous offenses, but the lack of mobility 
that made such punishment drastic was also what made it improbable:  better to resolve 
these issues here at home than to hope they can be transported elsewhere.  Rothman 
characterizes early Colonial Americans as a people disinterested in institutions (Rothman 
46), and if we consider institutional mechanisms as attempts to order and locate society, 
we can understand why:  they simply hadn’t the need for such order.  Society itself was 
small enough—and, importantly to Jameson, so was the economy—that citizens were 
able to locate themselves much more easily, and the need for an institution to do 
corrective work in this regard was unnecessary.   
 As discussed above, the developing of complex economies led to a strained ability 
to “map” one’s self in relation to the experience of those economies, and it was at this 
time that the term “offender” was substituted for the more essential “delinquent,” which 
Foucault argues more permanently defines and orders an individual:  “The delinquent is 
to be distinguished from the offender by the fact that it is not so much his act as his life 
that is relevant in characterizing him [sic]” (Foucault 251, emphasis added).  Intriguing, 
then, that just as individuals become less able to locate themselves in a communal 
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economy, governments become interested in taking on that locational act by taxonomical 
measures. 
 But with Foucault’s notion of order, as a function of the institution, comes an 
unexpected result with implications for Conover and Lincoln George:  these newly-
ordered classes become rigidly dependent upon their new status, and may end up 
reproducing the behavior for which they were originally ordered.  As Foucault notes: 
It is said that the prison fabricated delinquents; it is true that it brings back, almost 
inevitably, before the courts those who have been sent there.  But it also fabricates 
them in the sense that it has introduced into the operation of the law and the 
offence, the judge and the offender, the condemned man and the executioner, the 
non-corporal reality of the delinquency that links them together and, for a century 
and a half, has caught them in the same trap.  (Foucault 255) 
 
Where Foucault prefers the term fabricating, I would like to posit that mapping—in terms 
of Jameson’s cognitive uncertainty about terrain in the postmodern era—is a more 
productive term for describing the actions of the prison complex upon its inhabitants:  
quite literally and figuratively, the modern prison ascribes order to those judged “order-
less”; turns “offenders” into “delinquents.”  It does so, in fact, to such a large extent that 
Foucault sees delinquency, prison, and police functioning as a tripartite machine in which 
delinquency gets produced in prison (and in the judicial system, which leads there) and 
then circulated outside, where it can be monitored by the police (Foucault 282).  Such 
delinquency in the larger social context becomes a manifestation of power for the 
dominant class, who now have the ability to differentiate and economize delinquents, 
ensuring that those in power take advantage of illegalities which are reserved for them 
(Foucault 272).  And of course, mapping a delinquent class makes sure that those 
involved don’t confuse themselves with the dominant at the top.   
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 For Foucault, prison sets out to order the “order-less,” and in so doing, creates a 
class (an identity that multiple subjects can hold on to) that reproduces the lack of order 
that gives them shape.  But there’s a larger point to be made about the power structure at 
the top.  As Foucault suggests, this dominant class in fact puts the taxonomical interest of 
incarceration to work for insuring its own continual power, and to prove this, he sets out 
to consider the societal outcry on behalf of prison reform that accentuates each step of 
prison’s evolution (see also Rothman).  Lamenting the “failures of prison” (to reform, to 
educate, to reintroduce to society, etc.), Foucault insists that these aggrieved parties 
represented by prison reformists actually support the unstated “mission” of the prison.  
For it’s clear that these “failures” actually work in favor of the dominant elite, who, 
through newfound taxonomical order, have tightened their grip on a fragmenting society.  
It would be mistaken for us to think that these institutions would seek to actually re-map 
(as a theoretical alternative term for “reform” or “reintroduce”) this class of citizenry into 
the mainstream, for that society is largely un-mapped, or at least still groping for the 
filiations that create for them an identity.  Once order is established by creating an 
individual as a “delinquent,” and once the prison has given a locational order to that class 
to help individual members realize that identity of “delinquent,” it would actually be 
counterproductive to the dominant class to undo its own taxonomy, and to send these 
individuals back out into a world where they could be identified, at best, as “former 
delinquents.”  Such a term corrupts the logic behind its creation. 
 So for Foucault, not only does the prison reproduce disorder by identifying 
“offenders” as the “order-less,” but it actually thrives off such reproduction of 
orderlessness.  Power, conceived of here as order, actually requires flirtations with a lack 
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of power in order to be meaningful.  We might see this trend more easily through a 
connection to arguments about power found in the field of Rhetoric and Composition:  
we can easily compare Foucault’s identification of power in carceral settings to 
arguments like that of Sharon Crowley against the “gatekeeper” role expected of college 
writing teachers.  For Crowley, legitimization of our field (teaching “good English”) 
requires that some students out there must need our instruction (more pessimistically put, 
some students must be “bad” at English).  Crowley’s point is that our power stems from 
our ability to point out the powerlessness in others (Crowley 70-2), and so it is with 
Foucault’s notion of prison power.  We encourage the reproduction of disorder so that we 
can serve as agents of order. 
 Such ideas about reproduction hold clear implications for Conover as regards his 
rally for the guard “team” and his run-in with Lincoln George.  What we see in this 
exchange, located as it is in the “prison within a prison,” is a brief glimpse into 
Foucault’s thoughts on the rigidity of state-defined identity, as well as its ability to 
reproduce disorder.  George, having done nothing wrong (on the day in question, at 
least), still found himself unable to break away from the “delinquent” identity assigned to 
him (which is surely solidified more by the time he has spent in the SHU), and so his act 
of defiance is merely the only option left to him.  Conover calls this action a 
“renouncing” of the institution and the authority of the guards, an evaluation that 
supposes more thoughtful introspection than I feel comfortable claiming for George.  I 
would argue instead that George was renouncing nothing; that he was simply offering the 
type of response that the state claimed of his type—he refused order.  And importantly, 
his refusal was already anticipated by the state (here, in the form of the riot-geared search 
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team and the dungeon-like setting of the SHU), allowing him very little choice in how he 
could respond. 
 The same is true of Conover, who, once so critical of his fellow guards (at least as 
they were driven to violence and conflict), jumps quickly into the riot gear of his 
colleagues:  his job in this place is to ensure order, and the reason for the search was the 
fear of disorder.  I’m not claiming the author should be blamed for his behavior—such 
judgment forgets the spatiality of the prison itself.  The location of the prison creates an 
identity for its inhabitants (it, in effect, draws that “line” that Conover mentions), and 
those inhabitants, once initiated, simply play out the roles that their environment dictates. 
 We might consider here the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment of Philip 
Zimbardo, in which students were randomly assigned the roles “prisoner” and “guard” to 
play in a mock prison constructed on the Stanford campus.  Despite these participants’ 
similarities in reality, Zimbardo’s “line” (represented by the two roles assigned) had the 
effect of affecting a brutal violence in the participants designated “guard” upon those 
marked “prisoner.”  So profound was the resulting transformation in ordinary college 
students that Zimbardo terminated his experiment within six days, fearing actual harm 
might befall his subjects (see Zimbardo).  Such anecdotes suggest what I have been 
indicating with regards to prison’s ordering:  that the need for order produces an 
architecture (a rhetorical space) which quickly reconfigures the identities of its 
inhabitants. 
 Conover leaves us with another, as he closes out his section on the SHU:  that of 
Thomas Mott Osborne, a prominent and politically-connected prison reform advocate of 
the early 20th century, who famously submitted himself to confinement at Auburn in 
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1913.  His goal, like Conover, was to write a book about the experiences in order to 
reveal the lived-experience of penality with the American public.  As Conover relates, 
Osborne refused to do his assigned job in prison (likely to make a point), and was himself 
sentenced to solitary confinement.  In Osborne’s book Within Prison Walls, the author 
offers his own violent reaction when the warden came to offer release only a few hours 
later: 
At the sight of his uniform a fierce anger suddenly blazes up within me and then I 
turn cold [. . .] I am seized by a mild fit of that lunatic obstinacy which I have 
once or twice seen glaring out of the eyes of men interviewed by the Warden 
down here; the obstinacy that has often in the course of history caused men to die 
of hunger and thirst in their cages of stone or iron, rather than gain freedom by 
submission to injustice or tyranny. (Osborne, qtd. in Conover 135-6) 
 
Like the participants of the Zimbardo experiment, Osborne was “incarcerated” for only a 
week.   
 
Part Three:  “. . . warehoused in a vat that sears the very soul.” 
 We see clearly, then, that the rhetorical space of prison has the power to produce 
(and reproduce) identities detrimental to those it holds.  Whether “delinquent” inmate or 
conflict-prone guard, the space itself tends to transform those who enter it, even for small 
amounts of time.   
 But we have now the task of understanding how prison inhabitants resist such 
identification, for if their identities as “delinquents” (or worse) are enacted by rhetorically 
by space, it suggests that such identities may be subject to further rhetorical action.  
Might the inmate be able to argue against the prison space; to reclaim his or her own 
identity, or at the very least, to challenge the mapping of identity constructed by the 
prison space? 
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 In working to understand such possibilities, I want to return once more to an 
excerpt which began this chapter—that of Mumia Abu-Jamal: 
 For those critical years in the life of a male, from age fifteen to thirty, which 
 mark the transition from boy to man, Rabbani was entombed in a juridical, 
 psychic, temporal box branded with the false promise of “corrections.”  Like 
 tens of thousands of his generation, his time in hell equipped him with no  skills 
 of value to either himself or his community.  He has been “corrected” in 
 precisely the same way that hundreds of thousands of others have been, that 
 is to say, warehoused in a vat that sears the very soul.  (Abu-Jamal 42, 
 emphasis added) 
 
 When we find prison inhabitants utilizing location to express their own identities 
(a dog pound obviously befits only someone who is a dog; that is to say, without 
humanity), it becomes easy to see the merging of location and identity.  Any aim at 
rehabilitation, as Abu-Jamal suggests with his repeated focus on “corrections,” is largely 
illusory when one considers the space in which such corrections occur.  Faith in this logic 
betrays the fact that we don’t even need to do much labeling anymore—we simply put 
the criminals where they’ll be likely to label themselves:  “The pen,” “the ghetto,” and of 
course, “the warehouse.”   
 As we have seen in the discussion of Foucault above, much of the prison’s work 
as an environment is to hold those deemed—not by action, but by character—to be 
offensive.   By rendering a part of the population as a class of chronic, perhaps 
uncontrollable delinquents, we in fact work to draw for them a map of power—one in 
which the positionality of importance is merely who is on top, and who is pushed to the 
bottom.  So it is that location becomes an essential tool for labeling people—a lesson that 
prisoners such as Abu-Jamal have learned too well. 
 So when Abu-Jamal calls his location a “dog pen” or “warehouse,” he joins a 
sizeable fraternity of those looking to construct the prison according to their own 
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perception of marginalized identity:  “the ghetto” (see Kerman; Chapter Four), “hell” (see 
Lamb; Carter; Chapters Three and Four), “concentration camp” (see Carter; Kerman; 
Chapters Three and Four), or “plantation” (see Haley and X; Carter; Chapters Two and 
Three).  All are, of course, delinquents—that much Foucault (and the legal system) has 
pointed out for us—but we must notice too that a conception of the location they inhabit 
changes quickly according to the oppression they feel within.  These are exaggerations, 
surely—expressions of personal pain and alienation, amplified for the sake of pressing 
home a sense of emotion.   
 So when we believe we understand the location of prison, what we are inherently 
accepting as well is a set of tacit assumptions about those who reside therein.  The prison 
makes the prisoner, who in response, tries to re-map or re-organize the prison according 
to his or her perceived identity.  Gresham Sykes shares, in his book The Society of 
Captives, the insights of one (anonymous) New Jersey State Prison inmate who 
humorously notes:  “The worst thing about prison is you have to live with other 
prisoners” (Sykes 77).  Though a somewhat flippant, Yogi Berra-like aside, the inmate 
does point out an interesting question whose answer, I suspect, is not as obvious as we 
might think:  which came first, the prisoner (identity), or the prison (location)? 
 I’ll attend to this question in time, though I ask it here simply to frame our 
ongoing exploration of the prison space and how it affects all within.  With Conover 
we’ve noted how prison encourages the adoption of roles for those who are not 
incarcerated.  However, as the above examples can attest, exploring the development of a 
prisoner identity (and trying to keep it separate from the prison itself) becomes a 
somewhat trying endeavor.  Recalling Goffman, we can see quite clearly these prisoners 
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struggling with a process of mortification—that is, the process through which their vision 
of self has been stripped of them—as they attempt to define their locations according to 
how such visions have necessarily changed.  When an inmate such as Mumia Abu-Jamal 
labels his prison a “dog pen,” he is necessarily labeling himself (in accordance with his 
perception of self) as a “dog.”   
 And yet we don’t for a second believe Abu-Jamal to be accepting that.  Dogs 
don’t question their identities.  They don’t attempt to call into question the design of their 
pens.  Dogs don’t write.  So what Abu-Jamal, and others making similar claims, seem to 
be doing is pointing out the inconsistencies of prison’s intentions—in the words of 
rhetorician Jeffrey Walker, he is creating an exetastic buildup, made, “in order to 
generate in its audience a passional identification with or adherence to a particular 
stance, and that (ideally) will strike the audience as an ‘abrupt’ and decisive flash of 
insight” (Walker 53, emphasis added). 
 Such is the basis of Walker’s thoughts on enthymeme, that informal logical 
structure which serves to persuade with style and, importantly, stance.  Read another 
way:  style and location.  The definitions of enthymeme are infirm enough16 to warrant 
further explication from Walker:  “What remains characteristic of the enthymeme today, I 
think, is that it is a stylistically intensified argumentative turn that serves not only to draw 
conclusions but also, and decisively, to foreground stance and motivate identification 
with that stance (Walker 55, emphasis added). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Walker	  himself	  notes	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  modern	  theories	  of	  enthymeme,	  which	  are	  alternatively	  read	  
as	  “rhetorical	  syllogism”	  or	  “a	  kind	  of	  syllogism”	  (in	  keeping	  with	  Aristotle’s	  comments	  in	  Rhetoric),	  or	  as	  a	  
“Toulminian	  argument”	  in	  which	  certain	  warrants	  are	  omitted,	  to	  be	  filled	  in	  by	  an	  audience	  (Walker	  46).	  	  What	  
neither	  of	  these	  definitions	  highlights	  are	  the	  two	  elements	  Walker	  finds	  most	  important	  to	  enthymeme:	  	  that	  of	  
style	  and	  stance.	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 So in a move that will be very important for the remainder of this project (more 
on this in Chapters 2-4), we see in prisoners attempting to revise the design of their 
prisons a tendency to use enthymeme in order to draw their audience in more closely.  
There are at least two rhetorical spaces at play, then:  the fictionalized, reworked location 
of the exetastic buildup (the “dog pen” or “ghetto”), and the abstracted space of 
identification17 with which the author connects to his or her audience (the “my side” or 
“their side”, if rendered simplistically).  However, a third is clearly operative:  the literal, 
brick-and-mortar (and bars) setting of the prison institution itself, from which the inmate 
writes.  Thus it is that a concrete setting of the prison itself becomes rendered as 
rhetorical space, as it encourages a response to its own process of mortification.  The 
pivot point:  inmate identity, which is acted upon by the literal prison to produce a 
figurative one.   
 Back to our question, then, of what came first?  In a very literal sense it is, of 
course, the institution which serves as precursor to the entirety of what develops within 
its walls.  And it must be.  But in terms of rhetorical space, the point of origination is 
difficult to discern, and I believe it is in large part due to the dialectical nature between 
the prison and the prisoner.  The prison (and, according to Foucault, the justice system as 
a whole) creates the prisoner, who in turn creates his or her version of the prison as a 
response to mortification.  To the degree that prisons encourage a circulation of the texts 
written about them18, such “recreated,” rhetorical prisons then work back into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  I	  use	  this	  term,	  as	  does	  Walker,	  in	  the	  sense	  established	  by	  Kenneth	  Burke	  in	  A	  Rhetoric	  of	  Motives.	  	  For	  Burke,	  
“identification”	  (or	  more	  simply,	  “belonging”)	  is	  rhetorical	  (Burke	  28).	  	  I	  simply	  wish	  to	  push	  it	  a	  bit	  farther	  and	  
claim	  it	  as	  rhetorical	  space.	  
18	  See	  Foucault	  35,	  75.	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conception of the brick-and-mortar facility, which picks up once again in a vitriolic, 
dehumanizing spiral.   
 But all this is not as terrible as it sounds.  The goal of this project is not simply to 
point out the dialectical nature of prison and prisoner focused on the junction of location 
and identity. For once these prisoners begin to gain some measure of control over their 
rhetorical space—the prison that they can be said to redesign, or as will be used in 
subsequent chapters, “re-map”—we note a series of rather interesting rhetorical moves 
which speak to the power of rhetoric to order space (and thereby, identity).  As we move 
now towards exclusive study of inmate-authored texts, such moves will be the focal point 


















RHETORICAL CARTOGRAPHY AND PRISON WRITERS 
 
And I turned twenty-one in prison, doing life without parole. 
No one could steer me right, but Mama tried, Mama tried. 
       - Merle Haggard 
Part One:  “ . . . only me to blame, ‘cause Mama tried.” 
 Country music legend Merle Haggard may seem an unlikely a place to begin a 
conversation on prison’s rhetorical space; however, a closer look at Haggard’s “Mama 
Tried” reveals a subtle spatial inventory which may help guide our thoughts about how it 
is prison writers locate themselves within an intricate web of positionality.  In “Mama 
Tried,” Haggard’s fictionalized speaker19 shares perhaps not  the discrete spaces that 
become so much of an American prisoner’s life, as much as a directionality that may 
inform one’s occupation of such spaces: 
 The first thing I remember knowing/ Was a lonesome whistle blowing/ 
 And a young’un’s dream of growing up to ride, 
 On a freight train leaving town/ Not knowing where I’m bound/ 
 And no one could change my mind but Mama tried. (Haggard) 
 
Not content with a dull life, Haggard’s protagonist dreams of leaving town and heading 
off for a life of adventure—a concept that feels ruggedly connected with the “bad types” 
who will influence this voice’s life in counterproductive ways.  Important to this 
narrator—one who doesn’t need to know where he’s headed—is that “young’un’s dream” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Haggard	  indeed	  turned	  21	  in	  prison,	  serving	  a	  sentence	  at	  California’s	  San	  Quentin	  Prison	  for	  attempted	  
escape	  of	  the	  jail	  facility	  he	  had	  been	  incarcerated	  in	  for	  robbery.	  	  The	  fictionalized	  character	  of	  “Mama	  Tried,”	  
however,	  is	  serving	  life	  without	  parole	  (no	  crime	  is	  ever	  revealed	  in	  the	  song),	  suggesting	  a	  much	  more	  serious	  
offense	  than	  any	  Haggard	  was	  ever	  charged	  with.	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of christening his adulthood with an escape from the presumably dull life of the town that 
his mother tries so hard to align him with. 
 This town feels vague in the context of the song, though Haggard’s narrator does 
attempt to fashion it as a more fully-realized location.  Interestingly, Haggard’s speaker 
clings to a bit of Southern pride in his hints of rebellion and religion, which certainly 
gives us a better context for his location, but also forms a much more culturally-
located—and thus, once again, rhetorical—place for us to consider: 
 One and only rebel child/ From a family meek and mild/ 
 My mama seemed to know what lay in store. 
 Despite all my Sunday learning/ Towards the bad I kept on turning/ 
 Till Mama couldn’t hold me anymore. (Haggard, emphasis added) 
 
I read several important spatial references in this second verse:  the “rebel child” which 
connects this speaker to the Confederate ethos that permeates the South; the “family 
meek and mild,” which serves as both a reflection of that Southern pride, and as an 
important starting point for this speaker’s narrative; the “Sunday learning” which 
indicates a potential path of salvation, set against the actual path of “bad,” rendered here 
as a location because of the speaker’s revealed agency of “turning.”  
What this voice wants, then, is all that Southern pride, honor, and religion seems to 
exclude—the vice and “bad” influence that forms a path away from a mother who tries to 
steer her young son back to the socially acceptable society.  That steering is obvious—it 
is the plot point around which this entire narrative hangs—yet at some point the binary 
Haggard establishes (between the “goodness” of the town and its customs and the 
“badness” that must exist outside those boundaries) becomes too unstable for the 
speaker’s mother to continue her advocacy.  
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We see here a close alliance of identity and positionality:  despite the best efforts 
of this speaker’s mother to keep him as a part of the community, his dreams of wandering 
and his unhappiness with his broken family at home lead him to be the kind of person 
perhaps undeserving of the kind of community in which he’s been raised—put more 
succinctly, he becomes a person deserving of incarceration, according to the modern 
logic of the criminal justice system, with its inherent focus on binaries. 
In an interesting twist, then, Haggard’s speaker in “Mama Tried” serves to justify 
the logic of the prison, even as he sits locked within it—what historian H. Bruce Franklin 
considers an important revelation of the predominantly white attitudes towards 
incarceration of his time (Franklin 270-1).  Once again we see a binary created:  good 
people can live in the free world, with their mothers (likely because of that parental 
control); bad people must be removed from that world, and locked away with our 
speaker.  It is an adherence to a binary that would serve Haggard in much of his musical 
catalogue, including his later hit “Okie From Muskogee,” in which the Midwest 
Oklahoma town of Haggard’s imagination becomes a location of conservative holdout 
against the hippy culture of 1960s America.  These songs render their narrators largely by 
listing what the narrator is not. 
The most important point here, then, is that despite a first-hand experience with 
the losing end of prison’s binary space, Haggard’s narrator (and arguably Haggard 
himself) endorses the attempts of incarceration to rhetorically define him (remember that 
“bad” is not only an identity here, but a location, as it is set apart from the path of those 
who chose to follow the “goodness” of religion), and ends up following that logic as he 
attempts to rhetorically define himself. 
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 Figure 2.1 works to “map” Haggard’s understanding of the binary logic of prison 
as it is set up during the early part of the song20.  Easily defined as a choice between good 
and bad (which in our understanding of the setting can be read as “freedom” versus 
“prison,” as these are the guarantees of such spaces), Haggard’s narrator finds himself 
unwilling (or perhaps unable) to follow the sponsorship of his mother towards that 
“good” space of the town.  It remains a path that he understands as an option, but my 
reading of “Mama Tried” suggests that the town is best understood as a known quantity 
to this narrator.  More exciting is the alternative life that seems to be romanticized to 
Haggard (we can consider the predominance of songs about trains and travel in country 
music at the time to be a likely influence on a young narrator like Haggard), and which he 
intends to romanticize himself. 
 
Fig. 2.1 – “The Binary Logic of the Prison, in ‘Mama Tried.’” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  I	  use	  the	  terms	  “map”	  and	  “mapping”	  here	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  Jameson’s	  thoughts	  on	  “cognitive	  mapping,”	  in	  
which	  complex	  spatiality	  makes	  it	  necessary	  to	  chart	  one’s	  perceived	  postitionality	  (see	  Chapter	  One	  for	  more	  
on	  this).	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 The interesting thing about this reading of prison’s binary power is that Haggard’s 
narrator, once incarcerated, does not work to propose an alternative worldview that would 
challenge his incarceration.  A map of this narrator’s rhetorical construction of identity of 
himself after having been incarcerated would look essentially the same as Fig. 2.1; 
indeed, this is the purpose of “Mama Tried”—the narrator needs to explain that he is 
remorseful, and that he understands why he is locked up.  In constructing himself 
rhetorically, then, Haggard’s speaker seems only to accept the definition of his identity 
offered by the prison and the law, and to explain his own life story using the mapping 
provided him by the state.  If there is any motive here which is not simply following the 
logic of the prison, it is the implicit understanding that someone accepting of such 
binarism must really be changed; ready to try again on the outside.  It is a rhetorical move 
that has been tried many times before—consider the popular image of the “Uncle Tom” 
house slaves of the pre-Civil War era, who constantly validate the racist logic of their 
owners in order to stay in good favor (and importantly, to stay in the house).   
Such validation must be read as rhetorical, for it involves a person defined 
through symbolic language (prison inmate, slave, etc.) attempting to embrace such 
definition in order to preserve some shred of filiation or favor.  Here, then, we see 
Haggard’s narrator as a victim of efforts made toward his own redefinition; his only 
recourse, it seems, is to double down on such logic and cast himself in the logic of his 
masters21.  In the language of Goffman, Haggard’s song may be the ultimate step in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Though	  perhaps	  ancillary	  to	  the	  discussion	  here,	  I	  think	  we	  must	  read	  “Mama	  Tried”	  as	  a	  bit	  of	  subversion,	  
even	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  demonstrate	  some	  sincerity	  in	  its	  words.	  	  If	  we	  compare,	  again,	  “Mama	  Tried”	  with	  Haggard’s	  
later	  “Okie	  From	  Muskogee,”	  we	  see	  a	  host	  of	  autobiographical	  threads	  being	  pulled	  from	  Haggard’s	  own	  
experience	  and	  then	  worked	  into	  the	  prevailing	  logic	  of	  the	  communities	  he	  speaks	  from	  within.	  	  Lines	  such	  as,	  
“We	  don’t	  smoke	  marijuana	  in	  Muskogee;	  We	  don’t	  take	  our	  trips	  on	  LSD,”	  feel	  nearly	  sarcastic	  in	  conjunction	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mortification—the sign that our inmate narrator has finally been stripped of his former 
identity, and fully ordered by the state. 
David Bartholomae, in his article “Inventing the University,” claims rhetorical 
action as, “an act of aggression disguised as an act of charity” (Bartholomae 65), and 
though it is a very simple point made in the service of his analysis of freshmen placement 
essays, it is in this spirit that I want to question the mortification that seems to be 
exhibited by a song like “Mama Tried.”  Bartholomae’s point in “Inventing” is that 
rhetorical action, when rendered as aggression, can serve to cripple the voices of those 
students who find themselves suddenly dropped into a new rhetorical space to which 
they know they do not yet belong.  In large part then, our notion of this “aggression” rests 
upon a foundation of place and identity coming together in the service of persuasion. 
 We might consider, then, the ways rhetoricians have previously considered the 
intersection of place and identity—an intersection that frequently comes into relief during 
considerations of ethos.  Michael Halloran, in his 1982 article “Aristotle’s Concept of 
Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else’s,” works at a historical recovery of ethos by turning 
his attention to the appeal’s spatiality, which he believes to be an important element of 
the term that history may have overlooked.  In his research, it is proposed that the 
meaning we typically ascribe to the term ethos may be ignorant of the classical notions of 
the term, which emphasized convention and a very public character, as opposed to the 
rather individualized, idiosyncratic character we often find in rhetoric textbooks22.  As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with	  the	  historical	  details	  of	  Haggard’s	  famously	  “outlaw”	  life.	  	  So	  as	  Haggard	  appears	  to	  validate	  the	  logic	  of	  
prison	  in	  “Mama	  Tried,”	  we	  might	  be	  wise	  to	  consider	  such	  statements	  as	  a	  bit	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek.	  
However,	  for	  this	  project,	  the	  important	  reading	  is	  the	  one	  that	  Haggard’s	  audiences	  were	  likely	  to	  agree	  upon.	  	  
Singing	  so	  often	  as	  a	  type	  of	  mouthpiece	  for	  the	  “Silent	  Majority”	  in	  1960s/70s	  America,	  we	  are	  probably	  wise	  to	  
consider	  his	  rhetorical	  self-­‐identification	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  validate	  the	  popular	  logic	  of	  the	  times,	  for	  good	  or	  bad.	  
22	  Here,	  let	  us	  consider	  the	  typical	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ethos,	  as	  we	  might	  find	  it	  presented	  in	  a	  freshman	  
composition	  classroom.	  	  In	  the	  popular	  textbook	  Writing	  Arguments	  by	  John	  D.	  Ramage,	  John	  C.	  Bean,	  and	  June	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Halloran explains, “The most concrete meaning given for [ethos] in the Greek lexicon is 
‘a habitual gathering place,’ and I suspect that it is upon this image of people gathering 
together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas, that its meaning as character 
rests” (Halloran 60).  Taking his etymological argument a bit further, Halloran claims 
that the possession of ethos by an individual—along the lines of popular modern 
definitions of the term—is actually useful for establishing that individual as one being in 
possession of the virtues shared by the culture he/she is assumed to be speaking for.  
Thus, we find ethos to be a fairly communal, inherently spatial appeal—not merely the 
touting of one’s qualifications for the sake of claiming credibility, but the understanding 
of the space one inhabits so as to find credibility in the shared assumptions of the 
collective (for a similar conception of space and rhetorical invention, see Rickert). 
Such theorizing of ethos can be a very positive construction to offer those who 
have filiations through which they can gain an identity.  But what about those who have 
no filiations?  It is they, I would suggest, who often become the victims of the type of 
aggression Bartholomae laments:  those whose identity holds no connection to the larger 
community (or perhaps those whose connection has been removed), and who are cast as 
“outsiders” in order to reveal their powerlessness.  In a larger scope, the denial of identity 
at the hands of rhetorical action is necessarily vague—exemplified in Bartholomae’s 
rather limited notion of “aggression.”  But for the project at hand, Goffman’s concept of 
mortification serves us as an example of rhetorical aggression when limited to a very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Johnson,	  ethos	  is	  described	  thusly:	  	  “Ethos	  (Greek	  for	  “character”)	  focuses	  attention	  on	  the	  writer’s	  (or	  speaker’s)	  
character	  as	  it	  is	  projected	  in	  the	  message.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  writer”	  (Ramage	  et	  al.	  62,	  emphasis	  
in	  original).	  	  Such	  a	  definition—seemingly	  targeting	  only	  the	  writer/speaker	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity—is	  not	  
dissimilar	  to	  those	  found	  in	  other	  such	  textbooks.	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specific context:  that of prisoners, who are purposefully stripped of identity as they enter 
the rhetorical space of the prison. 
 Taking it as her point to directly address Halloran’s argument, and expand on its 
implications for discovering power, Nedra Reynolds examines the social weight of 
discussions of ethos in her 1993 article, “Ethos as Location:  New Sites for 
Understanding Discursive Authority.”  For Reynolds, the most important feature of 
Halloran’s work is its acknowledgement of ethos as a social construction, which belies a 
responsibility on behalf of the community doing the constructing: 
The idea of ethos as a social construction, in which subjects are formed by the 
habits of their culture, belies the charges that ethos can be “faked” or manipulated 
[. . .] When ethos is, as in the Nicomachean Ethics, a result of experience and 
instruction, it becomes a shared enterprise among members of the community, 
and the community decides, in turn, what constitutes justice, temperance, bravery, 
or ethics. (Reynolds, 328) 
 
In Reynolds’ reading, then, we might consider the labeling of “offender,” “delinquent,” 
or even “prisoner” as the rhetorical efforts of a community to praise itself for its good 
qualities, and punish those bodies who fail to fall in line.  That such labels often carry a 
reduced opportunity for freedom strikes me as a particularly aggressive—in keeping with 
Bartholomae—use of rhetoric, cleverly disguised as social progress.  It is the 
“warehouse” disguising itself as the reformatory. 
 The application of this socially-constructed ethos to incarcerated writers is a 
seemingly underserved line of inquiry (the Cheliotis article discussed earlier is a 
wonderful exception). However, the field of Rhetoric and Composition has long busied 
itself with inquiries along these lines where students are involved, especially since the 
“social turn” of the field in the late 1980s and 90s, in which rhetoricians became 
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increasingly concerned with accounting for the spaces in which composition occurs.  
Notable in this line of conversation is the work of Ellen Cushman, who, in in her 1996 
article “The Rhetorician as Agent of Social Change,” advances the notion of 
institutionally-located (the university is her institution of choice) teachers and 
rhetoricians “bridging with communities” for the purpose of empowering those 
traditionally left “outside” the university (Cushman 22).  Reflecting a vision of ethos as 
described by Halloran and Reynolds, Cushman charts the environment of her then 
university of Rensselaer Polytechnic as a means of accounting for the separation of 
academics and citizens experienced in Troy, New York.  Finding that the environmental 
features of the school (designed with the best of intentions, we are assured) serve to 
marginalize those outside the campus boundaries, Cushman invites her audience to 
consider Rensselaer (as a synecdoche for all universities) as rhetorical space, advocating 
that such a vision might be productively used to help break down “the sociological 
barriers between universities and communities” (Cushman 12).   
This call for activism speaks to what I’ve been hinting at as rhetorical aggression, 
which we might best understand as the efforts of a power structure to nullify the power of 
its constituents (whether knowingly or unknowingly) by using rhetorical space to reveal a 
distance between individual interlocutors and a privileged discourse.  Cushman arrives at 
the same point in “Rhetorician,” noting that those labeled anything other than “academic” 
find themselves uncomfortably mapped by the inhabitants of Rensselaer, who let their 
“bridges” to the community erode with time into something more like “barriers.”  For 
Cushman, the goal of the rhetorician should be to prevent such aggression, and to make 
spaces more inclusive, rather than exclusive.  While I certainly find such imperatives 
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rewarding, it is my goal here to note, instead, how victims of this aggression respond to 
such distancing, for it may be that these “outgroups” are fully aware of their 
victimization, and already have the necessary tools to transform it. 
 
The Cartographic Impulse 
 I would like to advance a notion of rhetorical cartography at play in these 
instances:  a concept which has recently been at work in many pieces of rhetorical 
scholarship—namely, that of Ronald Walter Greene and Kevin Douglas Kuswa in their 
2012 analysis of protest rhetoric—and which remains to be fully explored.  For Greene 
and Kuswa, the term is deployed as a way to fold terrain into an exploration of 
simultaneous (and occasionally overlapping) protests that appear in the early years of this 
decade:  the Arab Spring, the “Occupy” movement, and the Greek protests that formed in 
the wake of austerity debates, to name a select few.  For Greene and Kuswa, then, the 
term “rhetorical cartography” is understood more as a methodology than an object of 
study (though it is suggested as both; see Greene and Kuswa 273):  it is a way of 
managing large regions of political power and protest (which the authors term “accents”) 
so that they can be compared and contrasted, and so that a “flow” of protest rhetoric can 
be observed even across disparate regions (Greene and Kuswa 285).  It is in this way that 
the “Arab Spring” of 2011 can move, rhetorically, into a so-called “Global Spring” by the 
years’ end, uniting the protesters of nearly every continent under the umbrella of 
allegiance, even as they fight for very different outcomes.  In this way, “rhetorical 
cartography” works as a vessel for exploring the horizontal moves of rhetorical action 
from one region to another. 
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 In this project, I would like to suggest rhetorical cartography as a more discrete 
set of practices, utilized by individual rhetors in order to interact with (or to simply 
counteract) the effects of place upon their identities.  Not merely a way to conceive of 
rhetorical action as it appears on a map, in my view rhetorical cartography reveals an 
interaction between place and inhabitant that is dialogic and co-constitutive.  Rickert 
comments on such connections in his Ambient Rhetoric, as he considers the inventional 
action of the composer as understood by his theory of “ambient rhetoric”: 
 This dispersal of the inventive subject into an ambient rhetorical frame cannot 
 be reinscribed within a subject/object dichotomy where the  environment 
 determines the individual; the individual is already a part of the environment, 
 since to exist at all is already to suppose a world.  Thus subjects exist not as 
 separate from world but as a complex folding within other complex foldings of 
 material and discursive force.  (Rickert 96-7)  
 
In large part, my intention in examining rhetorical cartography is to note such foldings—
rendered here as an author’s efforts to first inventory the rhetorical spaces around him or 
her self, and second, to use this inventory as he or she attempts to recalculate his or her 
identity.  For perhaps unlike Rickert, I give primacy to the rhetorical efforts of the 
individual speaker, who understands his or her identity to be a product, necessarily, of the 
environment23.  Rhetorical cartography indicates an awareness that the place in which 
one composes is not simply passive, but insists on an ability of the human agent to use 
that understanding to control the place. 
 A similar understanding of this play between rhetor and space is assumed in 
recent scholarship by Johnathon Mauk, in his 2003 article “Location, Location, Location:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  This	  primacy	  runs	  somewhat	  contrary	  to	  Rickert’s	  theory	  of	  ambience,	  which	  is	  established	  early	  on	  as	  an	  
attempt	  to	  “dissolve”	  the	  “assumed	  separation	  between	  what	  is	  (privileged)	  human	  doing	  and	  what	  is	  passively	  
material,”	  (Rickert	  3).	  	  I	  too	  disregard	  a	  notion	  of	  passive	  material	  (the	  environment),	  but	  this	  does	  not,	  in	  my	  
mind,	  take	  away	  from	  the	  primary	  agency	  of	  the	  individual	  writer	  who	  works	  within	  that	  location.	  	  Rickert	  
seems	  to	  suggest	  something	  approaching	  a	  50/50	  breakdown	  between	  author	  and	  environment;	  my	  exploration	  
of	  rhetorical	  cartography	  necessarily	  claims	  a	  much	  larger	  stake	  for	  the	  human	  agent.	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The ‘Real’ (E)states of Being, Writing, and Thinking in Composition,” and by Steve 
Lamos’ 2012 article “Minority-Serving Institutions, Race-Conscious ‘Dwelling,’ and 
Possible Futures for Basic Writing at Predominantly White Institutions.”  As with 
Cushman, students are the focus for Mauk and Lamos, who consider the socially-
constructed ethea that govern academic success.  For Mauk, working at a heavily-
commuter community college in the Midwest, the issue at hand is the problematic way 
the university expects its students to label themselves “academics” or “scholars” without 
ever truly inviting them into the locations of academics or scholars.  Importantly, Mauk 
invokes for us a notion of “cartography” at play in these rhetors: “Students must learn a 
vast array of cartographic skills which help them gain a sense of location, a sense of 
where.  And without those skills, without a sense of location, students (and their teachers) 
are quite simply lost” (Mauk 368-9, original emphasis).   
 Lamos too invokes the usefulness of rhetorical cartography to resist aggression 
as he considers the rise of a neo-liberal guilt which threatens to render impossible the 
socially-constructed, locationally-dependent spaces in which he teaches Basic Writing.  
Fearing that the politically correct attitudes of the new millennium may seek to destroy 
any opportunity for those deemed “basic writer” to contest their label, Lamos turns to the 
concept of “dwelling” (see Reynolds’ Geographies of Writing; Rickert) in order to 
advocate the protection of race-conscious Basic Writing programs.  In clear terms, Lamos 
makes it his point to advocate a student’s engagement with spatially-ordered identity 
rather than polite, apologist renderings of the Composition classroom that would render 
the identity-heavy spaces Mauk touches upon impossible.   
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 Applying the same understanding of cartography to our prison writers, then, I 
return to the example of Haggard, whose song “Mama Tried” can be seen as an effort to 
reveal that the aggression of rhetorical space (mortification, for prisoners) has been 
internalized and verified.  Like the example of the “Uncle Tom” discussed above, it is a 
rhetorical attempt to gain favor by validating the calculation of authority; a pronounced 
attempt to claim the values of the majority as the speaker’s own, and thereby gain access 
to that position of privilege enjoyed by the citizens outside.  In cartographic terms, it is 
the privileging of authority’s space for the purpose of accessing that space. 
 Here’s the upsetting part, though:  if “Mama Tried” can be read as a regretful 
narrator praising the logic of his prison (and thereby verifying the mortification done to 
him), then there is, in fact, no real “Mama” for the song’s narrator.  In actuality, 
Haggard’s narrator is singing the praises of his prison, and personifying it as a loving 
mother for extra impact.  The song might well be called “Prison Tried”—although, a 
more on-the-nose reading would suggest the title is “Prison Did,” revealing an important 
lesson about space:  “No one could steer me right, but Prison did.” 
In a more broad reading of late-20th century American prison literature, Haggard’s 
embrace of prison logic is largely atypical.  For many of our nation’s incarcerated, the 
acceptance of identity created by prison is understood immediately as an impractical 
move, indicating guilt or a tacit identification with the law—both of which make for 
interesting songs, but might not help you find your way back into society.  Since we 
might infer that a large majority of prison inmates choose their actions as a means of 
eventually gaining release,  Haggard’s example may be a less practical road to take.  
Surely a perceived filiation with your prison should help them see you as someone 
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deserving of reintroduction to society.  But that sentiment gets confused when we 
consider that validation of prison’s mortification is also a justification for incarceration:  
if you understand why you’re here, then we were right to put you here.   
What is even more frightening still is the opposite:  if you don’t know why you’re 
here, we were probably still right to put you here.  If we consider Foucault’s thesis that 
institutions in general are a means for controlling an increasingly complex society (see 
Chapter One), then a tension or cognitive “unmappability” expressed on the outside could 
result in one needing the order of the state.  It’s a startlingly effective “Catch 22”:  once 
you accept the logic of the prison, you are essentially at its mercy. 
Thankfully, Haggard’s position is not the norm.  How then do we account for 
those who are not so eager to smile in the face of rhetorical violence—those who see in 
their state-issued identity an inconsistency with prison’s binary logic?  For those inmates 
who don’t tactically defer to the power of the state, what alternatives are left for 
(re)defining one’s self? 
 
Part Two:  Conceiving of Resistance as “Thirdspace” 
 As the field of Rhetoric and Composition has become more focused on assessing 
the spatial dimension of rhetorical acts and the process of teaching them, the notion of 
thirdspace (emerging from the field of critical geography; specifically postmodern 
interpretations of space and place established by Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja) has 
become an interesting framework for those interested in the field to consider in their 
work.  As studies throughout the 1980s and 90s became increasingly aware of what 
Pierre Bourdieu might call “symbolic violence”—the workings of rhetoric as they are 
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imposed by hegemonic forces, creating an “otherness” for rhetorical actors to find 
themselves written into—the field of critical geography was, at nearly the same time, 
developing the term “thirdspace” to indicate the cartographic effects felt by the oppressed 
or underrepresented who may be distanced from the value of their own experiences, 
which are calculated not in their own right, but in relation to another location (whether 
that location is geographic, economic, social, or otherwise abstracted).  This is to say that 
just as researchers in Rhetoric and Composition were becoming more interested in 
understanding the social, so too was critical geography—leading to a common concern 
which would bridge the two disciplines, especially along the lines of thirdspace. 
A note here on “cartography”—the concept of “cartography,” understood for my 
purposes as a charting of distance with relation to rhetorical space, importantly draws 
attention to the human agency of such charting (through social interaction).  For Edward 
Soja (as well as for Lefebvre, upon whose work Soja inscribes his own theories), this 
sociality was essential for understanding the locations, real and imagined, that human 
beings find themselves inhabiting: 
[A]ll social relations become real and concrete, a part of our lived social 
existence, only when they are spatially “inscribed”—that is, concretely 
represented—in the social production of social space.  Social reality is not just 
coincidentally spatial, existing “in” space, it is presuppositionally and 
ontologically spatial.  There is no unspatialized social reality.  There are no 
aspatial social processes. (Soja 46, emphasis original) 
 
Thus it is that in understanding the sociality behind creating place and location, what we 
are really interested in is the actions and motives of human beings who seek to create 
distinct locations for themselves and others.  More simply put, “place” means nothing in 
the absence of social actions.  For Henri Lefebvre, this sociality was interesting for 
understanding the relationship between “the forces of production and their component 
	   68	  
elements [. . .]; structures [. . .]; [and] superstructures” (LeFebvre 85).  For researchers in 
our field, we might conclude that this same concept became interesting for studying the 
underlying rhetorical force of such “calculation” as discussed above (see Mauk, Lamos). 
 This conflation of social interests brings us thirdspace, which Edward Soja 
defines early on in his book of the same name as, 
the space where all places are, capable of being seen from every angle, each 
standing clear; but also a secret and a conjectured object, filled with illusions and 
allusions, a space that is common to all of us yet never able to be completely seen 
and understood, an “imaginable universe,” or as LeFebvre would put it, “the most 
general of products.  (Soja 56) 
 
If this early stab at defining thirdspace reads a bit like a riddle, I would suggest that is 
likely what Soja is going for.  In large part a way for him to wrap up LeFebvre’s 
“trialectics of spatiality” (social practice, representations of space, and spaces of 
representation) as described in The Production of Space, Soja’s earliest shared vision of 
thirdspace can be more productively summed up as an attempt to describe a theoretical 
“location” (which is more nearly a way of thinking about location) that merges space 
with social behavior, so that thirdspace becomes a very dialectic, social space.  But why, 
if all space is inherently social, do we refer to this concept as thirdspace? 
The name “thirdspace” invokes Soja’s concept of “Thirding-as-Othering,” which 
reflects LeFebvre’s attention to breaking apart binarized categories like “subject/object” 
and “center/periphery” (Soja 60)24, and so we come to understand thirdspace as an 
inherently social conception of space which seeks to overcome such binarism—largely 
though refusing to be “othered” by social behaviors, and instead using one’s potentially 
“othered” social/physical location as a refutation of such distancing actions.  In seeking to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Or,	  more	  important	  for	  our	  current	  line	  of	  investigation,	  “good/bad.”	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understand the economy of prison writing—which includes both its subject writers and 
their predetermined positions within the prison structure—the importance of thirdspace 
becomes its ability to show alternatives to the binary logic of incarceration and its 
environment.   
Where Merle Haggard’s “Mama Tried” has already shown us how authors can 
compose themselves in accordance with prison’s binarism, a more fascinating site of 
inquiry may be into those texts that do not perpetuate such clear identities. In fact, there 
may be a more prominent trend in prison literature of such refusals of binarism, if one 
considers strong-voiced, popularly read narratives of the prison experience such as 
Malcolm X’s Autobiography, Mumia Abu-Jamal’s Live From Death Row, Rubin Carter’s 
The 16th Round, Assata Shakur’s Assata:  An Autobiography, Piper Kerman’s Orange is 
the New Black, and Etheridge Knight’s Black Voices From Prison.  Refusals of classic 
prison binarism can even be seen in anthologies of prison literature collected from 
“unknown” authors, such as Wally Lamb’s anthology Couldn’t Keep it to Myself and 
Paula Johnson’s critical anthology Inner Lives. 
The notion of thirdspace, then, allows us to focus our research on texts which do 
not take Haggard’s approach in mapping identity:  texts which instead map their 
grievances with prison’s binarism, and in so doing, attempt to destroy such binaries and 
present themselves anew.   
A perfect example for introducing such binary-resistant mapping, let us consider 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter From Birmingham City Jail”25.  Familiar to us in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Dr.	  King’s	  “Letter,”	  while	  technically	  written—at	  least	  invented—during	  a	  period	  of	  incarceration,	  does	  not	  fit	  
the	  criterion	  of	  long-­‐term	  incarceration	  that	  is	  important	  to	  this	  study,	  and	  so	  does	  not	  receive	  further	  analysis	  
in	  this	  project.	  	  Its	  inclusion	  here	  is	  only	  to	  further	  explain	  the	  rhetorical	  underpinnings	  of	  thirdspace,	  and	  to	  
serve	  as	  an	  important	  contrast	  to	  the	  rhetorical	  cartography	  of	  “Mama	  Tried.”	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historical sense, King’s “Letter” was composed around April 16th, 1963, following his 
arrest for leading a non-violent protest in Birmingham, Alabama.  As an established 
“classic” of protest literature, King’s “Letter” has frequently been the subject of 
rhetorical analysis, and here I hope to continue that discussion by indicating its usefulness 
as a demonstration of thirdspace. 
Discussion of the “Letter” requires some contextualization, so let us consider first 
the rhetorical situation in which King wrote.  Five days prior to writing, eight white 
clergymen from across Alabama had come together to release a letter referred to as “A 
Call for Unity” to a local newspaper decrying King’s strategy of non-violent protest; 
strategically admitting to injustice, but making clear that fights for reform should happen 
in the courthouse, not on the streets.  And as these opinions are voiced, we can see a 
fairly telling spatiality created for the purpose of observing identity.  A short letter in its 
entirely, I wish to share excerpts here that speak to my argument: 
We the undersigned clergymen are among those who, in January, issued 
“An Appeal for Law and Order and Common Sense,” in dealing with racial 
problems in Alabama.  We expressed understanding that honest convictions in 
racial matters could properly be pursued in the courts, but urged that decisions of 
those courts should in the meantime be peacefully obeyed. 
Since that time there had been some evidence of increased forbearance 
and a willingness to face facts.  Responsible citizens have undertaken work on 
various problems which cause racial friction and unrest.  In Birmingham, recent 
public events have given indication that we all have opportunity for a new 
constructive and realistic approach to racial problems.  (Carpenter et al., 
emphasis added) 
 
Central to the introduction of the “Call” is an early emphasis on the group themselves—
“we”—and a quick alignment of that “we” with virtue.  This group has “expressed 
understanding” and encouraged a “peaceful” obeying of legal decision.  We see this 
alignment of the in-group with facts and an intentionally vague body of “responsible 
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citizens,” a move which seems to invite readers to consider themselves a part of the 
solution.  Should the reader feel a connection, he or she is invited to consider an 
“opportunity for a new constructive and realistic approach to racial problems.” 
 But this invitation is clearly not leveled at all of Birmingham’s citizens: 
 However, we are now confronted by a series of demonstrations by some of 
our Negro citizens, directed and led in part by outsiders [. . .] we are convinced 
that these demonstrations are unwise and untimely. 
We agree rather with certain local Negro leadership which has called for 
honest and open negotiation of racial issues in our area.  And we believe this kind 
of facing of issues can best be accomplished by citizens of our own metropolitan 
area, white and Negro, meeting with their knowledge and experience of the local 
situation.  (Carpenter et al., emphasis added) 
 
Clearly a text reflective of its social context, we might still find it startling to see the “we” 
of these Alabama clergymen set so clearly against those who are not white.  By sticking 
so closely to the use of the “Negro” modifier, this group clearly distinguishes itself as a 
class apart from the “Negro citizens” of Birmingham.  Such observations should not be 
surprising. 
 But notice too how even within the “Negro” group, divisions quickly arise.  Some 
“Negro citizens” are being influenced by “outsiders”—an interesting distinction to offer 
in a letter encouraging, at heart, an observance of the law.  Such arguments are clearly 
already spatial in some ways—obeying the law of America certainly implies the civic 
duty of any American citizen—and should be able to persuade based on that ethos alone.  
This is very basic rhetorical cartography, and any American who has been through a 
high school Civics class knows it from experience. 
 But Carpenter and his fellow clergymen call that space into question here, 
creating separate groups of citizens—the “white and Negro” classes—and creating little 
room for confusion over who is of privilege here.  “Good” are the whites and the blacks 
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who follow them; “bad” are the blacks who would follow the advice of “outsiders26.”  
This letter, then, reveals a very clear, though largely unspoken, map of 1963 
Birmingham: blacks can live around the fringes of white Birmingham, but only to the 
extent that they emulate that “in-group” (as represented and constructed by law).  This is 
binary logic at its best:  you’re either with us, or against us27.  Of course, the “us” is 
whites, whose coherence as a group is assumed to be so inflexible that no one need 
confirm their boundaries. 
 Important to our understanding of the text, “A Call for Unity” is an open letter; 
one seemingly not addressed to King and his supporters themselves, but rather to the 
majority end of the binary—a somewhat thinly veiled attempt to push the problem of 
segregation and oppression out of the public’s view.  Though perhaps a bit reductive, we 
can understand this letter best as a dismissal of black protest by those who label King an 
“outsider,” and a lamentation that such action has occurred in largely white Birmingham.  
Here we find a rather simple message based on an even simpler inventory of location:  
there is a community of whites happy with the status quo, and a more nebulous 
community of unhappy blacks which does not fit neatly therein.  Like Haggard, the 
authors of “A Call for Unity” are working with binary logic from the start. 
When King responds in his own open letter (already a spatial move, as he’s 
emulating the “in-group” that has created him as antagonist), he uses two important 
strategies to interrupt this spatiality.  Let us consider these with reference to the text: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  We	  should	  note	  here	  that	  King’s	  name	  is	  referenced	  nowhere	  in	  “A	  Call	  for	  Unity,”	  leaving	  readers	  to	  simply	  
infer	  that	  it	  is	  he	  who	  is	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  use	  of	  “outsiders.”	  	  The	  power	  of	  that	  denial	  is	  quite	  exceptional:	  	  King,	  
whose	  actions	  inspired	  this	  letter,	  has	  become	  something	  of	  a	  “he	  who	  shall	  not	  be	  named”	  status,	  further	  
distancing	  him	  from	  the	  “citizens”	  of	  Birmingham.	  
27	  A	  popular	  line	  of	  argument,	  which	  is	  inherently	  spatial	  whether	  used	  by	  Arthur	  Miller’s	  character	  John	  
Danforth	  in	  The	  Crucible,	  or	  George	  W.	  Bush	  in	  his	  September	  20,	  2001	  address	  to	  a	  joint	  session	  of	  Congress.	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While confined here in the Birmingham City Jail, I came across your recent 
statement calling our present activities “unwise and untimely.” Seldom, if ever, 
do I pause to answer criticism of my work and ideas.  If I sought to answer all of 
the criticisms that cross my desk my secretaries would be engaged in little else in 
the course of the day, and I would have no time for constructive work. But since I 
feel that you are men of genuine good will and your criticisms are sincerely set 
forth, I would like to answer your statement in what I hope will be patient and 
reasonable terms. (King 289, emphasis added) 
 
First, King utilizes the place of jail as a privileged position from which to speak, 
directly invoking the place in the title of his piece, and somewhat flippantly referring to it 
later in his text as an opportunity to write and think28.  We might assume the jail cell to be 
a silencing location (where we lock up those trouble-making “outsiders”), and yet King 
rewrites it as a pulpit, loaded with meaning from which he can more precisely target the 
issue that troubles him.  The jail here is not a silencing mechanism—it is actually 
reconfigured as the reason for King to speak; a perceived “gag” turned “microphone.” 
Secondly, he nearly rewrites “A Call for Unity” as a direct appeal to him, 
claiming it as “criticism of my work and ideas,” (King 289) which he feels compelled to 
answer.  From the text of “A Call for Unity,” it is clear this position of King’s is purely 
invented—that letter is not addressed to him, but rather to those whites of Alabama who 
are bothered by his presence.  The clergymen of “A Call for Unity” had, essentially, 
written over King, targeting mainly those who were white, or who willingly followed the 
order prescribed by them.  By the time King writes “Letter From Birmingham Jail,” it is 
as though he is textually invading a conversation to which he had not been invited.  He is 
invading rhetorical space. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  From	  King’s	  “Letter”:	  “Never	  before	  have	  I	  written	  a	  letter	  this	  long	  [.	  .	  .]	  I	  can	  assure	  you	  it	  would	  have	  been	  
much	  shorter	  if	  I	  had	  been	  writing	  from	  a	  comfortable	  desk,	  but	  what	  else	  is	  there	  to	  do	  when	  you	  are	  alone	  for	  
days	  in	  the	  dull	  monotony	  of	  a	  narrow	  jail	  cell	  other	  than	  write	  long	  letters,	  think	  strange	  thoughts,	  and	  pray	  
long	  prayers?”	  (King	  302).	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 Fictionalized as a voice of injustice, and as a response to open criticism, King’s 
appeal for brotherhood and an end to the unjust conditions in Birmingham does a fairly 
remarkable thing:  it succeeds in shutting down the eight clergymen who had spoken 
earlier, even leading one contributor to lament that King made them look stupid, and 
reframed the members of his own Southern Christian Leadership Conference not as 
radical thugs, but as concerned citizens.  In 13 pages of eloquently written 
correspondence (at least as it is presented in the anthology A Testament of Hope), King’s 
“Letter” neatly shuts down the binary spatiality of “A Call for Unity,” and reframes both 
himself and his supporters not as “outsider blacks” or “white authority,” but as something 
else:  a literal third option, or thirdspace.   
Fig. 2.2 is a rendering of King’s “Letter” as a refutation of the binary established 
by the authors of “A Call for Unity.”  In dashed lines, we see the reading offered by those 
white clergymen, in which King (belonging to a category of “outsiders”) is attempting an  
invasion of Alabama and the order already established within.  In solid lines, we see the 
moves of King’s “Letter,” which at once casts his own efforts as something other than the 
Alabama/“outsider” binary, and in so doing, invites the clergymen to cast themselves 
along a similar ethos.  King renders both himself and the clergymen to which he responds 
as “concerned citizens/preachers,” which nullifies the binary and constitutes a new 
conversation altogether.  No longer simply a battle between insiders and outsiders, the 
“Letter” effectively maps King’s actions within a larger framework of injustice and 
responsibility which the clergymen cannot escape.   
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Fig. 2.2 – King’s “Letter” as Thirdspatial Map 
 
Important to our line of inquiry is that this refuting of the binary and invention of 
a new alternative identity is cast completely in rhetorical space, in two parts:  first, a 
“mapping” of King and his followers by the Alabama clergymen (what I will call 
locational inventory), and then a “re-mapping” of that terrain already calculated by the 
state (what I will call, to borrow a term from GPS devices, recalculation).  In this 
example, then, we see the emphasis upon rhetoric that becomes deployed during uses of 
thirdspace, but we also see a tendency to move through the very concerns that became of 
central concern to researchers in Rhetoric and Composition during that field’s “social 
turn” (“emancipatory” confirmations of identity and “communities of resistance,” among 
others).   
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Let us pause for a moment to consider the points made in this section.  Through 
an exploration of Merle Haggard’s semi-autobiographical “Mama Tried,” we have seen 
the binary logic common to prison, and the choices it intends to offer to those who would 
construct themselves within its framework: a binary decision.  For Haggard’s narrator, 
the choice was one of alignment—in constructing himself as one who agrees with such 
binary logic, he hopes to reduce the perceived distance between himself and the society 
that forms the basis for his ethos (as “connection to shared values within a community”).  
The alternative to this is thirdspace—the rhetorical reconfiguration of lived space in 
order to overcome the binarism that has been socially cast over it.  In Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s “Letter From Birmingham Jail,” we see the author taking this thirdspatial route, in 
which the space of the jail cell is rhetorically revised as a position from which to speak, 
and the simple binary of “inside/outside” (perhaps in this case “white/black” is just as 
fitting) becomes complicated enough so as to be called into question.   
Important to both of these examples is the two-step procedure I’ve referred to 
above:  first, the author must engage in a process of locational inventory, in which he or 
she considers the locations available and the logics that these places traditionally afford.  
From there, in considering the calculation of larger society (in the context of prison 
writing, this can be assumed to be the prison administration itself, which is of course 
caught within a web of criminal justice apparatuses), the author must choose to either 
accept that calculation, and write him or herself into that mapping (as we see with 
Haggard), or attempt to recalculate that space (thirdspatially) so that the narrative being 
produced finds itself at odds with the prevailing logic of society, as we see in King.  
These arguments for identity are always spatial, as they involve rhetorical space; 
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distance created, challenged, or maintained on behalf of a social collective, and weighted 
down with real, perceived, and historical locations (see Mountford).  Thus, authorial 
constructions of identity are always inherently cartographic, as the authors themselves 
are afforded opportunities to validate or complicate the mappings of identity that every 
individual is subject to.  To argue for one’s self is, necessarily, to argue for one’s place. 
So what does this mean for our archive of prison authors?  If the prisoner is understood to 
be incarcerated against his/her will, then we can safely assume that most prison authors 
are writing in an attempt to influence release—are their rhetorical efforts, then, simply 
attempts to figuratively free themselves through writing?  I would suggest at this point 
that an understanding of these texts as simple pleas for freedom is uncomfortably 
reductive.  Considering these texts as rhetorical efforts to reinscribe and reorder space 
reveals that prison authors may have a larger agenda than simply attaining freedom—a 
concept which, like rhetorical space, need not be solely concrete.  In large part, the 
rhetorical considerations of identity exemplified by these prison authors reveal that much 
more may be at stake:  as Foucault might say, “not merely the body, but the soul.” 
 
Part Three:  The Rhetorical Cartography of Prison Authors 
 In his foundational analysis of prison literature, Prison Literature in America:  
The Victim as Criminal and Artist, historian H. Bruce Franklin points out a shift in the 
genre occurring around the decade of the 1960s, when prison authors began writing less 
in the autobiographical/picaresque mode (what we might reductively view as “bad men 
confessing their adventures in an attempt to titillate readers”) and more in a 
communal/social manner that began tracing the effects of society upon their behavior 
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(Franklin 240-50).  Not only, then, did the prison narratives of the later half of the 20th 
century begin to take on a social weight, but the authors themselves worked to shift 
themselves from being seen as victimizers into being seen as victims in their own right.  
This shift, as Michael Halloran has primed us to intuit, seems geared towards establishing 
not a solitary credibility, but one that makes itself known through—and which indeed 
makes its meaning dependent upon—a collective presence.  As Franklin explains: 
The works of today’s prisoners, though predominantly autobiographical, are 
rarely intended as a display of individual genius.  Whereas the literary criteria 
dominant on campus exalt what is extraordinary or even unique, with 
“originality” as the key criterion, most current autobiographical writing from 
prison intends to show the readers that the author’s individual experience is not 
unique or even extraordinary, but typical and representative.  (Franklin 250, 
emphasis added) 
 
In other words, the decade of the 60s—the same decade that brought us Merle Haggard’s 
acceptance of the prison binary in the form of “Mama Tried” and King’s refusal of it in 
his “Letter”—also saw the creation of a prison writer community interested in portraying 
itself as victim.  Or even further reduced, this decade saw the emergence of an 
identifiable “prison author thirdspace.” 
 Key to this shift, in Franklin’s eyes, is the emergence of Malcolm X’s 
Autobiography of Malcolm X (“as told” to Alex Haley), which gets credit for being a very 
formative work of prison’s narrative shift. Strictly speaking, X’s Autobiography is not 
quite a work of prison literature, as it was not written in prison, and only deals with that 
carceral setting for a few, rather limited, chapters29.  However, the power of the 
Autobiography comes largely in the transformation that occurred in X during this time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  X	  was	  imprisoned	  for	  only	  six	  years	  (1946-­‐1952)	  for	  burglary	  charges,	  and	  his	  treatment	  of	  those	  years	  in	  the	  
Autobiography	  is	  carefully	  condensed	  into	  only	  a	  few	  chapters.	  	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  material	  from	  these	  chapters	  
details	  mainly	  his	  conversion	  to	  Islam,	  which	  speaks	  to	  his	  transformation	  from	  young	  “hood”	  to	  political	  figure;	  
as	  X	  himself	  would	  put	  it,	  from	  “Satan”	  to	  “Minster	  Malcolm	  X.”	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making it a likely source of inspiration for others behind bars.  In contrast to Haggard, 
Malcolm X spends his time working to show the political and social distancing that 
plagued him throughout his early life; the ways that he was kept separate, as a young 
man, from the dominant, white culture, and how that distance drove him to a life of heavy 
drug use and low-level crime.  Thus it is that, even though the majority of his work takes 
place outside prison walls (as does the writing itself), the positioning of the prison 
chapters near the middle of the book speaks to the institution’s power to identify (we 
could also say “transform”) individuals.  It also speaks to X’s cartographic instincts as a 
writer, which we will explore in detail. 
 
Rhetorical Cartography, Part One:  Locational Inventories 
 The first step we must take when analyzing literature along the lines of 
cartographic rhetoric is to understand the locational inventories established by the author:  
the places that he or she invokes in order to begin the work of mapping or re-mapping.  
Malcolm X’s Autobiography serves us well as an introduction to this process, as 
the locations that he writes about are consistently tied in to his understanding of the social 
implications behind such environments.  So it is that his early childhood locations of 
Omaha, Nebraska and East Lansing, Michigan function less as lived environments for the 
reader—though this is not to suggest a failure on X’s behalf in bringing them to life—but 
more as a two-pronged synecdoche for the segregation and oppression of blacks in the 
Jim Crow-era North.  Less important to X are the individual memories of Omaha or East 
Lansing; rather, each becomes a telling part of the race-conscious oppression that was 
typical of the time.  Similarly, the streets of New York, notably Harlem, become less 
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important to the specific instances of X’s criminal youth (though here, we do see a strong 
tendency toward anecdotal description of the city), but take on a cultural importance as 
we watch a young Malcolm Little and his allies con and exploit those around them in an 
endless progression of hustles and vice.  As will be revealed, these spaces work less on 
their own merit and more through their addition, which points out (to recall Walker’s 
thoughts on the exetastic buildup of enthymeme, discussed in Chapter One) the 
inconsistencies of society’s (and prison’s) intentions. 
By the time we get to prison—both the Charlestown State prison where he begins 
and ends his sentence, and the Norfolk, Massachusetts Prison Colony where he is 
transferred during the middle of his incarceration—these spaces are nearly glossed over 
in terms of physical description or spatial preoccupation.  What becomes more important 
in the prison space is the way it affects the young Malcolm Little: first inspiring a 
rebellious hatred of all guards and inmates (earning X the nickname “Satan”) and then 
inspiring a commitment to education and religion (which would begin his transformation 
into the “Minister Malcolm X” persona associated with the Nation of Islam).  By the time 
X is released from prison to begin his tenure with the Nation of Islam, we understand his 
locations to be chosen primarily for their social weight; for their ability, as elements in an 
exetastic buildup, to prime the reader for the “passional identification” Walker sees as the 
endpoint of enthymematic rhetoric. Another way of thinking about this:  when these 
spaces become more akin to tropes (each telling the same story of alienation and 
disappointment), we as readers are increasingly able to beat X to the punchline—that 
these spaces are made of isolationist intent, and that they benefit from their ability to 
remove certain actors from the economy.  So blatant is this long exetastic buildup that by 
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the time X travels to Mecca, we fully understand that the chapters spent in the East will 
work to revise the lessons learned in America, and even the reader with no previous 
knowledge of X’s life will understand the promise of transformation to occur through 
transit. 
Allowing us even greater access to these spaces, for the purposes of analyzing 
rhetorical cartography, is the way X consistently ties his identity (in the form of aliases) 
to each space he moves through.  Fig. 2.3 offers a mapping of X’s various identities in 
chronological order, showing the important linkages between space and identity. 
 
Fig 2.3—“A Chronological Mapping of Malcolm X’s Identities” 
 
  X’s early childhood in Nebraska and Michigan is lived under his given name 
“Malcolm Little;” his years as a hustler in Harlem see him presented as “Detroit Red30;” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  An	  interesting	  spatial	  note:	  	  X	  had	  not	  lived	  in	  Detroit,	  but	  needing	  to	  distinguish	  himself	  from	  other	  “Reds”	  in	  
Harlem	  at	  the	  time	  (including	  comedian	  Redd	  Foxx),	  he	  chose	  the	  more	  familiar	  city	  name	  over	  his	  true	  home	  of	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prison time transforms him first into “Satan,” and then into “Malcolm X;” with the 
Nation of Islam, he is “Minister Malcolm X;” and by the time he has completed his 
pilgrimage to Mecca and returned to start his own black nationalist movement, he has 
fully embraced Orthodox Islam and become “El Hajj Malik El-Shabazz”31 (see Fig. 2.3).  
Each of these names reveal Malcolm X as a product of his environment—a tactic he 
himself realizes by the end of his narrative, as he considers his open text “Letter From 
Mecca,” which he is sure will startle Americans who are used to the image of hate 
connected with X and the Nation of Islam.  As X considers the reaction to his change, he 
writes:  “Even I was myself astounded [at the transformation represented in “Letter From 
Mecca”].  But there was a precedent in my life for this letter.  My whole life had been a 
chronology of—changes” (Haley and X 339, emphasis in original). 
Thus, Malcolm X’s locational inventory offers an easy point of entry into our 
analysis, for X himself so neatly ties his separate identities to the rhetorical spaces of 
their origin.  From there, X removes the effect of time (chronology), and looks to draw 
conclusions about his identities based on the alienation done to him by the state (the 
initial mapping of his identity).  Fig. 2.4, an important reworking of 2.3, reveals the same 
mapping as thematic, along the issue of racial respect, rather than narrative. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
East	  Lansing	  (Haley	  and	  X	  96).	  	  In	  this	  example,	  we	  see	  the	  name	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  an	  identity	  (“Detroit	  
Red”)	  based	  on	  space,	  rather	  than	  to	  passively	  let	  space	  dictate	  identity	  (X	  could	  have	  very	  well	  been	  “East	  
Lansing	  Red,”	  if	  that	  were	  the	  case).	  	  We	  should	  see	  this	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  X’s	  cartographic	  instincts,	  which	  
become	  more	  refined	  during	  and	  after	  his	  incarceration.	  
31	  In	  Islam,	  the	  title	  “El	  Hajj”	  or	  “El	  Hajji”	  is	  an	  honorific	  title	  given	  to	  someone	  who	  has	  completed	  the	  
pilgrimage,	  or	  hajj,	  to	  Mecca.	  	  Thus,	  the	  influence	  of	  space	  upon	  his	  identity	  becomes	  textually	  represented	  in	  his	  
religion.	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 Fig. 2.4—“A Thematic Rendering of X’s Locational Inventory” 
 
Likely an inventory chosen for the kind of work X is to later accomplish through 
his Autobiography—work which dedicates itself to showing the cultural separation 
between the white majority and ethnic minorities—an important element to X’s thematic 
locations is that they are multiple, allowing him greater room for creating distinct, binary-
resistant identities that are part of his message of liberation (note that the sheer number 
here also serves an exetastic function—he is, in other words, benefiting from the length 
of this list).  Fig. 2.4 shows that these aliases fit neatly into a pattern of seeking out 
respect—his early lived locations read much like a laundry list of identities that restrict 
him from respect in the world of the White majority.  Turning to religion moves him 
closer in to the other end of that majority’s binary, and yet the particular religion of his 
choice—the Nation of Islam, or N.O.I.—complicates that movement until the N.O.I. 
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itself begins to take on a distinctly thirdspatial feel.  If X feels content with his identity at 
the end of the book—and I would suggest both his final chapter and Haley’s “Epilogue” 
make this clear—it is not because he has escaped from one end of the binary to the other 
(a move that we could see as “White Denial of Respect”à “White Provision of 
Respect”), but because he has refuted both of these alternatives, denying their power as 
logic, and largely escaped them altogether.   
This is perhaps most easily understood when compared to Haggard, who in 
choosing only two locations for his inventory (the “badness” of life inside prison walls, 
and the “goodness” of the people on the outside), really sets himself up only to embrace a 
binary logic—that of prison institutions.  In such a binary, moving toward either end is a 
move aimed at validating the logic of power.  With Malcolm X, we see much more 
potential for creating a meaningful identity based on new, thirdspatial locations—an 
invention which disrupts power. 
Interesting too is the way that X’s new map (Fig. 2.4) provides both us and him 
with a distinct moment of transition:  the prison.  Haley quotes X in his epilogue as 
claiming, “I’d put prison second to college as the best place for a man to go if he needs to 
do some thinking.  If he’s motivated, in prison he can change his life” (Haley and X 391-
2, emphasis in original).  I would argue that such a reading of prison is facilitated by the 
kind of locational inventory that becomes X’s major theme.  Seeing the space of prison as 
an intersection (best represented by the movement “Satan”à “Minister Malcolm X”) 
between the problematic identities of his past and the more positive identity he adopts in 
later life, X’s Autobiography becomes very much a prison narrative, as it is that prison 
which gives it form.   
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We can note the comparison to “college,” which gets rendered as the “best place 
for a man to go if he needs to do some thinking,” and tends to follow the dominant logic 
of society in the 20th century.  When X suggests that prison is the “second best” such 
place, he is not solely rendering prison as a new space; he is in fact recalibrating the 
college itself as well, since it would typically not be compared to prison in terms of 
educational impact.  I don’t think it is X’s intention, in this comparison, to elevate prison 
or to reduce the importance of college.  In this act of recalibration, X is simply working 
to disrupt the traditionally-held values of each (college as “good”/prison as “bad”) and 
point out the similarities inherent to both (and in the process, the inconsistencies of both).  
Neither is now good or bad; they are both turned into a matrix of potential educational 
spaces, absent any valuation except the supremacy of the college (which I suspect is a bit 
of a farce for X). 
An important alternative to Haggard’s prison, which simply sat at one end of a 
binary, X’s prison becomes loaded with rhetorical weight as he begins to craft it as a 
waypoint, rather than a destination.  As we will see, redressing the prison space as such 
allows for important identity work to be done through the process of recalculation.  
Important to our understanding of the inventory process, however, is that it works in 
tandem with Walker’s remarks on enthymeme—that is, the inventory itself functions as 
that exetastic buildup which seeks to point out the inconsistencies and flaws in the 
original logic of power.   
I make this point here to reaffirm that the spaces of importance here are 
rhetorical—they are certainly real spaces, but rendered as text for X’s book, they become 
abstracted as well; representational for the purpose of communicating intention, and 
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necessarily burdened by a historical context of racism (all in keeping with Mountford’s 
definition of rhetorical space; see Introduction, Mountford 42).  As we now turn to X’s 
work with “recalculation,” such an understanding becomes useful. 
 
Rhetorical Cartography, Part Two:  Calculation and Recalculation 
 If we are to assign a degree of “genius” to Malcolm X for the cartographic instinct 
that so shapes his Autobiography (and which will inspire a slew of prison autobiographies 
to follow), we may first want to investigate the way X’s instincts were very much 
influenced by the Nation of Islam; specifically by its leader, Elijah Muhammad.  
Muhammad’s offshoot of Islam, which saw him as a messenger from Allah, gained its 
reputation of “hate rhetoric” during the late 50s and early 60s for advocating segregation 
on behalf of African-Americans.  It was Muhammad’s belief, and a major tenet of what 
would become known as the “Black Muslim” movement, that the integrationist intentions 
of civil rights leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. were destined for failure, 
because the condition of African-Americans in postwar America proved all too easily 
how the white majority would always look to oppress minorities, especially those with 
visible markers of difference.  More to the point, they really wouldn’t even have to try, as 
the spaces created by that majority would automatically calibrate its inhabitants.  Such is 
the power of rhetorical space. 
In the Nation of Islam, whites were actually believed to be “devils,” whose lot in 
life it was to consistently put blacks and other ethnic minorities down.  With this belief in 
mind, Elijah Muhammad made it his goal to consistently point out to African-Americans 
how their treatment was proof of the impossibility of integration.  In the chapter “Savior,” 
	   87	  
in which Malcolm X documents his early days with the Nation, he shares with the reader 
a piece of instruction from Muhammad consistent with this goal: 
One day, I remember, a dirty glass of water was on a counter [in a Nation of 
Islam-owned grocery store] and Mr. Muhammad put a clean glass of water beside 
it.  “You want to know how to spread my teachings?” he said, and he pointed to 
the glasses of water.  “Don’t condemn if you see a person has a dirty glass of 
water,” he said, “just show them the clean glass of water that you have.  When 
they inspect it, you won’t have to say that yours is better.” 
Of all the things that Mr. Muhammad ever was to teach me, I don’t know why, 
that still stands out in my mind. (Haley and X 205) 
 
Though not overtly cartographic in nature—the metaphor of the glasses is perhaps more 
concerned with simple comparative arguments than spatial ones—what we see in this 
anecdote that so stands out to X is a reliance on subtly revealing social injustice.  Elijah 
Muhammad’s metaphor is an apt one because it relies so entirely on guiding the 
perception of those it seeks to instruct, with the intention of motivating an identification 
with stance.  Trusting that a dirty glass of water is as undesirable to others as it is to him, 
Muhammad’s philosophy is merely one of hinting at his own perception and trusting 
others to agree with his evaluation. It is obviously relational, but more than that, it is 
enthymematic—relying, as we have seen from Walker, on the realization of 
inconsistencies (a comparison of the two glasses) which creates in its audience an 
identification with stance (“you won’t have to say that yours is better”).  It is a move 
predicated, as Walker expects of modern enthymeme, on style and stance (Walker 61-3). 
 While the “glasses” anecdote is admittedly short, it seems to gain from its 
simplicity in X’s eyes, as this tactic become foundational for the author, whose implicit 
cartographic arguments throughout the Autobiography are based very much on that 
adherence to enthymematic argument.  Looking at the Autobiography with the attention 
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to these inter-locked tactics, what is revealed to us is a host of distance-based hypotheses 
that become part of X’s meaning-making. 
 For just as our spatial inventory revealed the designs of an exetastic buildup, our 
next step in rhetorical cartography—that of recalculation—can be seen to draw heavily 
upon that “identification with stance” that closes out the enthymeme.  We know what the 
originating calculation is—it is that ordering of the state; that drive to control the inmate 
by stripping away his or her identification (Goffman’s mortification).  For rhetorical 
cartography to function as a “remapping” of identity, the author must in some way 
relocate his or her self; what better way to do this than to change the reader’s stance?  By 
bringing the reader to his own side, X necessarily changes the way he is located, and 
hence, his own identity. 
 Let us explore this carefully, noting first the calculation of the state, and then the 
recalculation done by X’s narrative.  In the early years represented by the 
Autobiography, we find the young X (Malcolm Little) living in Lansing, Michigan, 
where his father preaches the word of Marcus Garvey, whose Universal Negro 
Improvement Association advocated the return of black Americans to their native Africa 
(a concept which will appeal to Malcolm in different ways throughout his life).  Little 
textual time is spent in Lansing, but in just a few chapters X makes it clear how he 
realized very early the way that the whites of the area had rejected the few African-
Americans in their presence.  Beginning with the murder of his father32, X’s early 
rejection comes into full focus.  Unable to mentally cope with the death of her husband, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  The	  events	  of	  X’s	  father’s	  death	  are	  largely	  unknown.	  	  In	  the	  chapter	  “Nightmare,”	  X	  tells	  us	  that	  his	  father	  
was	  found	  beaten	  and	  left	  on	  train	  tracks	  to	  be	  killed.	  	  The	  assumption	  is	  that	  he	  was	  jumped	  by	  a	  group	  of	  white	  
racists	  unhappy	  with	  his	  personal	  politics,	  though	  it	  is	  suggested	  by	  some	  that	  he	  simply	  lay	  down	  on	  the	  tracks	  
to	  commit	  suicide	  (Haley	  and	  X	  10).	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  actual	  reasons	  for	  his	  father’s	  death,	  what	  is	  important	  to	  
this	  analysis	  is	  that	  X	  considers	  it	  a	  result	  of	  segregation	  and	  racism.	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X’s mother falls into insanity, and her children are taken from her to be spread across 
different foster homes.  This experience gives X his first glimpse of the alienation of 
African-Americans on behalf of the whites in Michigan: 
When the Welfare people began coming to our house, we would come from 
school sometimes and find them talking with our mother, asking a thousand 
questions.  They acted and looked at her, and at us, and around in our house, in a 
way that had about it the feeling—at least for me—that we were not people.  In 
their eyesight we were just things, that was all. (Haley and X 12, emphasis in 
original) 
 
As “things,” Malcolm’s family is easily split apart, and the rage that builds slowly in the 
young Malcolm Little seems to be easily connected to his realization of that rejection, 
and a burgeoning acceptance of race difference: 
I truly believe that if ever a state social agency destroyed a family, it destroyed 
ours.  We wanted and tried to stay together.  Our home didn’t have to be 
destroyed.  But the Welfare, the courts, and their doctor, gave us the one-two-
three punch.  And ours was not the only case of this kind.  (Haley and X 21) 
 
With a new sense of being different—being a “thing” not worth caring for like a normal 
person—Malcolm’s characteristic anger begins to be sharpened at school, where his 
teachers smile to his face even as they tear down the race he clearly belongs to.  This 
space clearly influences his own identity at the time, as X refers to himself as a 
“mascot”—a token black student who, by showing any promise at all as a student, 
constantly surprised his outwardly racist teachers.  Most damaging to young Malcolm 
seems to be the degree to which teachers and students alike use derogatory language such 
as “nigger” and “coon” to his face, making no attempt to conceal their rejection of black 
people and culture: 
[. . .] it just never dawned upon them that I could understand, that I wasn’t a pet, 
but a human being.  They didn’t give me credit for having the same sensitivity, 
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intellect, and understanding that they would have been ready and willing to 
recognize in a white boy in my position.  But it has historically been the case with 
white people, in their regard for black people, that even though we might be with 
them, we weren’t considered of them.  Even though they appeared to have opened 
the door, it was still closed.  Thus they never did really see me. (Haley and X 27, 
emphasis in original) 
 
By invoking so clearly the arguments about identity that these school associates make 
implicit, X renders his argument as inherently spatial, for it is revealing the process of 
socially-constructed ethos described by Michael Halloran and Nedra Reynolds above.   
Sharing the same place, young Malcolm Little is still perceived as an outsider; not 
considered of the people with whom he interacts.  Literally he might share the same 
classroom, but the identity that he is constantly reminded of (“mascot,” “nigger,” “coon”) 
speaks to very different experiences of that space.  What X is revealing is a process of 
calculation, in which the space fails to encourage the perception of a similar identity.  His 
teachers and classmates reject him, so that even as X might be sitting in the same 
classroom, he clearly understands that his spatiality is something of an exception. 
Such alienation reaches a climax when the young Malcolm Little is asked by a 
familiar teacher what he’d like to be when he grows up.  Malcolm replies that he’d like to 
be a lawyer, and receives a surprised response from his instructor: “Malcolm, one of 
life’s first needs is for us to be realistic.  Don’t misunderstand me, now.  We all here like 
you, you know that.  But you’ve got to be realistic about being a nigger.  A lawyer—
that’s no realistic goal for a nigger” (Haley and X 36).  Reading spatiality into this 
teacher’s statement, we can see he is encouraging X to be “realistic” not about being 
black, but about being an “outsider” to the white majority. 
 Feeling betrayed by an adult whom he’d trusted, X states that it was at this time 
that he began to “change inside” (Haley and X 37), and began to withdraw from the white 
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people at his school (though we might argue that through their repeated identifications of 
him, he was not withdrawing, but actually accepting the distance they ascribed through 
alienation).  Here then is the seed of the Autobiography’s theme:  rejected repeatedly 
until he stepped back from social engagement, Malcolm X was taught early on the 
distance (the calculation of the majority) that he would face as an African-American in 
the mid-20th century.  
Just as his memory of the teacher’s ignorance becomes a sad refrain throughout 
the book, the moment itself becomes a necessary ingredient for understanding the 
distance imposed on him and African-Americans as a whole.  For example:  When X 
later moves to Boston to live with his sister Ella, the big-city atmosphere puts him in 
contact with a larger African-American community, and he quickly learns this culture 
he’s been deprived of in Michigan.  But with it, once again, comes an unspoken 
alienation that reminds him of society’s calculation.  One of his first lessons is in style, 
and X quickly begins to buy zoot suits on credit and apply a painful, lye-based solution to 
his hair in order to straighten it.  The “conk,” as it is called, is a then-popular hairstyle 
worn by young black men in an effort to emulate the hair of their white neighbors.  For 
the authorial X, “conking” seems a painful memory, and not only because of the chemical 
burning that the process entailed: 
How ridiculous I was!  Stupid enough to stand there simply lost in admiration of 
my hair now looking “white,” reflected in the mirror [. . .]I vowed that I’d never 
again be without a conk, and I never was for many years [. . .] This was my first 
really big step toward self-degradation:  when I endured all of that pain, literally 
burning my flesh to have it look like a white man’s hair. (Haley and X 54, 
emphasis added) 
 
 I have to pause for a moment to consider that “lost in admiration.”  It is a simple 
enough phrase; somewhat cliché.  But in this example, I believe we might do well to read 
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it for spatial insight.  For in the example of “conking,” what we have is a minority black 
culture that is appealing to X, and its appeal is largely based on the styles they have 
developed to emulate the white majority.  X might have been “lost in admiration” looking 
at himself after that first conk job, but in a very spatial sense, I would argue that X was 
quite literally lost; unable to conceive of himself fully as either majority or minority. 
X also learns a popular dance, the “Lindy Hop,” and begins to spend his nights 
out in the city, dancing in any jazz club or ballroom that will allow black patrons.  And 
when he begins to see a young black girl named Laura, the relationship is quickly 
derailed by the appearance of an upper-class white girl, referred to as “Sophia” in the 
text, with whom he quickly engages in a romantic, though secret, relationship that 
endures until he is sent to prison. 
 Though it is the “conk” which gets the strongest reaction from X in these Boston 
chapters, the importance of his dress, dance, and relationship preferences are charged 
enough to allow us as readers a glimpse of what his time in Boston meant in terms of 
distance.  Here, finding his way towards fitting in with the black subculture of the East 
Coast, we see young Malcolm Little striving to overcome the rejection of white culture 
(as experienced in Michigan) by uniting with those whom he shares skin color.  But in so 
doing—and here I think we begin to see the motion toward stance that will ultimately 
recalculate his identity—we understand Malcolm to be more nearly participating in the 
rejection of the whites.  He is emulating their hair and fashion, and desiring the white 
women whom he is culturally forbidden from being with.  He is, in other words, 
attempting to revise that calculation that has been haunting him since childhood by 
painting himself as more similar to the white majority than dissimilar.  However, not 
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unlike the example from Haggard that opens this chapter, X’s rejection of his own style 
serves to validate the majority view, leaving him participating in his own alienation by 
embracing the image of the dominant (X is validating the majority’s ideas of “beauty” 
and “style”). 
 As he moves to Harlem (a move driven by work opportunities), these markers of 
white rejection remain somewhat constant.  Despite the distance between him and 
“Sophia,” and her marriage to a white military officer, the relationship between them 
continues.  With World War II heating up at this time, X relates that Harlem becomes 
even more segregated as white sailors on leave in New York City are forbidden from 
entering Harlem.  It is here that X becomes “Detroit Red,” and begins a life of crime—
mainly selling marijuana, but also “steering” men towards prostitutes and, eventually, 
engaging in petty burglary, for which he is ultimately imprisoned.  When it becomes 
known that Sophia and her younger sister had been part of X’s burglary ring, the young 
man realizes he is about to receive a much stiffer sentence than that typically reserved for 
first-time burglars.  His crime, as he realizes, is not so much the theft, but his proximity 
to white women (Haley and X 150).  Despite his attempts at visual markers of filiation, X 
cannot convince a white jury that he shares their ethos. 
 It is here that X makes one of his most profound spatial arguments, summing up 
the entirely of his cultural trajectory both in Boston and Harlem (extending all the way 
back to Michigan as well) and reinforcing the point made by H. Bruce Franklin regarding 
the shift in prison literature of the 60s: 
[. . .] people are always speculating—why am I as I am?  To understand that of 
any person, his whole life, from birth, must be reviewed.  All of our experiences 
fuse into our personality.  Everything that ever happened to us is an ingredient. 
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Today, when everything that I do has an urgency, I would not spend one hour in 
the preparation of a book which had the ambition to perhaps titillate some readers.  
But I am spending many hours because the full story is the best way that I know 
to have it seen, and understood, that I had sunk to the very bottom of the American 
white man’s society when—soon now, in prison—I found Allah and the religion 
of Islam and it completely transformed me.  (Haley and X 150, emphasis added) 
 
The locations of Boston or New York are perhaps unimportant, then, in terms of 
discrete, real space.  As far as distance is concerned, these cities are fairly random, 
geographically (at least as random as the events of his life that led to his travels).  And in 
fact, we know this to be true when we consider the ways that authors to follow X would 
chart that same path in different locations of the post-war era:  Muhammad Ali, for 
instance, so fed up with racism in Louisville, Kentucky that he is moved to throw his 
Olympic gold metal into the Ohio River (Ali and Durham 66-77)33, or the example of an 
imprisoned Rubin Carter, recalling the way a moment of self-defense against a white 
pederast at the Passaic Waterfalls in Patterson, New Jersey led to a life of institutions and 
corrections with racial undertones (Carter 28-34; see Chapter Three)34.  The real spaces 
are as interchangeable as the actors within—what endures is the perceived distance 
between white and black, the reduction of self-worth that it produces, and the frustration 
(frequently leading to criminal behavior) that comes from being a “the very bottom of the 
American white man’s society”—a metaphor which, once understood, carries with it a 
strong plea for rhetorical cartography based in large part on its enthymematic ability to 
encourage an identification with stance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Many	  interested	  in	  Ali	  (notably	  biographer	  Thomas	  Hauser)	  believe	  his	  account	  of	  throwing	  away	  his	  gold	  
metal	  to	  be	  fiction—simply	  a	  flourish	  created	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  selling	  his	  own	  autobiography.	  	  For	  our	  
purposes,	  it	  really	  doesn’t	  matter	  whether	  this	  event	  happened	  or	  not;	  Ali’s	  emulation	  of	  X’s	  cartographic	  moves	  
is	  more	  fascinating,	  even	  if	  it	  produces	  counterfeit	  anecdotes.	  
34	  Another	  anecdote	  which	  careful	  readers	  should	  be	  suspicious	  of.	  	  But	  again,	  whether	  or	  not	  Carter’s	  violence	  
against	  the	  man	  at	  the	  Passaic	  Waterfalls	  was	  justified	  is	  an	  issue	  for	  other	  researchers.	  	  What	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  
this	  project	  is	  that	  Carter	  uses	  the	  public	  space	  of	  a	  city	  park	  to	  reveal	  the	  distanciation	  done	  him	  (and	  other	  
blacks)	  by	  the	  community	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	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 This is the distance that matters to X, and though he directly invokes it above in 
what could be considered the book’s midsection, it is a distance that he has been 
developing enthymematically since the first chapters, when he first wondered why it was 
that he couldn’t become a lawyer.  Authorial hindsight aside, the answer to that question 
becomes quite clear with his trip through the U.S. legal system, and his incarceration at 
Charlestown State Prison. 
 For X, who is known around the prison as “Satan” during his early months 
because of his vicious attitude and preference for solitary thought, the location of prison 
puts him in connection with others wondering about the condition of minorities in 
America.  One such inmate, referred to as “Bimbi,” entertains the other prisoners with his 
philosophical musings—among them, that the only true difference between those on the 
inside and those on the outside was that the former group “had been caught” (Haley and 
X 154).  This realization (again functioning enthymematically—perhaps a precursor to 
the logic of Elijah Muhammad, which ultimately reforms him) seems to appeal to X, who 
begins to look at the racist plague in America in different terms.  At Bimbi’s suggestion, 
X enrolls in correspondence courses—first in English, and then in Latin as well. 
 Though it is ultimately the N.O.I. that changes X for good, we can see in these 
early initiatives at self-driven education perhaps something of an attempt to reconcile that 
distance that the newly-awakened Malcolm perceives.  Visual markers like the conk and 
the zoot suit have not allowed X to craft himself in the fashion which he desires, and I 
believe we can read his turn to education as a tactic designed to improve upon that result, 
and with similarly cartographic intent35. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  At	  this	  point,	  however,	  I	  believe	  we	  still	  have	  to	  see	  X	  working	  within	  the	  binary	  logic	  of	  prison.	  	  “Bimbi,”	  
perhaps	  having	  internalized	  that	  binary	  for	  too	  long,	  encourages	  X	  to	  educate	  himself	  in	  order	  to	  move	  closer	  to	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Certainly we can’t understand the impetus to learn that incarceration presents by 
itself.  A common element to prison literature is the drive for education, frequently driven 
by the prisoner’s desire to better his or her self.  But in X’s case, we can see the 
motivation of distance as well.  X has constantly ruminated over that teacher who 
discouraged him from pursuing a legal career.  Just before he gets arrested in Harlem, he 
actually maps this distance onto other black “old-timer hustlers” he knows who frequent 
the Negro club “Small’s.”  Intrigued at the young hustlers who would form circles around 
these “old-timers” to make sure they get enough to eat, and have clothing to keep them 
warm, X wonders at the meaning of such a motley group: 
In one sense, we were huddled in there, bonded together in seeking security and 
warmth and comfort from each other, and we didn’t know it.  All of us—who 
might have probed space, or cured cancer, or built industries—were, instead, 
black victims of the white man’s American social system.  (Haley and X 90, 
emphasis added) 
 
 “Huddled” together in a small club in Harlem, these men ponder the spaces they could 
have inhabited (including “space” itself), and yet without knowing “it,” the distance tells 
them nothing.  What is missing is the understanding of the “white man’s American social 
system”—that space that is charted by young Malcolm Little’s teacher back in Michigan, 
and every space which follows.  It is a refrain designed to encourage identification with 
Malcolm’s plight—the enthymematic endgame which culminates in his eventual 
recalculation.  For if the reader can be moved to X’s “side,” then X is no longer the 
alienated subject who so easily locked away and forgotten. 
So if X and his fellow hustlers didn’t “know it” yet (we can attribute this early 
revelation of theme to be the work of an authorial Malcolm X), the suggestion seems to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  acceptance	  side	  of	  the	  binary.	  	  Had	  the	  N.O.I.	  (which	  was	  perhaps	  pregnant	  with	  thirdspatial	  affect)	  not	  
appealed	  to	  X	  so	  much,	  it	  is	  conceivable	  he	  might	  have	  educated	  himself	  along	  more	  traditionally	  White	  lines	  
(perhaps	  including	  Christianity),	  and	  ended	  up	  a	  much	  different	  character	  than	  we	  now	  know.	  
	   97	  
be that it would take a trip to the penitentiary to understand their community as one of 
outcasts.  In reality, “it” was a lesson he’d been learning since childhood, but not until he 
is incarcerated (that is, not until his “place” has been made absolutely clear to him) does 
he begin to see the spatially disruptive power of it. 
 The prison chapters, in the book’s midsection, provide the thematic climax for 
X’s narrative.  X himself calls his life one of “changes,” and we see in his work the way 
that prison acts as an incubator for the grand transformation from “hood” to Muslim.  
Key to that transformation, we must conclude, is the location itself, which seems to prove 
in concrete space what X has been slowly realizing in rhetorical space:  that his life is 
very much a struggle to seize whatever scraps of opportunity have been left to him by the 
dominant society, who will punish and rebuke him for seizing those opportunities.  His 
life is something of a “rigged game,” precisely because he is not invited to participate in 
the dominant culture—he is alienated from it, and then punished for that distance.  This, 
at least, is the reading that X seems to encourage.   
 Prison becomes, for Malcolm X, both a site of destiny for America’s blacks36, as 
well as a site of potential transformation37.  It is, then, a site in which one can finally 
realize the distance that has been imposed upon him or her; yet upon that realization, it 
can also become a site for adopting tactics to fight that alienation.  It is both a site of 
mapping (or calculation, done here by society and authority), and a motivation to “re-
map” (by an enthymematic process of spatial inventory and recalculation, in response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  X	  in	  his	  final	  chapter:	  “I	  think	  that	  an	  objective	  reader	  may	  see	  how	  in	  the	  society	  to	  which	  I	  was	  exposed	  as	  a	  
black	  youth	  here	  in	  America,	  for	  me	  to	  wind	  up	  in	  a	  prison	  was	  really	  just	  about	  inevitable.	  	  It	  happens	  to	  so	  
many	  thousands	  of	  black	  youth”	  (Haley	  and	  X	  378).	  
37	  X,	  in	  his	  chapter	  describing	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  “Black	  Muslims”:	  	  “The	  white	  law	  agencies’	  second	  major	  concern	  
was	  the	  thing	  that	  I	  believe	  still	  ranks	  today	  as	  a	  big	  worry	  among	  America’s	  penologists:	  	  the	  steadily	  increasing	  
rate	  at	  which	  black	  convicts	  embrace	  Islam”	  (Haley	  and	  X	  258).	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that ordering influence).  Simplified further:  it is at once a space that orders, and a space 
that encourages reordering. 
 
Conclusion 
 As H. Bruce Franklin suggests, X’s Autobiography is a book that serves us as a 
landmark in prison literature, as it recasts the narrative of the prisoner in terms of victim 
rather than victimizer—a shift that certainly changes the genre (Franklin’s concern), but 
which serves as well to prototype a new cartographic potential for reclaiming or 
reconceiving of one’s identity (my concern).  Drawing upon the spatial resources 
available to him (including the thirdspace that he is to establish by the book’s end), X’s 
narrative draws upon the work of modern enthymeme to halt the flow of alienation, and 
then attempts to reverse this flow in the service of a newly-imagined, community-based 
ethos.  This halting and reverse are the processes I have labeled above spatial inventory 
and recalculation. 
 In constructing a spatial inventory, X’s goal is to unite the rhetorical spaces of his 
life into a cacophony of alienating voices—voices which, he understands, benefit 
tremendously by removing him from their proximity.  In X’s particular case, the 
inventory is led by the voice of that schoolteacher, who is at once asking Malcolm Little 
to conceive of himself as an educated adult (“What do you want to be?”), and at the same 
instant, making clear that his skin color will prevent him access to a mainstream, 
professional world (“That’s no realistic goal for a nigger”).  Perhaps the first realization 
of the inconsistencies of his place in the world, X uses this anecdote as an anchor point 
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for further inconsistencies, making his inventory perform the work of an exetastic 
buildup. 
 Drawing on the power of these inconsistencies, X then works to recalibrate his 
identity, following largely in the footsteps of Elijah Muhammad’s enthymematic story of 
the dirty glass.  That is, without directly invoking the “dirtiness” of his position, X is able 
to trigger a passional identification in the reader, who is motivated to stand with X by the 
laundry list of injustice drawn up by the inventory.  By the time the book concludes, I 
would argue that the reader is moved to strongly identify with X as an American citizen, 
and less so with his previous identities (“outsider,” “hate preacher,” “bigot,” etc.).  The 
“genius” of the Autobiography is that it recalibrates X by bringing the reader to him.   
 So we understand rhetorical cartography to be a largely enthymematic process—
one, that is, which draws heavily upon style and stance to persuade its audience of 
thirdspatial claims.  It is an informal logical system, and it functions largely as the result 
of the rhetor’s awareness of the environment he or she inhabits, and an ability to reveal 
that environment in new ways (indeed, in the case of binary-resistant thirdspaces, to 
reveal new environments altogether).  What we have charted in this chapter, then, is a 
framework for analyzing the cartographic preoccupation of those who look to textually 
“remap” themselves in rhetorical space.  In the remaining chapters of this volume, we 
will put to use this framework for considering the textual mappings of those who would 
follow X, in order to understand how they create themselves from the spaces they 
occupy.   
 
 




RACE, SPACE, AND DISTANCE 
 
I could feel fear and anger erupt within my body, the anger dominating the fear as 
the man’s malicious words echoed through my mind.  He had used the word black 
as though it was something nasty.  A stinking motherfucker who was trying to 
force us into an indecent act had the nerve to call us “black” with the implication 
that we were nasty, because of our blackness. 
      - Rubin Carter 
 
Part One:  “. . . black as though it was something nasty . . .” 
 Throughout Rubin “Hurricane” Carter’s 1974 autobiography, The 16th Round, the 
author busies himself not only with the depressing details of his marginalized life, but 
quite often we find him engaging in the kind of ordering work that we’ve already seen as 
an extension of prison’s logic (which, as we will see in this chapter, produces results that 
are both meaningful and abhorrent).  The quote that opens this chapter is no exception—
here, in rather stark terms, we find actors rigidly defined by two identities, one black and 
one homosexual.  That they come into conflict at all seems to be puzzling to Carter, but I 
would suggest the larger problem for him is the “unmappability” suggested earlier by 
Jameson:  lacking a more authoritative voice that might establish the value of these two 
camps, Carter himself is stunned at the racist accusations of a middle-aged White 
pederast who infiltrates his space and attempts to force Carter and his friends into sexual 
acts.  The problem for him seems to be one of simply questioning hierarchy:  if this 
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deviant can still use our black identity against us, then are we to understand ourselves as 
less than even the most predatory of his class? 
  The echoes of homophobia ring throughout The 16th Round with disappointing 
regularity, and make reading the book uncomfortable for most audiences in 2015.  
Whether we choose to rationalize his behavior or launch into accusations of his character, 
I believe the homophobic tendencies of Carter to be a product of cartographic rhetoric, 
and it is at precisely this point (the above quote) that we begin to see how such 
spatialization becomes an important part of Carter’s argument38. 
 But like all stories, this one requires some contextualization.  At this point in the 
book—a chapter titled “A Fight for Life”—Carter is still a young kid in Paterson, New 
Jersey.  As the leader (or “war chief”) of his neighborhood gang, the “Apaches,” Carter 
begins by relating various scuffles that have busied his crew, primarily those that involve 
a rival gang, known as the “Mohawks.”  But the point of such discussion is to get to a 
space of great importance for Carter:  the swimming hole at the Passaic Waterfall, known 
by neighborhood kids as “Tubbs.”  An unlikely display of diplomacy among the Paterson 
gangs, Tubbs, as a space, seems to bring out a less hostile side of the tribal gangs: 
The gangs’ governing bodies had agreed that there could never be any justifiable 
reason to violate this swimming hole’s neutrality.  To do so was looked upon as 
an act worse than treason.  It was the only place in Paterson—or in all of Passaic 
County, for that matter—where all club members were on neutral ground. (Carter 
26, emphasis added) 
 
Tubbs, then, is not simply recreational.  It becomes, to Carter and his fellow gang 
members, a “free space”—a concrete space turned rhetorical, where all kids can enjoy the 
weather, and importantly, exist on neutral ground.  Forget tribal identities and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  It’s worth mentioning that this line of argument begins very early on in the book—just twenty-six pages in, in my 
paperback edition.	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hierarchies that hold them in place:  at Tubbs, a concrete belief in equality between 
children transforms the space into a neutral ground that does not exist anywhere else in 
Paterson.  And in some way, the diplomacy of the kids actually turns this space into 
something larger than its physical features would suggest: 
We called the place “Tubbs”—a reference to its size and shape.  Relatively 
speaking, Tubbs was no larger than an ordinary bathtub, but hardly pure enough 
to bathe in.  The filthy water in which we luxuriated was about five or six feet 
deep, complicated by a deadly whirlpool where a small waterfall began.  More 
than one boy had lost his life in these muddy waters, but Tubbs was our Mecca in 
the summertime, the only one we had, and we loved every stinking nasty inch of it.  
(Carter 26-7, emphasis added) 
 
So despite the small size (it’s hard to imagine any large group of children sharing a 
swimming hole no bigger than a bathtub; much less a large group of gang members), the 
poor water quality, and the very real threat of death, Tubbs becomes transformed by these 
kids into something more.  A “Mecca,” which, as it’s used here, sounds more like a 
metaphor used to show reverence than pilgrimage.   
Favoring the pejoratives “stinking” and “nasty” as he does (these adjectives are 
commonly used throughout The 16th Round; more frequently to describe people, rather 
than spaces), we can conclude that the physical location of Tubbs is quite depressing.  
Yet, for Carter and crew, its rhetorical dimensions make it something special.  It is 
certainly not favored for its beauty or accommodations, emphasizing the nature of the site 
as one predicated on a type of egalitarianism.  Tubbs is “neutral ground,” understood to 
be free of violence (amounting to “treason” for those who break that trust), and a large 
part of its appeal is in the freedom from order.  Even rival gang members—those who 
have self-ordered—seem disinterested in their identities at the swimming hole. 
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So all is serene and neutral, but as the chapter’s title suggests, this is not to last.  
The details are presented with the vagueness of childhood memory, but a rough sequence 
of events can be understood:  Carter and his friends are enjoying a day at Tubbs when 
they spot an older man (in his early thirties) laying in the grass nearby, apparently drunk.  
The crew makes typical jokes at his appearance, but Carter notes, “[h]e didn’t look like 
the common hobo that I was familiar with” (Carter 30), and suggests the man was simply 
feigning drunkenness.  Before long, the man rises and moves to confront Carter and his 
friends—offering first a gold wristwatch to anyone who will come closer.  When no one 
takes the offer, he pulls off a gold wedding band and offers it as well.  Still no takers. 
At this point, Carter says the man seemed to sober up quickly, and goes to 
intercept one of the boys.  Begging for company, the man starts to go for the boy’s belt, 
calling his young victim “darling” and “Moonshine” in a flirtatious play.  When the boy 
breaks free, the man changes his tone, calling the young boy a “black bastard,” and 
threatens to “take some” (Carter 30-1).  It is at this point that Carter becomes enraged, 
grabs an empty bottle, and throws it at the attacking outsider.  The two end up in a 
scuffle, and, overpowered by the older man, our author claims that his life was in danger.  
Carter pulls a pocket knife from his jeans and stabs his attacker repeatedly.  As Rubin 
flees the scene, he is convinced the man is dead. 
It later turns out that the man has survived, and when the police come for Carter, 
he is dealt his first sentence in a correctional facility:  the camp-like Jamesburg State 
Home for Boys.  And with the sentence comes an important lesson that will figure into 
Carter’s extended narrative:  as a black man, he is constantly in the “wrong place.” If it 
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wasn’t obvious to him before, it becomes so after a space of his own co-invention 
becomes the site of his undoing. 
 So it is that even at Tubbs, where he thought himself the most equal to those 
around him, he finds that the dominant white culture can invade on a whim, and 
reconfigure his identity without his participation.  Based on the amount of time devoted 
to Tubbs and Jamesburg (pages 26 through 92, in my edition) and the placement of these 
section so close to the text’s beginning, we can understand this lesson to be perhaps one 
of the most formative of Carter’s life.  It will certainly be used to explain his other legal 
troubles to come. 
In the previous chapter, we explored the notion of rhetorical cartography by 
analyzing the works of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, and while I don’t 
mean to suggest that only African-American men of the civil rights era exhibit a 
cartographic awareness in their enthymematic constructions of identity, I am aware that 
by moving now to an analysis of Rubin Carter I may seem a little short-sighted.  I 
believe, however, that the racial component of texts such as these may allow us a distinct 
site of entry into a deeper examination of rhetorical space and those who use it for 
persuasion.   
This chapter will explore Carter’s text in order to understand an awareness of 
spatiality informed not only by the prison context (though certainly that context is 
important to this project), but also by the socially-constructed issue of race as it plays out 
in modern American society, for in this light also we may notice a distinct tendency 
toward cartographic rhetoric.  The notion of race, it will be shown, has as much impact 
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upon the rhetorical cartography of imprisoned writers as does the environment of prison 
itself. 
 
Part Two:  Connecting Faces and Souls 
 Understanding race as an inherently spatial feature is oftentimes a contentious 
argument in America, owing to an ugly legacy of subordination and segregation.  But this 
issue can be as simple (though admittedly reductive) as turning again to the type of 
binary logic we’ve seen favored by American institutions:  white is not black and, in fact, 
gains its whiteness in large measure because of its distant relationship to black.  The 
identity of each category is dependent upon the existence of the other, and then 
reinforced by an attention to distance.  The relationship is so significant, in fact, that it 
may be hard to discern the logic that created such spatiality in the first place:  was the 
creation of a category called “white” an attempt to distance outsiders from dominant 
culture, or a means of defining that dominant culture as a distinct, privileged entity?  
Since the two ends of the binary depend so much upon each other for definition, it is 
simply impossible to place primacy on one or the other reading—they happen mutually, 
and the strong relationship between them indicates a clearly territorial intention in the 
way race gets created and managed.  That is to say, while arguing white/black may seem 
at heart an identity issue, in light of the distance and boundaries that are inevitably 
created in its service, the binary is very much a spatial issue as well. 
 Because just as we construct space, so too do we construct race.  That second 
clause is certainly a contentious one, as critical race theorist Ian F. Hanley López 
demonstrates in his article “The Social Construction of Race.”  Tracing the ways that 
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Americans have traditionally attempted, unsuccessfully, to define race as a biological 
trait, Hanley López turns to the fading relationship between the United States and Mexico 
that began in the early 19th century to illustrate how race can be constructed:  “In 1821, 
when Mexico gained its independence, its residents were not generally considered a race.  
Twenty years later, as [American travel writer T.J.] Farnham’s writing shows, Mexicans 
were denigrated in explicitly racial terms as indolent cowards” (Hanley López 171).  
Thus, “Mexicans” were created, textually, in compliance with the political will of the 
majority.   
Highlighting the arbitrary nature of such constructions, Hanley López reveals that 
just two decades later, in the writings of Arizona mine owner Sylvester Mowry, we see a 
reference to Mexicans as “naturally industrious and faithful” (Hanley López 171).  And 
of course, by the early 20th century, such definitions would be reversed as xenophobic 
authority began to punish the Mexican identity with claims in the opposite direction.  For 
Hanley López, this century of constantly shifting attitudes towards Mexican nationals is 
an example par excellence of the “plasticity of race”:   
Accretions of racial meaning are not sedimentary products which once deposited 
remain solid and unchanged, or subject only to a slow process of abrasion, 
erosion, and buildup.  Instead, the processes of racial fabrication continuously 
melt down, mold, shatter, and recast races:  races are not rocks, they are plastics. 
(Hanley López 171, emphasis added) 
 
I very much like the use of the term fabrication here, for it reminds us of the similarities 
between spatial meaning and construction of identity.  Casting race as a process of 
fabrication calls attention to the human action needed to distinguish one set of human 
beings from another, much as we would delineate borders in geography, leading Hanley 
López to his main argument: 
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Races are categories of difference which exist only in society:  They are produced 
by myriad conflicting social forces; they overlap and inform other social 
categories; they are fluid rather than static and fixed; and they make sense only in 
relationship to other racial categories, having no meaningful independent 
existence.  Race is socially constructed.  (Hanley López 171, emphasis added) 
 
Two thoughts are important in the above quote:  the first is quite simply that “race is 
socially constructed,” which, for our purposes, allows it to become an underlying feature 
of rhetorical cartography (which is innately interested in human constructions of space, as 
they occur in text); the second is the implication that essentialist or biological definitions 
of race are deceptive, for races mean nothing independently of one another.  Hanley 
López continually establishes this second point in his article as he claims there is greater 
variation, genetically, between members of any one “race” than there may be between 
differing “races”—a point that formed the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
against Japanese-born immigrant Takao Ozawa in the 1922 case Ozawa v. United States 
(Hanley López 167) 39.   
In what may be the finest sentence of his piece (certainly the most useful for this 
project), Hanley López comments that “social meanings connect our faces to our souls” 
(Hanley López 165), and it is upon that point that we should pause for a moment to 
consider the place of race-minded criteria in this research project.  If our faces connect to 
our souls via socially-constructed meaning, what does this mean for incarcerated writers 
specifically, and rhetorical cartography in general? 
The answer in both cases is likely centered on the identification of human 
agency—this in opposition to natural effect—that creates or “fabricates” those faces, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 From Hanley Lopez:  “When Japanese-born Takao Ozawa applied for citizenship he asserted, as required by the 
Naturalization Act, that he was a ‘white person.’  Counsel for Ozawa pointedly argued that to reject Ozawa’s petition 
for naturalization would be ‘to exclude a Japanese who is ‘white’ in color.’  This argument did not persuade the Court” 
(Hanley Lopez 167). 
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which are meant to reveal one’s soul.  Thus, regardless of the interior of the person, how 
he or she will be known to the world (this is surely the “face” Hanley López is driving at) 
is subject to social intervention, which is likely entirely beyond the control of the 
individual his or herself.  The point is worth considering:  we can control our expressions 
and perhaps work to shape our facial features to some extent, but how these things 
explain who we are is left, in essence, to those who we come in contact with. This is the 
lesson that Carter was forced to learn at Tubbs:  if not that his identity was determined by 
others, at least that such identity was malleable enough to change in an instant. 
Thus, in a metaphorical stream of identity, there is in fact a “current” that each of 
us may be swimming with or against—the direction dependent upon which side of the 
dominating/minority paradigm you happen to be assigned.  This “swimming” then 
becomes of cartographic impetus, as we seek either to align ourselves with, or to move 
against, the rush of social mediation.  In writing (as in speech), this plays out rhetorically, 
and so understanding the social construction of race allows us to conceptualize the forces 
that push or pull one along, even as he or she attempts to move his or herself.  That this 
swimming plays out differently for different “races” is perhaps immediately 
recognizable, but is important enough to state plainly here. 
For the specific site of prison itself, Hanley López’s understanding of how 
identity is formed by external sources (that is, external to the individual) feels especially 
useful, for the placement of people into carceral settings is a quite startling, though very 
simple, example of how identity can be radically altered by strangers.  Many of us may 
have felt “labeled,” “distanced,” or “othered” at some point in our lives, whether by an 
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individual or a group, and this type of alienation usually produces a fair amount of 
anxiety; an anxiety that requires response. 
Let’s take a hypothetical look at commonplace schoolyard altercation to illustrate:  
consider the young boy on the playground who is called “sissy” by his classmates.  A 
couple of things are important in this example:  the first is that what is being highlighted 
in this encounter is both the behavior of the individual child, as well as the distance of 
that behavior from those doing the name-calling.  It both lowers the status of the 
recipient, and elevates the status of the speaker(s) as well.  The second important point is 
that this type of labeling invites the recipient of the insult to respond in some meaningful 
way—perhaps in a showcase of masculine feats aimed at challenging the alienation 
(Well, could a sissy do THIS?!), or maybe just in a verbal argument regarding the terms 
of the distance charted (LeBron James is afraid of heights too, and he’s not a sissy!).  
Being located in an undesirable way, the recipient of the insult feels it his duty to contest 
that location, or to recast that majority position as defective in its own right.   
Of course we’re speaking in hypotheticals here, but if we can understand such 
hypothetical bullying as a spatially-preoccupied assertion of identity—both in how it 
alienates its subject and how it invites contestation—then we can apply the same function 
to a more rigid setting.  The American prison system, in fact, can be said to function in 
largely the same way:  it alienates (or “mortifies,” in Goffman’s terminology) the subject 
from his or her culture (at the same time elevating itself as the institution with the moral 
“high-ground”), and encourages that subject to attempt renegotiations (in a spatial 
metaphor, we could consider these “remappings”) to close that distance a bit.  In light of 
Goffman’s detailed analysis of the mortification process (see Goffman 12-74), I would 
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suggest this applies to all prisoners, though we must consider how this point is especially 
salient in regards to those whose racial identity, as Hanley López demonstrates, makes 
them especially subject to spatial organization.  As the African-American population is so 
often understood to be disproportionately incarcerated by the justice system40, the 
writings of this subculture surely hold significant insights into the inner-workings of 
rhetorical cartography as understood in this project.. 
 As we move towards a rhetorical analysis of specifically African-American 
inmates, one remaining concept must be considered to adequately prepare our 
cartographic framework:  that of what carceral narratives mean to the group under 
consideration.  In part, we’ve explored this element already, to the extent that we have 
theorized cartographic responses to be a product of, and answer to, prior cartographic 
action (à la our hypothetical schoolboy).  So at a minimum, we can understand carceral 
narratives authored by incarcerated African-Americans to be an attempt at redefining the 
distance created between society and themselves—in large part, these authors appear to 
be interested in proving themselves closer to the majority that has rejected them, just as 
our fictional schoolboy might if he were to begin exhibiting his athletic ability in the face 
of name-calling.   
 But this understanding of rhetorical cartography is rather general, and provides us 
no specific insight into the minority group chosen as this chapter’s thematic scaffolding.  
How then, might we shape our cartographic thinking in order to appropriately draw 
conclusions about African-American prison literature, in particular? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  For reference, see the NAACP “Criminal Justice Fact Sheet,” which claims black incarceration rates to be around 
six times higher than white, even when considering similar crimes (“Criminal Justice Fact Sheet”).  	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 It may help in this case to consider also the work of critical race theorist and civil 
rights scholar Richard Delgado, who finds an important utility in a practice he calls 
counterstorytelling.  In his article “Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:  A Plea for 
Narrative,” Delgado begins with a consideration of the types of narratives that we are 
examining here, under the rather broad category of “legal stories”: 
Many [. . .] who have been telling legal stories are members of what could be 
loosely described as outgroups, groups whose marginality defines the boundaries 
of the mainstream, whose voice and perspective—whose consciousness—has 
been suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized. (Delgado 60, emphasis added) 
 
Though Delgado’s idea of “legal stories” is necessarily broad for the purposes of his own 
work, it is not hard to understand the application to prison literature.  For while a good 
number of prison-authored texts make it a point in their storytelling to explore the world 
outside of the legal system, when we account for their textual existence as being driven 
by the locating/ordering power of the justice system, we quickly see that all prison texts 
are inherently “legal stories.”  Like the theoretical black hole, then, I think the drive to 
author “legal stories” becomes inescapable once the subject crosses that event horizon of 
the prison sentence; this is because the law orders, and the “legal story” attempts to 
correct/refute that order.  Foucault theorizes that the prison serves to legitimize and 
replicate its own power (this is in large part due to its reproduction of “delinquents”; see 
Foucault 264-71), and we might consider this replication force as well:  driven into an 
environment that largely governed by attempts to instill order in its inhabitants, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that those inmates then become attentive to order on the inside.  We 
accept this line of thinking readily with our military, but I think we rarely draw the same 
conclusion about our penitentiaries. 
	   112	  
 Delgado speculates that the legal stories of minorities serve as a refutation of the 
majority’s narrative, in a manner that is reminiscent of our previous discussions on 
thirdspace: 
The attraction of stories for these [minority] groups should come as no surprise.  
For stories create their own bonds, represent cohesion, shared understandings, and 
meanings.  The cohesiveness that stories bring is part of the strength of the 
outgroup.  An outgroup creates its own stories, which circulate within the group 
as a kind of counter-reality.  (Delgado 60, emphasis added).  
 
Counterstorytelling, then, can be understood along the same lines as thirdspace in that 
both seek to subvert power mechanisms that perhaps should discourage dissent or debate 
among oppressed peoples.  Counterstorytelling is not explicitly spatial, as we see in 
Soja’s thoughts on thirdspace, but as Delgado continues to develop his thesis, we see a 
kind of relational spatiality built into its theorization, and a direct invocation of the 
racialized group under discussion in this chapter: 
The dominant group creates its own stories, as well.  The stories or 
narratives told by the ingroup remind it of its identity in relation to outgroups, and 
provide it with a form of shared reality in which its own superior position is seen 
as natural.  The stories of the outgroups aim to subvert that reality.  In civil rights, 
for example, many in the majority hold that any inequality between blacks and 
whites is due either to cultural lag or inadequate enforcement of currently existing 
beneficial laws—both of which are easily correctable.  For many minority 
persons, the principle instrument of their subordination is neither of these.  
Rather, it is the prevailing mindset by means of which members of the dominant 
group justify the world as it is, that is, with whites on top and browns and blacks 
at the bottom. 
 Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for 
destroying mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared 
understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes 
place.  (Delgado 60-1, original emphasis) 
 
	   113	  
For Delgado, then, the utility of counterstorytelling is in disrupting oppressive ideology41, 
and it does so not by finding “new spaces” to occupy (as in the binary-disrupting power 
of thirdspace), but rather by simply destroying the unspoken authority of the majority.  
Delgado actually defends counterstorytelling in this manner, referring to the practice as 
the “destructive other half” of the creative dialectic (Delgado 61); thus rendering both 
stories and counterstories not as discrete units in perpetual combat, but two necessary 
(perhaps complementary) halves of the same ongoing discussion.  The “law” may put you 
in your place, where you can tell “legal stories” to try to challenge that position. 
 This is a useful frame of mind for us to consider when heading into the rhetorical 
analysis of African-American prisoners, whom we so often see as unlucky insurgents or 
victims perpetually trying to fight back against a system too large to be fought.  Indeed, 
these authors are often victims, but we should resist seeing their rhetorical efforts as some 
kind of Sisyphean errand.  Understanding these inmates’ rhetorical efforts as a significant 
portion of the dialectic regarding penality is a useful starting point for such analysis as 
follows, for it gives each individual rhetorical act both the potential to be response in and 
of itself, and the potential to be responded to.  Since rhetorical cartography is chiefly 
interested with textual presentations of relationship and distance, this dialectical nature is 
worthy of our attention, and may aid in our understanding of the cartographic instinct, 
especially as it applies to rhetors located in the African-American experience. 
 For them, it is clear, prison is not the first location in which they are cast as an 
outgroup. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This term is preferable, for this project, to Delgado’s less certain “mindset,” which leaves something to be desired in 
precision.  Delgado continues to qualify his term, including the claim that “mindsets” are “nearly invisible”; 
“eyeglasses that we have worn for a long time” (Delgado 61).  This field’s familiarity with the term “ideology” makes 
it a more appropriate substitution here. 
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Part Three:  “Here Comes the Story of ‘The Hurricane’” 
At about 3:00 a.m. on June 17, 1966, the late night calm of Paterson, New Jersey 
was suddenly shattered by the voices of an angry white mob that had gathered in 
front of a dilapidated old bar and grill.  The crowd furiously pushed and shoved 
against a cordon of police officers who had surrounded the tired nightspot, trying 
to get a look at the four bullet-riddled, blood-smeared bodies lying on the floor 
inside. (Carter 1, emphasis added) 
 
 So begins the narrative of former middleweight boxer Rubin “Hurricane” Carter, 
as represented by his 1974 autobiography The 16th Round:  From Number 1 Contender to 
Number 45472, written while Carter was doing a double-life sentence in Rahway State 
Prison in Eastern New Jersey. Convicted (despite eyewitness accounts that he was not 
involved; crippling false testimony from witnesses and police alike; having his first trial 
thrown out by the court) of taking part in a triple homicide42 in his hometown of 
Paterson, New Jersey, Carter seems immediately interested in tracing the spatiality of his 
wrongful conviction.  In part, this is achieved through the work’s title alone, which 
preoccupies itself with showing the “fall” from “Number 1 Contender” to New Jersey 
State inmate number 45472—a descent which hinges on the assumed cultural distance 
between celebrated athlete and convicted murderer. 
 Taking that preoccupation with distance further, Carter immediately invokes 
racial alienation as he paints the scene of the murder for us with spatial precision:  the 
city of Paterson is subject to “angry white” mobs whose existence in the city—as echoed 
by the narrative style of this opening—seems to predate that of the speaker himself.  As 
our author and his friend, John Artis, are escorted to the hospital on the night of the 
incident (where they are held for identification by the lone survivor of the shooting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  That fourth victim mentioned in the opening quote to this section—that of Willie Marins—would eventually recover 
from a gunshot wound to the head that left him blind in one eye.  Marins himself dismissed both Carter and his friend, 
John Artis, as suspects on the night of the shooting.  However, Marins’ testimony would be later dismissed due to his 
condition, and Carter would be given two life sentences, with Artis picking up the third murder charge.	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Willie Marins) we are treated to further subtle hints on the racial divide that characterizes 
Paterson:  the “rough” search that each are subjected to, and Marins’ hospital room, 
which is just as “starch-white” as the individuals who work within it (Carter 2).  Thus, by 
the time Carter openly reveals the problematic way in which he has been “mapped” 
within Paterson, we as readers may have beat him to the realization: 
Everything suddenly fell into place.  I realized with a deep-seated uneasiness that 
if, in fact, two black men had shot this man, then it would make no difference to 
[the people of Paterson] that I was short, and the boy with me tall; that I was bald, 
bearded, and ugly while John Artis had no hair on his face at all; that I was black 
as virgin soot, and he as yellow as the sun—because to this critically injured man 
teetering there on the brink of death, all black people would look the same, 
especially those the cops had brought in.  (Carter 2-3, emphasis added)  
 
Looking back to Delgado’s insight on faces and souls, we see quite easily that Carter 
expects all black faces to “look the same” in Paterson because they share a common 
“soul” in the minds of the local white population.  Surely exaggerated for the sake of the 
narrative (the record shows that Marins, despite overwhelming pressure from the police, 
didn’t simply accuse the first black man the police brought to him as his attacker), what 
we may more productively see in Carter’s opening gambit is the impetus for his own 
cartographic work.  In other words, it is not of primary importance that Paterson’s white 
majority was truly as divisive on that night in 1966 as Carter portrays them; rather, what 
is important is that Carter sets the reader up to immediately recognize this alienation, for 
it is that perception that will ultimately drive what we can see as the author’s refrain:  to 
be black in America is to be, necessarily, something less than a citizen. 
 Let’s pause here to consider Carter’s argument graphically.  If we recall Figure 
2.1 (see Chapter Two) as a starting place for Merle Haggard’s spatial arguments, the most 
important point becomes the choice of Haggard’s narrator between two discrete spaces:  
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what I termed “Good World” (Freedom) and “Bad World” (Prison).  While the influence 
of “Mama” seemed set to pull the narrator into that “Good World” sphere, we noted that 
the rebellious attitude of Haggard’s protagonist resulted in a departure from that path 
towards the path of the outlaw.  Important to our consideration here is that this “map” 
depended upon the element of choice:  you can have the good life, but rejecting it 
necessarily means a bad one, in the form of prison. 
 In Carter, I believe a very similar operation to be in play, though with the element 
of choice removed.  We might consider Carter’s “map” to be more like what I’ve 
illustrated below as Figure 3.1—a graphic which tries to keep the important dimensions 
of Fig. 2.1 in place while interjecting the social reality of our author’s position. 
 
Fig. 3.1 – “The Binary Logic of Racism” 
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 In Figure 3.1, we see the same two worlds reflected in text as we saw with 
Haggard; however, in the important place of “Mama,” who was conceived as an advocate 
for Haggard’s narrator, we find in Carter’s mapping what I will call a gatekeeper43.  For 
Carter, unlike Haggard, the ultimate destination is not a choice; that point of arrival will 
depend on his being allowed, by this gatekeeper, into the world that he desires.  
Unfortunately for Carter, the gatekeeper he has identified is skin color, and lacking the 
appropriate physical features, he uses this map to reveal how he will never be allowed 
into the spaces of dominant culture. 
 Let us unpack this map for a moment, as I’m aware of its deceptive simplicity.  I 
want to clarify that this mapping is not of my construction, but rather my attempt to 
reveal, graphically, the major tenant of Carter’s narrative.  Having mapped his 
postionality based not on choice but on skin color, Carter, I believe, begins to explain to 
himself the way that that his contact points with the dominant culture (configured, as 
Paterson, to be mostly white) always result in his incarceration.  Originally lacking the 
ability to understand the invasion of Tubbs that occurred in his childhood, Carter 
becomes able to express a “truth” about his life through his cartographic actions.  What 
he arrives at, with the map revealed in Fig. 3.1, is a simple understanding of citizenship:  
to be black in America is to be, necessarily, something less than a citizen. 
 For how else can we understand the Tubbs invasion?  In a presumably neutral 
space (what we might productively called a literal “thirdspace”), Carter and his allies 
believed themselves to be “equal”—a term that seems to apply to more than just the gang 
kids who interact there.  I think we can read Carter’s early introduction to Tubbs as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Of	  course,	  “Mama”	  was	  a	  gatekeeper	  as	  well.	  	  Haggard’s	  narrator	  simply	  doesn’t	  see	  her	  as	  such.	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something of an active creation, dependent on the agency of the gang members 
themselves:  “We called the place ‘Tubbs’; “Tubbs was our Mecca” (Carter 26-7, 
emphasis added).  Even more revealing here is the indication by Carter that Tubbs had its 
own procedures to be followed:  “Even allowing for the official neutrality of the territory, 
there was very little intermingling between us.  But the rules required greetings and 
salutations, and these we extended to each member of the other clubs, according to his 
rank and reputation” (Carter 27, emphasis added).  If we add to this the earlier statement 
that violating the spot’s neutrality was “looked upon as an act worse than treason,” we 
can easily see that Tubbs is an invented spot with rules and regulations—an order that is 
perhaps surprising coming from those who are so often assumed to be disorderly. 
 But this space seems to be corrupted nearly instantly,  with the simple arrival of 
an older, white outsider.  In terms that reflect this project, I think we find this incident to 
suggest that thirdspace, while certainly prized by Soja, is perhaps fragile at best.  The 
thirdspace of Tubbs was not enough to order our narrator, and so he would be moved to 
Jamesburg State Home for Boys—that is, torn from the “neutral” rhetorical space of his 
creation, and dumped into a rigidly ordered state institution.  In terms more familiar to 
Carter’s line of thought, this instance certainly reflects the thesis that to be black in 
America is to be, necessarily, something less than a citizen. 
 I’ve repeated this phrase often in this chapter because I believe it speaks to the 
construction of Carter’s long-term argument.  For if blackness is necessarily a deficiency 
that obfuscates citizenship, then Carter needs to do very little explaining of his future 
periods of incarceration.  What we see is, once again, enthymematic:  having established, 
via the incident at Tubbs, that the major struggle of his life is one predicated on 
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inconsistency (the predator at Tubbs is afforded more social status than the black 
children), we as readers tend to note similar trends in every space Carter then moves 
through, including (chronologically) Annandale Reformatory, Trenton State Prison, and 
Rahway State Prison. When one reflects on the amount of time spent, narratively, in 
Jamesburg (approximately 58 pages44), compared to the rush of narrative time spent in 
these later institutions, I believe we see that Carter understood his first brush with 
institutional logic to be not only formative for him as a person, but certainly foundation 
for his argument as well. 
 As we now see a very spatial and enthymematic design behind Carter’s writing, 
let us consider The 16th Round as a discrete message that, against staggering odds, found 
its way out of the prison where it was written and into a mainstream society that 
eventually pardoned its author.   Understanding the cartographic structure as we do, we 
should be able to now explore how such spatiality produced a successful plea for release.  
In large part, as the next section will argue, this “success” is due to the narrative’s clear 
preoccupation with redressing spatiality, and the identity that forms in the wake of such 
revision.  That Carter understands this important connection is revealed through his 
spatial inventory, which is our first object of investigation. 
 Yet before we continue with this analysis, we must attend to the issue of 
innocence and guilt (here we are again delving in to the binary logic of the prison 
system).  To be perfectly clear, the degree of Carter’s innocence or guilt is of no interest 
to me in this project.  Despite Carter’s release in 1985, there still exists a level of doubt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  In estimating this, I’m starting with the introduction to Jamesburg in the chapter “Hell Hath No Fury Like the State 
Home’s Scorn” (beginning on page 43) and including most of the text that runs through the chapter “Free, Free at 
Last!,” which details his escape from Jamesburg.  The latter chapter, while occurring narratively after his escape, is so 
full of memories and references to Jamesburg that I think we have to consider it still very much of that vein.	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among those interested in his case as regards his innocence—a debate which was recently 
called back to life by Carter’s death on April 20, 2014.  The reversal of Carter’s 
conviction was predicated on racist attitudes and improperly collected evidence on the 
part of the Paterson police department—in other words, it was based on the conduct of 
the investigators (found to be acting in a racist manner), rather than on any evidence of 
Carter’s innocence.  Following his release, support for Carter surprisingly waned, perhaps 
evidenced most visibly by Bob Dylan’s refusal to play his song “Hurricane” in concert.  
Speculation from those interested in this refusal claim Dylan’s abandonment of the song 
stems from a shaken faith in Carter’s innocence; however, this argument is met with the 
point that Dylan’s change in style and tour setup may have rendered “Hurricane” too out 
of place or impractical to perform.  Dylan’s silence on the subject keeps the debate active 
to this day. 
 But in the case of this project, Carter’s innocence or guilt is irrelevant. Deciding 
whether Carter was involved in the triple homicide under discussion moves our analysis 
into problematic terrain.  What is actually useful about the case and the memoir it 
spawned is the effect it had on Carter’s freedom, and the spatial impetus that would 
influence the rhetoric used within that memoir.  In other words, the debate surrounding 
Carter’s culpability is merely a distraction to the real issue under exploration here:  how 
Carter uses rhetorical cartography to reconfigure his identity against the state’s design.  
Unlike Dylan’s song, this is not a story of “The Hurricane.”  It is an analysis of the story 
written by “The Hurricane.” 
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Growing Pains:  Spatial Inventories of a Young Hurricane 
 In a rhetorical move that may owe something to the prototypical Autobiography of 
Malcolm X (see Chapter Two), after setting up the scene of the Paterson triple homicide 
of June 1966 (and then locating himself within it), Carter’s first chapter in The 16th 
Round takes us back to the beginning of his life in Delwanna, New Jersey.  As the book 
opens, Carter is immediately drawn towards locating himself within larger spheres of 
culture: 
Rubin, my Christian name, comes from the book of Genesis, chapter 29, verse 32 
of the Holy Scriptures.  Other than both of us being black, that about the only 
thing the Bible and I ever had in common. 
Hurricane is the professional name that I acquired later on in life.  It provides an 
accurate description of the destructive forces that rage within my soul. 
Carter is the slave name that was given to my forefathers who worked in the 
cotton fields of Alabama and Georgia, and was passed on to me. (Carter 4, 
original emphasis) 
 
Right away, then, I think we see Carter’s rhetorical mission is to show himself at a level 
of removal from mainstream society: his name reveals a distance from the religion that 
takes primacy in American culture, a “destructive force” that paints him as violent, and a 
legacy of oppression that separates him from the mainstream white society that once 
forcibly ordered his ancestors.  What we might see as telling within this opening gambit 
is the level of disconnectedness Carter feels about his own name—with the exception of 
“Hurricane,” which gets the most concrete explanation of the three offerings, Rubin 
Carter seems to feel ambivalent about the names given to him by his family.  A 
misplaced faith in the Christian Bible and the legacy of slavery work not to connect 
Carter to his own family or culture, but almost as question marks or placeholders for an 
identity he is still considering—or as I would argue, placeholders for the spaces that will 
mold his identity.   
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 In this way, Carter’s name is used more to introduce the main theme of his work: 
the instability of his identity, and the way that all attempts to identify himself in the 
future will be set very much against the efforts already undertaken on behalf of the 
majority to define him in their own right.  We might expect an author opening his or her 
autobiography with an attention to names to use those names in order that we might gain 
a more concrete understanding of who he or she is.  With Carter, we get instead only the 
introduction of how “plastic” his identity really is—plastic not for its demonstrated 
malleability, but for its potential. 
 Working towards an understanding of Carter’s spatial inventory is our first object 
of analysis here, and as I hope will be obvious, it is an investigation that has already 
started here with the above discussion of Tubbs.  What we arrived at there was the 
recognition that Tubbs, as a discrete space that had been partially engineered by the 
young gang kids that Carter socialized with, was reconfigured by the arrival of an 
outsider who, nevertheless, outranked the kids that frequented the swimming hole (in 
terms of age certainly, but skin color even more).  In that instance, I commented that 
Tubbs became a spot of genesis for Carter’s main argument:  to be black in America is, 
necessarily, to be something less than a citizen.  Here, we will look at the other spaces 
which figure into Carter’s spatial inventory, and how those spaces contribute to the 
argument already started. 
 Fairly immediately, readers would be hard pressed to find locations established 
which work along the lines of equality or unity.  For the most part, Carter’s inventory of 
spaces featured throughout his childhood and early adulthood feel more centered on the 
notion of conflict—typically conflict which results in violent combat and Carter’s 
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alienation from others.  Basements become a thematic trend in this inventory:  from the 
basement of his own apartment building in Passaic (where, as a young kid, he brutally 
beats an older boy trying to steal the Carter family’s coal) to the basement of his 
dormitory at the Jamesburg State Home for Boys where he is sentenced as a pre-teen (and 
where he is frequently attacked and threatened by inmates and guards alike), these 
subterranean locations are frequently cast as dark, ugly spaces where, perhaps 
understandably, dark, ugly things happen (see Carter 6-9; 49-53; 55-61; 64-6); frequently 
against Carter’s best efforts.  So it is that even after defending his family’s coal supply in 
that first basement encounter of the book, his father comes home to whip him for his 
fighting (Carter 9). 
 One surprising effect of these subterranean spaces is that they already show Carter 
to be caught up in a web of invoked distance.  Writing of his run-in with the antagonist 
referred to only as “Bully,” Carter betrays an uncomfortable level of interest with pushing 
this marginalized subject into further marginalization:  “When I reached the cellar, I 
vaguely made out the outline of Bully’s body in the obscurity of the coal bin.  His 
features blended almost perfectly into the blueness of the coal he was stealing—this cat 
was just that black” (Carter 7, emphasis added).  We might be tempted to view such 
description as somewhat reverential—a young Afro-American boy prizing the darker skin 
color of his rival.  But all too easily, that context changes, and when Carter’s father 
comes home to find Bully’s mother weeping at his doorstep, Carter’s description begins 
to take on a new meaning.  Consider the following passage, in which Carter considers the 
injustice of his own father siding with Bully:  “He could at least have tried to get my side 
of the story, I felt, or even my brother’s or Lillian’s.  No.  He believed Bully’s black 
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picker-headed mammy—and I’ll bet she was the one who had sent Bully over in the first 
place” (Carter 9, emphasis added). 
 Here we witness the first instance of Carter’s self-deprecating stance towards 
“blackness”—though an African-American himself, Carter makes sure to emphasize the 
darker skin of his rival by attaching it to a negative stereotype (the “picker-headed 
mammy”), and ends finally with an unwarranted assumption of criminality.  In my mind, 
such rhetoric follows the same prevailing binary logic that the young Rubin laments in 
Paterson:  to be black in America is, necessarily, to be something less than a citizen.  In 
this case: criminal. 
 The 16th Round frequently deals in these surprisingly unflattering depictions of 
blackness—whether it is comparisons of other black men to gorillas or Zulus, or the 
simple appropriation of “nigger” as a pejorative term, Carter’s understanding of his race 
is equal parts pride and distaste, dependent largely upon where he is at the time.  So it is 
that in the basement fight above he falls into language like “picker-headed mammy,” 
while periods of brief freedom result in a more favorable treatment, such as the 
description of the beautiful “Regina,” whom Carter meets upon his return from the Army:  
“Regina was pure blaaack.  A deep unglazed black—not the shiny color of coal, which 
was so reflective, but the unblemished sheen of virgin soot, with the same dull, soft, 
ungleaming quality about it” (Carter 136, original emphasis).  So for Carter, I would 
argue, “blackness” means different things in different places—a lesson he seems to have 
internalized from his own experiences.  Another way of saying the same:  this author 
senses the utility of “blackness” depends very much on the space in which it is defined. 
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 Unfortunate too are the offices of authority figures, where a young Rubin45 
frequently finds himself as the result of his actions, and where his identity is frequently 
forged for him.  After being picked up by the police for petty larceny (his father turns him 
in), Rubin finds himself in a police interrogation room where he is beaten by a 
stereotypical “bad cop” and then deceived by an equally clichéd “good cop” (Carter 23-
4).  The same treatment is afforded him a few years later, when he is arrested for the 
Tubbs stabbing (a crime which it is important to remember, in Carter’s narrative, was one 
acted out in self defense), and Rubin’s “soul” is revealed by another “bad cop” as 
connected to his skin color via racial slurs (Carter 37).  Later, as Carter is completing his 
time at Jamesburg, his counselor Mr. Moore promises to release young Rubin in ninety 
days on the condition of good behavior.  Rubin is ecstatic at the promise of release, and 
carefully maintains good behavior for his final three months, but upon returning to Mr. 
Moore’s office at the end of the 90 days, he is greeted instead with “Mr. Wallace,” who is 
looking to file a false report against the child for insubordination (Carter 86-7).  Feeling 
betrayed by the system, Rubin blows three months of good behavior in an instant when 
he smashes up the office and makes a scene of his injustice.  Back to “square one” in 
terms of identity, Rubin plans and executes an escape the next night. 
 In both of these cases, we see authority figures using their spaces of confrontation 
to identify young Rubin in consistent ways:  as a troublemaker, as a violent child, and as 
an individual in need of confinement.  I think it important to point out that unlike Rubin 
himself, these authority figures do have the agency of choice that has already been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For this section, it becomes necessary to separate the authorial Rubin Carter and the child in the narrative, for the 
former is an actual rhetorical actor, and the latter must be understood as something of a constructed character (perhaps 
not disingenuously, but for the sake of establishing meaning) within the story.  To make this distinction accessible, in 
this section we will refer to Rubin Carter, the author, by his last name; the child who is acting within his narrative, we 
will simply call “Rubin.”  Such distinction is actually in line with Carter’s text, in which he often refers to his three 
different personalities:  “Rubin,” “Hurricane,” and “Carter” (Carter 310, 337) 
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connected to Merle Haggard’s narrator:  these counselors, police officers, and wardens 
could allow Rubin entry into that “good world” he desires—the character of Mr. Moore 
seems to make this point most clearly, as he nearly extends Rubin the agency to control 
his own fate by agreeing to an early release.  Whether or not the offer is sincere, by the 
time Mr. Wallace appears, all bets are off, and Rubin is once again denied access to a 
world in which he would be a citizen; an equal.   
 Though I assume Carter has fictionalized these characters to a large extent, I defer 
to the text and choose read the two offers made by Moore and Wallace as sincere—that 
is, Moore seems to really want to help Carter, and Wallace seems to be interested more in 
rejecting him. In both cases, then, the administrative space of the warden’s office 
becomes an area where the intentions of the authority figures get rendered into choices 
that Rubin himself can make (he can either be good, as he was following the discussion 
with Moore; he can be violent, as he is after talking to Wallace).  That he acts in 
cooperation with the intentions of those authority figures speaks, I think, to the power of 
the space itself to assign Carter identity.  So, like the basements that are called into 
thematic consideration by the text earlier (always pushing Carter into violence, and 
revealing a very problematic tendency to degrade those who share his skin color), these 
spaces seem to reveal both the powerlessness of Carter’s position and the plasticity that 
authority figures see in his identity.   
 Cultural spaces play into the young Rubin Carter’s formation as well.  Each run in 
with the law brings Rubin an increased distance from his family—namely his father, who 
refuses to acknowledge Carter’s existence on the two occasions that his actions bring 
policemen to the family home (see Carter 19, 25).  After his family’s move to Paterson, 
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Carter joins “The Apaches,” and finds himself growing ever further from mainstream 
society through the group’s logics of violence and crime.  Significantly, Carter is 
appointed the position of “war chief” by the Apaches (putting him into the dual role of 
consigliere and general, owing to his fighting ability), and it is here that Rubin first finds 
a degree of acceptance, or proximity, to a culture.  No longer the outsider, Rubin feels a 
pride in his newfound identity, though he begins using it immediately to chart his own 
distance of superiority: 
I was proud of my position.  It made me feel like a god.  In my mind, I vaguely 
recalled some misbegotten slogan that went “Equality for all under God.”  I 
couldn’t accept that.  What with the position I held, and the gang’s dependence 
upon my fighting skills, I felt uniquely superior.  In the Apaches I was, in fact, 
accepted as a god, and there could be no equality in the world that I lived in—a 
world of conflict and confusion, where only the strong survived. (Carter 16, 
emphasis added) 
 
It is perhaps telling that instead of using his “position” to feel himself an equal part of a 
group, young Rubin immediately rushes towards thoughts of superiority and distance.  
Whether the product of immature ego or simply the practical lesson learned from a short 
lifetime of seeing “only the strong survive,” Carter’s rush to distance himself from a 
community he now sees as accepting, and yet inferior, seems to follow from the 
experiences of his childhood:  a kind of predisposition to distanciation.  Cast away lest ye 
be cast away.  
 But if this list of locations featured in the childhood sections of Carter’s memoir 
feels a bit like an assortment of metaphors for being alienated, I believe we must consider 
how much this inventory becomes the driving force (the exetastic buildup) of the author’s 
strategy for later identification.  Let us consider a graphic representation of Carter’s 
journey, which I have illustrated below as Figure 3.2.  In this mapping, which features a 
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chronological list of the places Carter visits and the filiation these places inspire, we see a 
rough account of the centripetal and centrifugal forces important to Carter’s narrative. 
 
Fig. 3.2 – Carter’s Alienation as Exetastic Buildup 
 
To indicate the degree of Carter’s own initiative here, I have distinguished his path with 
solid and dotted lines—solid indicating movement of Carter’s own volition, and dotted 
representing the movement that is forced upon him by outsiders.  What we notice 
immediately is a fairly obvious pattern of Carter’s agency and the marginalization forced 
upon him from external sources.  The first instance is easy enough:  defending his family 
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coal from “Bully” gets him punished on behalf of his father, who resents his son’s violent 
behavior.  From there, a chance membership with the “Apaches” gains Carter some 
respect, pushing him to “war chief” status, in which he feels himself to be elite beyond 
his fellow members (in this way, Carter alienates himself from the group he wanted to 
belong to).  These two early instances form a division in Carter’s young mind:  at least 
some of the time, he can control his own identity (though he does fail to manage a 
sustained proximity to others), and some of the time, he will be marginalized for his 
behavior.  But after the incident at Tubbs, a steady pattern emerges.  From here on out, 
Carter will continually try to suggest himself a fitting member of various spaces (his 
“good behavior” at Jamesburg is the first instance of this, and represents the promise of 
autonomy).  When that incident ends with sabotage at the hands of Mr. Wallace, I believe 
Carter’s mapping is complete.  From this point on (the final circle is a question mark, as 
it can be a placeholder for any of his future encounters), Carter seems to see his path set.  
He will continually be pushed back into the margins, despite his best efforts.  And 
unsurprisingly, his narrative spends less time in those future areas, as the outcome is 
already established. 
 In much the same way we see Malcolm X turn the spaces of his own life into tidy 
dioramas of racial prejudice46, we see Rubin Carter affect the same type of stance in his 
own locational inventory, though his alienation is not always simply racial.  Young Rubin 
is also a small child with a stuttering problem and a knack for fighting, and these 
differences get held against him even by those of similar racial constructions.  It is, in 
fact, rather telling that most of the spaces Rubin encounters throughout the early chapters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  The comparison to Malcolm X is apt here, for Carter encourages the reader to see similarities between the two 
men—especially as regards their shared “fight” for the poor and oppressed (Carter 231, 250). 
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of The 16th Round feel more abstract and not quite “lived in” (hence the rather vague 
descriptions featured here).  They are likely more abstract than concrete to the writer 
himself, who I believe to be working more closely with his enthymematic argument of 
citizenship and marginalization than with the details of the reality he writes. 
 But for Carter, lamenting such alienation is merely the first step.  We have now 
the task of investigating the recalculation of space and identity that Carter creates using 
these spatial inventories—that is, how Carter’s narrative processes these spaces into an 
enthymematic argument for his identity.  By the end of The 16th Round, I believe we as 
readers are encouraged to see Carter as something other than the violent criminal he is 
assumed to be by the state.  That the author is able to rewrite himself in this way suggests 
that his rhetorical efforts must successfully challenge such an identity. 
 
Crossfire Hurricane:  Recalculating the Prisoner Identity 
 Rubin Carter spends quite a bit of time inside “ordering” institutions during the 
narrative of The 16th Round, and like Malcolm X before him, I think he picks up much of 
his cartographic drive from the emphasis on order one expects of such locales.  As such, 
it is perhaps an uncontentious claim that alienation becomes a primary concern for 
Carter’s formation of identity.  And in nearly every case, immediately after being pushed 
away from a privileged segment of society (usually in the form of incarceration), Carter 
begins distancing himself from those he has been grouped with.  The narrative of his time 
at Jamesburg focuses on his first few days at the boys’ home, in which he finds himself 
thrust into multiple conflicts (most of them physical) as he tries to find his place (Carter 
43-76).  Skipping forward in time a few years, Carter offers his assessment of the 
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detention facility as a place that is equal parts insane asylum and “child slavery system” 
(Carter 77).  But perhaps most interesting to our current line of investigation is the 
frequent disgust Carter shows for the rampant homosexuality of the institution.  Here we 
will focus on Carter’s affinity for revealing alienation, and the effect this has upon his 
own distancing actions. 
 Let us consider Carter’s narrative as he learns to cope with the Jamesburg 
environment: 
 [. . .] I accepted the inevitable, and with this acceptance came the belief that I had 
been betrayed by the white distributors of equal justice.  I bitterly resented being 
confined to this pus-filled New Jersey pit.  I despised the sadistic men and latent 
homosexuals who worked there in the guise of correctional officers, and it was no 
well-kept secret how I felt. (Carter 78, emphasis added). 
 
Here, I think it’s safe to say Carter is engaging in a bit of rhetorical “mapping.”  
Emphasizing the skin color of the “distributors of equal justice,” we see easily the 
distance between authority and “ordered.”  Just as it was at Tubbs, skin color is the mark 
of privilege.   
 Allow me to forgo the “maps” here and offer an analogy instead:  that of a 
standard classroom magnet.  Even if we have a host of metal fragments evenly distributed 
over a tabletop (a fitting analogy for the more egalitarian “Tubbs,” perhaps), all it takes is 
the wrong polarity to wander in and order what is around it (our white deviant from 
earlier), pushing these fragments away in a circle, and leaving a diameter of clear tabletop 
around the magnet itself.  The lesson learned is not that the children like Rubin need to 
remove themselves from the area, but that they need do nothing; the authority figure (in 
this case, anyone with white skin) will automatically order them.  This seems to be the 
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lesson Carter has learned from the Tubbs event, and it puts him in a rather tough 
situation, if he should want to challenge that order. 
 So against the state’s narrative of Carter’s criminality, Carter begins to attend to 
spatiality—trying to call into question that magnetism that has pushed him to the 
margins.  He does so first by challenging the logic of the Jamesburg inmates’ 
incarceration:  “Most of the Jamesburg kids had only committed the same violations of 
rules as had endeared Huckleberry Finn to millions of people, but in us society found 
these deeds intolerable” (Carter 77, emphasis added).  Though not overtly spatial, what 
we might consider here is the way Carter expands his case onto the national identity in 
order to show injustice.  Knowing well the ubiquity of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, 
Carter chooses the fictional hero to demonstrate how, absent a darker skin color, the 
majority of Americans (we could reconfigure this as a space: “America”) would have 
little issue with the colorful antics of young boys.  They might actually celebrate such 
antics with literary praise and pop culture representations.  We can, of course, question 
the issue of color, as it is raised nowhere in the quote above.  But Carter is trusting we 
remember Tubbs, where his experience established an important inconsistency regarding 
citizenship and skin pigmentation. 
 That this questioning of justice is important to Carter should come as no surprise; 
that he does so at the same time as he discusses a “pit,” whose occupants amount to 
“pus,” perhaps is.  For as has been mentioned earlier, Carter’s work spent describing 
Jamesburg takes up nearly as much time as the description of his detainment and trial 
later on in the book, which, being the most egregious of his experiences and the impetus 
for the writing of his narrative, is assumed as the text’s focal point.  As investigators of 
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rhetorical cartography, we might productively view this early preoccupation with 
Jamesburg (nearly 60 pages) as the textual basis for what the book will become—the first 
rhetorical example of Carter actively working to recalculate himself against the ordering 
processes of society.   
 In establishing Jamesburg as a “pus-filled New Jersey pit”—complete with 
aggressive, menacing, often homosexual, predators in the form of both guard and 
inmate—Carter finds himself able to draw out the themes that become important to his 
plea for justice at the book’s conclusion.  That these themes revolve around him A.) 
tracing the ways he’s been alienated from society, and B.) attempting to create distance 
between himself and those he’s been aligned with, necessarily shows us the way that the 
Jamesburg narrative becomes a prototypical mapping environment for Carter, and 
actually teaches him the moves he will need later on. 
 For the text spends far less narrative time with his experiences in the Army’s 101st 
Airborne (where Carter is celebrated as a boxer, and remembers, briefly, how it feels to 
be at the top of a social hierarchy), or with his short stint at Annandale Reformatory (an 
experience required by his escape from Jamesburg, and which only reaffirms the lessons 
he learned there).   
Similarly, his stay at Trenton State Prison is narratively short47, and serves really 
only to modify the alienation he has learned at Jamesburg, and to influence further his 
cartographic instincts.  At Trenton State, Carter begins to realize that he is not merely a 
misunderstood Huck Finn in the eyes of the government, and not just a step below 
“citizen,” but actually something less than human: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This despite the mention that his time in Trenton State Prison lasted “four years and two months” (Carter 185), a 
significant stay. 
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Two of the hardest things about being in [prison] are, first, that you can never 
make a decision for yourself—every one, from the time to eat or sleep, walk, talk, 
or even breathe, is already made up for you; the only thing that is yours to decide, 
which requires no deep concentration, is whether or not to stand up or sit down in 
your cell. 
The other thing is the unreasonable absence of women.  We inmates sit in prison 
and listen to the President of these United States fly all over the world in search of 
a mate for a jive-ass gorilla in some zoo, but for us, the people in his prisons, he 
doesn’t do a goddamn thing!  Our position as humans is relegated to one inferior 
to that of the wildest beast. (Carter 170, emphasis added) 
 
Having thus modified his appreciation of the “mapping” done to him, Carter then begins 
to swing again at the institution itself, condemning the administration’s tactics of 
controlling inmates through arranged homosexual encounters, and its indifference to the 
mission of “rehabilitation”—casting those in control as devious and dangerous hypocrites 
(Carter 171).   
 It is also at Trenton State Prison that Carter is introduced to the long-term effects 
of incarceration in the form of “Mr. Summers,” an elderly man who happens to be held in 
the cell next to Carter’s, and who chooses to hang himself in his cell after realizing that 
he can no longer defend himself against the younger prisoners (Carter 174-7).  When 
Carter expresses the pain that accompanies his memories of Summers’ suicide, it is hard 
to ignore the way that this elderly inmate has become essential proof for Carter that the 
institution is interested only in denying humanity—configured as life, when viewed over 
an extended time period—to its inmates.   
 Carter’s appreciation for the lessons learned at Trenton State Prison is significant 
enough that, upon release, he chooses to stay in Trenton as he resumes his pugilist 
training—the thought being that a visual reminder of the prison, and his proximity to 
such a dehumanizing location, will encourage him to stay out of trouble.   
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 Ultimately, we know that Carter does not stay out of trouble, and after a 
thoroughly problematic investigation and trial following the shootings at Lafayette Bar 
and Grill in 1966, he finds himself back at Trenton State Prison, and eventually at 
Rahway State Prison, where the author begins work on the text.  Likely due to the 
importance of the trial events themselves—we know Carter’s reason for writing the text 
to be to reveal the injustice of his treatment, and ultimately, to inspire his release48—the 
narrative time spent in these two prisons towards the end of the book is comparatively 
short.  Back at Trenton State Prison, Carter reveals again how violent the population is 
and how much the administration relies on homosexuality to control its inmates.  Sent to 
Rahway, Carter finds an institution that allows for more humanity in their prisoners, and 
decides that with enough separation from the population, he can bear imprisonment while 
awaiting his appeals.  But a new warden at the prison brings back the harsh, 
dehumanizing atmosphere Carter was used to at other institutions, and in a dramatic 
finale to the book, the author shares his experiences in trying to stop a riot that broke out 
in response to the warden’s harsh attitudes (Carter 322-33).   
 It may come as a surprise to readers that so little time is spent, narratively 
speaking, in the two state prisons which figure most prominently into Carter’s plea for 
justice (the two institutions he serves in as a result of the 1966 murder charges).  
However, in analyzing The 16th Round for its rhetorical cartography, we can see that 
these spaces need not be as intricately developed as is the section on Jamesburg, for the 
“mapping” events have been completed already.  Sections on Jamesburg State Home for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  From Carter’s final chapter, sharing the influence of a prison-reform advocate named Fred Hogan:  “[Hogan] left 
behind a helluva footprint point in the right direction for penal reform in New Jersey [ . . .]He opened up several 
blocked avenues on which I could continue to work towards gaining my release.  The publication of this book is just 
one of those avenues” (Carter 334).	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Boys in the earlier chapters of the book have served Carter to trace the way government 
and society would look to distance him from their ranks, as well as inspired him to 
consider what actions he would take in response—his “remapping.” 
 Once we make the transition to Trenton and Rahway, Carter’s “mapping” (that 
cartographic action which is done to him) simply needs to be updated for a more mature 
population:  human agency and sexuality is denied.  In response, Carter’s recalculation 
(that cartographic action which is done by him) tightens up as well, changing the terms of 
its separation from one aggrieved by slavery to one denied any existence at all.  In this 
way, we as readers don’t need to spend a good deal of time with Carter at his current 
location, for the mapping and recalculation have already been established.  Again 
utilizing enthymeme, we see Carter preoccupy himself early with collecting the 
inconsistencies of his positionality in America so that his spatial inventory becomes one 
predicated on pointing out marginality.  Thus it is by sheer additive force that the reader 
is slowly moved more towards an identification with Carter, and by the time we end up 
with the author at Rahway—as he writes The 16th Round—I believe we’re quite clearly 
“in his corner.”  Despite starting off as a juvenile delinquent with the promise only of a 
future based in criminality, Carter has successfully recalibrated his identity so that the 
reader privileges his stance.  And, quite obviously, we begin to complete his thematic 
examples without help:  to be black in America is, necessarily . . . 
 So it is in the last chapter that Carter avoids rehashing his existing “map” 
(inventory) yet again.  Instead, he takes a cue from the activists he hears about outside the 
prison walls, and uses his closing to expand his map onto society on a large scale—a 
move reminiscent of Malcolm X’s Autobiography: 
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For all the shit that a black man goes through in his life, perhaps the most 
significant thing he learns is that his life is capricious at best.  He’s always 
subjected to someone else’s whim.  Anybody who claims that a man is the master 
of his own fate should jump ass-first off the tallest building, and then try to master 
getting his black ass back up on that bad motherfucker.  It was this way for me 
with the courts and with this prison, both of which were designed to defeat the 
human spirit.  The judges, lawyers, and educators of the world all spoke 
reverently of honor, justice, and truth, but these were merely glib words spewed 
out of plastic pigs, and the people didn’t really believe that shit themselves. 
(Carter 314, emphasis added) 
 
If the prison system had been a connecting metaphor for the way society had always tried 
to distance Rubin Carter, then the author trust it will serve in the same way for all of 
Black America.  In this way, Carter makes his final spatial appeal:  that of ultimate 
connection to every oppressed African-American.  His story may be shockingly violent, 
and his own temperament may have contributed significantly to the way he was 
dismissed from larger society, but at the close of his narrative he is offering himself up as 
an analogue to the experience of “black man.” 
 We can see this as a strategic move on his part, for by the very end Carter is 
appealing directly to the reader to save his life49, and so connecting himself to the entirety 
(or at least, majority) of Black America may grant him some allies.  But more than this, 
we can see Carter’s final mapping actions to be the sign that he’s learned well the power 
of rhetorical cartography.  Against the mappings done to him by the state, Carter has 
embraced the power of counterstorytelling, and with it, an attention to the real and 
experienced places around him that have functioned to alienate him; to separate him from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The book ends in this way:  “I come to you in the only manner left open to me.  I’ve tried the courts, exhausted my 
life’s earnings, and tortured my two loved ones with little grains and tidbits of hope that may never materialize.  Now 
the only chance I have is in appealing directly to you, the people, and showing you the wrongs that have yet to be 
righted—the injustice that has been done to me.  For the first time in my entire existence I’m saying that I need some 
help.  Otherwise, there will be no tomorrow for me:  no more freedom, no more injustice, no more State Prison; no 
more Mae Thelma [Carter’s wife], no more Theodora [Carter’s daughter], no more Rubin—no more Carter.  Only the 
Hurricane.  And after him, there is no more” (Carter 336-7). 
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society.  That his narrative is heard, and that his plea for freedom is eventually granted 
eleven years after the publication of his book50, should serve only to reaffirm his 
conviction (and hopefully ours) in cartographic rhetoric. 
 
From Spatial Victim to Victimizer 
 Before we close an analysis of Carter’s The 16th Round, we would be wise to 
consider one of the less pleasant effects of Carter’s cartography:  the rampant 
homophobia that runs like a current throughout this narrative.  In large part, we might 
assume that such attitudes are partly a reflection of Carter’s time, and partly a response to 
the victimization he encountered at Tubbs.  Yet both are problematic explanations, as 
they are unquestionably apologetic towards behavior that cannot be defended, and neither 
connects this undercurrent to the spatiality from which it began. 
 In my reading, Carter’s offense at homosexuality has less to do with sexual acts 
themselves, and more to do with the type of recalculation work that was discussed above.  
Let us consider the following meditation on homosexuality at Jamesburg, which appears 
in the middle of the narrative time spent there: 
  Now I might have been a little more naïve than was considered healthy for 
a Jamesburg youngster at that time, but I’ll be goddamned if I was downright 
stupid!  Jamesburg had taught me something since I’d been incarcerated there:  
now I knew what a faggot was when I saw one, and this was what we had in 
tow—a goddamned faggot, a fuck boy. 
  Wait a minute.  I’ll have to retract that statement; it is not entirely the 
truth.  The boy was not a committed homosexual, but he did submit, nonetheless, 
to what, I think, were the degrading desires of stronger inmates in return for 
cigarettes, food, and favor.  At Jamesburg, it made no difference if one had or 
didn’t have the inclination to become somebody’s “wife.”  If one couldn’t protect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 A third trial in 1985 resulted in Carter’s release, not because of his presumed innocence, but because of the grossly 
illegal conduct of the Paterson Police Department during the crime’s original investigation.  Among other issues, Carter 
was not “Mirandized” upon his detainment, was taken to the scene of the crime instead of to police headquarters, and 
was not present for (nor did he consent to) the search of his vehicle. 
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himself in a sure-fire, devastating manner in a fight, before very long he would 
find himself switching and “married” to a tougher inmate. (Carter 76, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Such a quote is admittedly uncomfortable to read in 2015, but I find it utterly telling of 
Rubin Carter’s penchant for perceiving (and now creating) alienation.  Here, rather than 
expounding upon his own removal from society, however, Carter is instead looking to 
alienate himself from others—homosexuals, in particular.  We have seen this type of 
behavior, in part, when the “war chief” Carter wasted no time in establishing himself as 
the “God” of his neighborhood gang.  And yet here, the pronounced distance created feels 
more intentional; more problematic.   
 The rhythm of these two paragraphs is of interest to me:  compare the short, tense 
syntax of the first paragraph (ending, as it does, with amplified pejoratives toward 
homosexuals) to the longer, more patient example of the second.  It even feels a bit like 
the authorial Carter has witnessed himself degrade a group of people with the kind of 
power typical of his profession, and then, surprisingly, paused to explain:  “Wait a 
minute.  I’ll have to retract that statement; it’s not entirely the truth.”  The more patient 
Carter then explains what really bothers him about the men who engage in relations with 
other men:  it is entirely dependent upon power, and the homosexuals, in Carter’s view, 
are those who simply don’t have it.  If one couldn’t “protect himself,” the result was that 
his masculinity would be stripped from him, and he would take on a subservient role to 
his aggressor.  Let us consider the way Carter extends the quote above, which follows an 
extended description of the act in question: 
 This was the first time that I had ever witnessed a homosexual act, and, to be 
truthful, it was neither fascinating nor overly repulsive to me.  But it did stink.  I 
looked upon the deed with an attitude of dishonorable indifference:  indifference 
in that it had no physical effect upon my person; dishonorable in that, if this punk 
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had offered only a molecule, a mere speck—a tiny smithereen—of resistance 
verbally or otherwise, I would have forced myself to become his ally and be ready 
to go to war again, if necessary.  (Carter 76, emphasis in original) 
 
Here, then, we see the problem for Carter:  masculinity.  As Carter chooses euphemism 
after euphemism for the smallest possible dosage of masculinity (the emphasis on 
“smithereen” makes this quite obvious), we see that this is the root of his problem with 
homosexuals—he thinks they simply become homosexual because they’ve given up.  If 
they had any reserve of machismo left in them, surely they would fight, and if they did, 
Rubin “Hurricane” Carter would be there as an ally.  Carter does not hate homosexuals; 
he hates those who give up their masculine identity. 
 I think this preoccupation with masculinity runs back pretty far with Carter, at 
least through the Tubbs encounter, where the problem wasn’t so much the possibility of a 
sexual encounter (though this was surely problematic), but that the neutrality of the space 
was violated, and its inhabitants were easily recalculated by an authority that the author 
questioned.  Here in Jamesburg, again, we see a hatred of recalculation—Carter is angry 
at those who would force others into giving up their manhood.  Homosexuality is a 
problem not because it is nasty, but because, as Carter sees it, it invades a person’s 
identity.  For Carter, whose entire career would become built on being the most powerful 
man in the room (or ring), this abdication of masculinity is equal to accepting the order of 
an unquestioned authority.  Homosexuality, to Carter, is not an identity in and of itself, 
but rather the deferment of identity. 
 The fact that Carter continues to throw out pejorative slurs against homosexuals 
for the rest of the book should be seen as uncomfortable to us not only for its offensive 
politics, but because Carter is, perhaps unconsciously, ensuring the same kind of 
	   141	  
alienation he so laments.  Unhappy with those who would offer no fight, Carter uses 
labels like “faggot” and “jail-house punk” to distance them from his own subjectivity.  It 
is the same move that hurt a young Rubin Carter, called “black as though it was 
something nasty,” by an outsider who likely intended a fair amount of distance to be felt 
through that term.  Internalized, now Carter is doing the same to others. 
 I can’t answer for Rubin Carter, but I suspect that this aggressive distancing is a 
product of his efforts to recalculate.  In attempting to draw others to identify with his 
stance, he is perhaps interested in setting up a “straw man” to take his place at “the 
bottom.”  And since homosexuality is defined by Carter as a characteristic of those who 
are weak, those who exhibit it are seen as an easy target to hold down.  So this is the 
unhappy corollary to our first exploration of rhetorical cartography: Carter has 
recalculated his identity successfully, but he has done so at the expense of others.   
 I don’t offer this corollary to suggest that all who seek to recalculate necessarily 
do so at the expense of others—as the next chapter can attest—but it should be noted that 
the intricate web of relationships that we call “sociality” makes possible such unfortunate 
outcomes.  I would suggest that in Carter’s case, an early demonstration of the fragility of 
thirdspace (the encounter at Tubbs) has perhaps corrupted his ability to truly see 
“outside” of the binary “box.”  Absent a conception of a neutral, third option, perhaps 
Carter finds himself caught more in a one-for-one exchange, where the rise of one group 
necessarily means the downfall of another.  Not unlike Haggard, then, Carter’s efforts at 
rhetorical cartography may, in part, serve to reinforce the some unpleasant binaries that 
existed before him.  Carter has demonstrated an ability to remap himself, but not in a way 
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 By attending to a close reading of Carter’s memoir, what I hope becomes obvious 
is the rhetorical power seated behind the two moves already proposed for analysis of 
rhetorical cartography:  spatial inventory and recalculation.  It is the intention of this 
chapter to reveal how these two processes play out in an actual piece of prison literature, 
and how they work in tandem to create an identity out of a push for identification.   
 First, in considering Carter’s spatial inventory, we noted how the important 
physical locations of Carter’s life became ordered around a rather useful exetastic 
buildup, which pointed out the inconsistencies of citizenship in America.  So it is that the 
most formative moment of Carter’s young life—his “fight for life” at Tubbs—becomes 
representative of the author’s struggle, revealing the extent to which his existence has 
been one of being pushed into the margins.  Though other locations figure into his early 
inventory, we see how easily these spaces become understood not as concrete locations, 
but as afterglow images of that fight at Tubbs.  Despite two clear instances in which 
Carter actually is celebrated for his agency (once as leader of the “Apaches,” and later 
when he begins to box in the Army), the majority of the locations used in The 16th Round 
become configured as more similar to Tubbs than dissimilar.  Whether Carter truly sees a 
reflection of Tubbs in the litany of carceral and institutional spaces he moves through, or 
whether this is all a bit of thematic jest aimed at persuasion, is completely unclear.  But 
important to this project is that the author is able to create this inventory, relying as it 
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does on enthymematic structure, for the purpose of guiding the audience’s perception of 
Carter’s life.  If, like me, the reader of The 16th Round feels some sympathy for Carter at 
the book’s conclusion, I think it is likely because he or she has been convinced by the 
author that it was not he who was bad, but the spaces through which he moved.  Such is 
the power of stance. 
 Similarly, in looking at Carter’s ability to recalculate his identity in the face of 
carceral order, I believe we see a lot of rhetorical power in the author’s use of space.  
Mainly achieved by pushing other marginalized subjectivities away from himself 
(perhaps akin to the schoolboy labeled “sissy” being quick to ridicule the girls on the 
playground), Carter works to reclaim for himself some measure of filiation with the 
outside world.  Though it’s painful at times to note how quickly Carter falls into name-
calling and judgment, we can understand these instances as unfortunate by-products of an 
overall successful appeal to be considered innocent; human.  For good or bad, Rubin 
Carter’s memoir became a large part of his eventual release from prison, and so his 
ability to recalculate himself from “homicidal street thug” to “oppressed, powerless 
minority figure” must be judged as similarly successful. 
 What I find absolutely fascinating in such an example is the basic tenet of this 
project as a whole:  that in negotiating a textual identity, the spaces used become more 
important than the individual his or herself.  Our spaces tell stories, and I would suggest a 
myriad of possible narratives exist for each of us.  The ability to actively shape that 
narrative by controlling how the audience reads these spaces is, ultimately, an agency to 
be prized by those of us who study rhetoric.  At a time when we are constantly 
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questioning the role of the “other,” I would suggest we would all do well to look at Rubin 
Carter more closely. 
 However, as we acknowledge these cartographic instincts to hold the potential to 
liberate various marginalized subjectivities, we must also question how such instincts 
come about.  I’ve hinted here that I believe Carter to have read, and been inspired by, the 
earlier memoir of Malcolm X.  As noted historian H. Bruce Franklin claims, X’s work 
can be seen as a prototype of late 20th century prison literature, and so we might be quick 
to read Carter’s memoir as a work designed to be cartographic because it follows upon 
another text with substantial spatial impact.  In other words, the “genius” of Carter could 
easily be reconfigured as simple emulation. 
 We don’t have access to the authorial mind of Carter to confirm or deny whether 
such work was largely emulation, and yet I find myself doubting that this is the case. The 
question becomes:  could Carter have engaged in a process of recalculating his identity—
based on the spaces he’d been exposed to—had he not been aware of the Malcolm X 
text?  I like to think the answer is yes. 
 One of the problems of looking at rhetorical cartography in the prison literature of 
African-American males in the late 20th century is that so many prominent figures come 
easily to mind.    Writers like King and X are so celebrated that we would be misguided if 
we didn’t compare them with the writers who followed.  But does this mean that without 
King and X, an entire window of rhetorical agency is necessarily left closed?  Does 
rhetorical cartography necessitate a “genius figure” to mimic? 
 In the next chapter, we will look to resolve this issue by changing our focus to the 
narratives of American female prisoners, writing in the late years of the United States’ 
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“War on Drugs.”  This corpus is largely devoid of any standout texts that might set the 
tone for future works (though the work of Piper Kerman, who will be considered in 
Chapter Four, has perhaps become the exception to this claim), and so it should provide 
useful to us as a contrast to the works discussed thus far.   
 So while we might be done with Rubin Carter for now, let’s not forget him 
entirely as we look to explore how cartographic instincts may arise even without a 





















VARIATIONS ON A POLITICAL CARTOGRAPHY 
 
Prison is quite literally a ghetto in the most classic sense of the [word], a place where the 
U.S. government now puts not only the dangerous but also the inconvenient—people who 
are mentally ill, people who are addicts, people who are poor and uneducated and 
unskilled.  Meanwhile the ghetto in the outside world is a prison as well, and a much 
more difficult one to escape from than this correctional compound.  In fact, there is 
basically a revolving door between our urban and rural ghettos and the formal ghetto of 
our prison system. 
       - Piper Kerman 
 
 Author of the best-selling memoir Orange is the New Black:  My Year in a 
Women’s Prison, Piper Kerman is certainly not the first person to compare the U.S. 
prison system to a ghetto.  In earlier chapters we’ve noted a slew of real world metaphors 
used by prison writers in an attempt to communicate the emotion of their location with a 
mainstream population that is largely ignorant of it; along the way, we’ve seen these 
writers grasping for meaningful comparisons and frequently settling on those so loaded 
with contextual meaning that we may occasionally question the sincerity of the message.  
So when Kerman makes the same move in Orange, it’s largely unsurprising. 
 What is perhaps startling, however, is the impetus for using that metaphor.  
Though her accusatory comparison will become a major piece of her argument towards 
the book’s conclusion, it is, at this point, merely a response to another familiar spatial 
comparison:  that of “Club Fed.” 
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 As Kerman, now released, was nearing the midpoint of her sentence at FCI 
Danbury in Connecticut, the “camp”51 began to buzz  with news of another prominent, 
upper-class white woman who was destined for incarceration:  TV personality Martha 
Stewart.  As Kerman and her comrades considered the possibility of a celebrity such as 
Stewart joining their ranks, it seems that Stewart herself was considering what the future 
had in store for her, and had begun soliciting the reactions of recently-released female 
prisoners in the New England area.  So it was that the Danbury inmates found themselves 
reading an article published in the local Harford Courant, in which a woman recently 
released from Danbury (known as “Barbara” in the article) had been contacted by Stewart 
for the “inside scoop on life in the Danbury Camp” (Kerman 199). 
 The inmates at Danbury wasted no time speculating that “Barbara” was actually 
an inmate known as “Levy”—a French woman who had so annoyed the inmates that her 
recent release had been widely celebrated.  But here was Levy, annoying them again.  In 
the article, Levy infuriates the women by calling Danbury a “big hotel” that provided 
amenities like libraries and salons—amenities that she’d been unaccustomed to on the 
outside (Kerman 199).  To Kerman, this “Club Fed” image of FCI Danbury was 
unquestionably illusory, and spoke to how Levy had found new, unlikely spatial 
metaphors in order to project a more middle-class image of herself.   
 Kerman objects to that identity and to the location that develops it, and instead 
offers the “ghetto” comparison that opens this chapter.  Having sufficiently corrected the 
label of space, she then turns her eye on Levy herself: 
 It was too painful, I thought, for Levy and others (especially the middle-class 
 prisoners) to admit that they had been classed as undesirables, compelled  against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Here,	  I	  am	  not	  joining	  the	  metaphor	  game,	  but	  rather	  picking	  up	  the	  terminology	  Kerman	  herself	  uses	  
throughout	  Orange.	  	  FCI	  Danbury,	  being	  minimum	  security,	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  camp,	  rather	  than	  “prison.”	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 their will into containment, and forced into scarcity without even the dignity 
 of chosen austerity.  So instead she said it was Club Fed.  (Kerman  201, emphasis 
 added) 
 
That Levy would falsify her account of Danbury in order to present herself favorably is 
of interest to me, yet beyond the scope of this project.  What is of most importance here, I 
believe, is the surprising way that Kerman’s narrative bounces around between spatial 
metaphors (such as “summer camp,” “dorm room,” and “ER ward”) for over half of the 
book until this moment.  Absent a clear way to make sense of her experience, Kerman 
seems to “try on” different descriptions for the prison until this moment, when someone 
offers a metaphor she deems inappropriate.  Once “ghetto” becomes appropriated here, it 
serves as an organizing theme for the book’s central message (one advocating reform), 
and is even echoed (via the “revolving door” trope) in the book’s Afterword: “It 
sometimes seems that we have built revolving doors between our poorest communities 
and the correctional facilities, and created perverse financial incentives to keep those 
prisons full, at taxpayers’ expense” (Kerman 299). 
 In plain terms:  the comparison of prison to a “ghetto” becomes important to 
Kerman, and yet it becomes accessible to her only when it is first needed to recast 
(perhaps “remap”) the prison as something other than a luxury resort.  And as should be 
clear by this point, that “remapping” is initiated not to define the space of the prison 
itself, but rather to make an argument about personal identity.  Kerman understands 
Levy’s desire to be classed as something other than “undesireable,” an impetus which 
serves as the pivot point for her metaphorical description of Danbury. 
 The previous chapter tracked the enthymematic argument of Rubin Carter and 
made the point that Carter’s spatiality (for which he eventually earned a release) was 
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based at least in part on an inventory of contextually-loaded spaces (“Black America,” for 
example) that were available to him prior to the act of writing.  In essence, Carter had a 
few different identities to choose from before becoming preoccupied with the prison 
space. 
 The texts under analysis in this chapter come from female prisoners writing in the 
late 20th/early 21st centuries.  Though this corpus offers a greater range of variation 
between age, race, and background, these women are more similar than not in two 
important ways:  one, they are all connected by what could be called the “late period of 
the U.S. War on Drugs”—an era which has seen prison populations explode, especially in 
regards to female prisoners52; two,  their spatially-minded texts appear more isolated—
unaware of each other’s existing arguments—than do the texts examined previously.   
 There are certainly a number of speculations we could extend in an effort to 
explain this last criterion, and yet there is only one that I can comfortably offer here:  that 
these writers are perhaps connected more by generic conventions than social action.  In 
understanding the influence of genre conventions, let us first turn to an analysis of two 
other female-authored prison texts, written and published before Kerman’s memoir. 
 
Part One:  Introduction to Disappointment 
 Novelist Wally Lamb came to female prison writing almost begrudgingly.  
Amidst a publicity tour for his second book in 1999, Lamb found himself contacted by 
York Correctional Institution librarian Marge Cohen, who was looking to invite 
professional writers as speakers at the prison.  As Lamb states, a string of suicide attempt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Many	  competing	  statistics	  are	  offered	  for	  this	  trend,	  some	  estimating	  as	  much	  as	  an	  800%	  increase	  in	  the	  
number	  of	  female	  prisoners	  between	  1980	  and	  2012—an	  era	  roughly	  corresponding	  to	  the	  most	  active	  years	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  “War	  on	  Drugs”	  (see	  “Incarceration”;	  Kerman	  299).	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had recently rocked the prison, and administrators had turned to a prison writing program 
in an effort to help inmates cope with depression.  Reluctantly, Lamb agreed to visit.  The 
inmates had recently seen him on Oprah.  He was expecting little more than a brief talk 
and some questions.  When, at the end of his visit, an inmate asked him when he’d be 
coming back, Lamb decided to create a bi-monthly writing workshop for interested 
inmates.  He expected an overall lack of interest, waning attendance, and only a few short 
meetings to transpire (Lamb 2-4). 
 Four years later, the work to come out of Lamb’s workshop—which attracted a 
regular crowd of 15-30 participants—was collected for publication as an anthology:  
Couldn’t Keep it to Myself:  Testimonies From Our Imprisoned Sisters.  As editor of the 
collection, Lamb’s insight into his role of sponsorship made is unusually clear within the 
volume’s slim introduction.  Lamb (along with workshop co-facilitator Dale Griffith) 
makes clear his own presence in the essays that make up Couldn’t Keep it to Myself: 
 “Fat writing was made more lean.  Flat phrasing was enlivened.  Paragraphs 
 and episodes were cut and pasted.  Shorter, self-contained pieces were seamed 
 together when theme or motif invited the fusion.  Consequently, there is a range 
 of editorial involvement, from minimal nip-and-tuck to a level of activity 
 approaching “as written with.”  Most fell somewhere in the  middle of the 
 continuum.  In all cases, the writers had final approval over their edited works.  
 (Lamb xii) 
 
The result is a fascinating anthology full of insight into the world of American female 
prison inmates, though somewhat colored by Lamb himself.  Nine of the 11 pieces in the 
book are from inmates of the York Correctional Institution in Niantic, Connecticut.  Of 
the remaining two, one is authored by Lamb’s cousin, who had been imprisoned on drug 
charges in 1990 in the Kentucky State Penitentiary for Women; the final author was 
Lamb’s co-facilitator, Griffith. 
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 Though a fascinating entry into the corpus of this study, Couldn’t Keep it to 
Myself does present us with a few limitations to consider.  Firstly, the editorial 
involvement by Lamb and Griffith does challenge our ability to explore the rhetorical 
motives behind the texts.  Chronology, for instance, is a facet left inaccessible to us when 
we acknowledge the varying levels of “copy and paste” editing.  Secondly, criminal 
actions—a fairly large part of traditional prison narratives—is left almost entirely out of 
the book, as Lamb explains that his mentees are legally prohibited from referencing their 
crimes when profit is involved (in keeping with Connecticut’s “Son of Sam Statute53”).  
On the whole, notions of guilt or innocence have been banished from our framework 
since the beginning of this study, so such an omission is largely irrelevant.  But important 
to the discussion at this point is a reminder that this chapter is more interested in generic 
moves—an object of analysis that renders both of these limitations of less pressing 
concern.  In fact, as one of the more circulated collections of female prison writing in the 
past decade (owing largely to Lamb’s status as a best-selling author), Couldn’t serves us 
as an excellent companion to Kerman’s work. 
 I turn first to that author who is not an inmate of York:  Louisville resident Nancy 
Birkla.  Birkla’s presence in this text is likely a function of her kinship with its author; 
despite this, her narrative bears striking resemblance to those to come out of Lamb’s 
workshop.  As a focal point, Birkla, like others, tends to draw the narrative back towards 
her childhood and the budding behaviors there which will later align with her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  From Lamb:  “To prevent high-profile criminals from profiting from heinous deeds, the New York legislature 
enacted the “Son of Sam” law in 1977.  The statute allowed victims of a person convicted of a crime to access profits 
made from that crime.  In a later case involving a book by a well-known organized crime figure, “Sammy the Bull” 
Gravano, the Son of Sam law was challenged and declared unconstitutional because of its overly broad restriction of 
First Amendment rights.  A second Son of Sam statute, enacted in 1992, narrowed the scope of the earlier law.  If an 
author made only incidental or indirect reference to the crime he or she committed, then profits from the writing could 
presumably fall outside of the “profits made from a crime” definition.  Following New York’s lead, the U.S. 
government and some forty states, including Connecticut, passed their own versions of Son of Sam statutes” (Lamb xi).	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incarceration.  So too does she reveal a history of sexual abuse, and a problematic ex-
husband who we might be tempted to see as an indirect cause of her entry into the 
correctional system.  Birkla’s essay “Three Steps Past the Monkeys”54 serves us as a 
perfect starting place for considering the larger, polyvocal narrative of Couldn’t Keep it 
to Myself. 
 Beginning our analysis with an attention to spatial inventory, it is important to 
note that as a short essay (26 pages in the hardback edition), none of the spaces we 
encounter can be as fully developed as we find in the book-length narratives previously 
analyzed.  Birkla works to alternate between childhood settings (including neighborhoods 
in Connecticut, Indiana, and Pennsylvania; focusing most intently on a section in her 
grandmother’s house) and the 1989-90 settings of her arrest and incarceration (Southern 
Louisville, the Jefferson County Jail, a rehab facility in Kentucky, and the Kentucky State 
Prison for Women).  Additional, less important locations appear in her account of ex-
husband “Bobby,” whom Birkla meets in a Wisconsin dive bar, and eventually follows to 
Kentucky, though these locations never get developed beyond stereotypical descriptions 
(perhaps because of the over-riding attention to Bobby during these times). 
 In each of these spaces—the grandmother’s house excepted—Birkla chooses to 
show us the seeds of depression and addiction that figure so prominently into her 
eventual incarceration (which, for the purpose of this analysis, we should read as shades 
of “disappointment,” with prison serving as the ultimate realization of this).  In 
Connecticut, living near her extended family, a young Birkla seems peaceful and happy.  
But where her father’s job takes the family first to Pennsylvania, and then Indiana, things 
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  The	  title	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  Birkla’s	  life-­‐long	  fear	  of	  the	  flying	  monkeys	  from	  The	  Wizard	  of	  Oz.	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begin to fall apart.  Admitting that her childhood is “a bit hazy” to her, Birkla wastes no 
time constructing a recurrent theme between these new spaces:  “I remember little about 
the schools I attended, or specific teachers, or the usual kid-centered events most of my 
adult friends recall.  I remember the nightmares though—the terrifying dreams that 
eventually seeped into my waking hours as well” (Birkla, in Lamb 125-6, emphasis 
added).  Immediately setting herself up as an outsider with regards to childhood, then 
(indicated by her lack of connection with friends based on memories), Birkla focuses on 
the “nightmares” which seem representative of that outsider status. 
 These nightmares specifically refer to a life-long fear of monkeys, which haunted 
her dreams past childhood and well into adulthood.  As a clever trope for connecting this 
essay, the monkeys figure prominently into all stages of Birkla’s life.  It is not until the 
final pages, however, that we (and Birkla’s narrative presence, as well) realize the 
importance of the monkeys:  they are a long-repressed reminder of a period of recurrent 
sexual abuse in Allentown, Pennsylvania, where a neighbor molested Birkla and her 
friend, and threatened to send the flying monkeys from Wizard of Oz after them if either 
were to tell.  Burying the memory except for the monkeys, Birkla then questions her 
irrational fear of the animals and the way the figure into her vivid nightmares.  These 
nightmares, certainly literal to Birkla’s narrator, become more nearly a sickening and 
recurrent trope for exploring alienation—what we might read as a continual alienation 
via disappointment, a map explored in Fig. 4.1. 
 As Fig. 4.1 reveals, a good deal of Birkla’s perceived alienation (represented as 
tan circles bearing “B”) comes from a disappointment in her body image—a 
disappointment which is often used by others to force Birkla into the margins.  For, in 
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coping with the nightmares, Birkla begins the practice of self-mutilation, and enters into 
an addictive relationship with sweets.  While she’s able to hide the cutting, her addiction 
results in rapid weight gain and ridicule from other children—a taunting which is eerily 
paralleled in a later experience in the Jefferson County Jail, when she and another  
 
Fig. 4.1 – “Nancy Birkla’s ‘Alienation Via Disappointment’” 
 
overweight female are targeted for persecution with the nicknames “Humpty” and 
“Dumpty” (Birkla, in Lamb 126).We can note easily in Fig. 4.1 that just as Birkla was 
alienated from her peers at school (indicated at point 1), so too was she quickly alienated 
in the prison setting (point 4).   
	   155	  
 While arguably obscuring the actual locations of her narrative, I find Birkla’s 
thematic mapping fascinating, nevertheless, for in it we see a story of distance that begins 
to reveal a rhetorical awareness.  Birka’s spatial inventory quickly falls away from the 
literal, and is used to create spaces more like backdrops, which she can then connect via 
the common refrain of obesity.  Considered another way:  If Fig. 4.1 is a map, it is a 
figurative one, in which the trope of alienation is more important than the actual 
movement between and inside these spaces. 
 And just as importantly, once established, this trend allows Birkla the chance to 
redress her identity.  As she enters early adulthood, Birkla’s weight is a constant source 
of disappointment, and she feels it unlikely that she will ever find a man who loves her 
the way that she is.  This is until she meets “Bobby,” a lighting technician for a touring 
rock band who charms Birkla early on even as he manipulates he with further 
alienation55.  Despite consistently pushing her away with verbal taunts (echoing the 
alienation already established regarding her physical appearance), Bobby holds Birkla 
with a new addiction—this time to drugs—and the two are married within five years.   
 Birkla’s relationship with Bobby is indicated in Fig. 4.1 by point 2, which shows 
one of the few instances in her narrative in which she flirts with acceptance (here, she is 
held constantly on that line of affiliation—pushed out by abuse, yet reeled in by drugs).  
As a counteragent to the narrative of disapointment, then, we see Birkla establish Bobby 
early on as a potential source of fulfillment, predicated on that issue of addiction that has 
the connective thread of her life:  for as addiction (to both sweets and drugs) consistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  In their first meeting, Bobby challenges Birkla to a contest on the popular arcade game Centipede, and quickly 
unplugs the machine to erase her score when she defeats him (Birkla, in Lamb 120).  Despite this seemingly 
unimportant instance of aggression, Birkla’s inclusion of the event within her narrative suggests to us early on that she 
reads Bobby’s abusive behaviors as defined by disappointment; each additional depiction of Bobby we read is colored 
by this early definitional argument.	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threatens to push her farther away from an “in group,” with Bobby, the addiction serves 
to finally reduce the distance she feels. 
 Flash forward to 1989, and Birkla is caught in the Louisville Metro Police 
Department’s largest drug-trafficking sting to date—“Operation Barfly.”  When she is 
arrested, Bobby makes no appearance at the jail (despite multiple pleading phone calls 
from Birkla).  Her time in prison serves to make that distance between herself and Bobby 
more apparent as his absence becomes felt most acutely, and when she is finally released, 
she returns to find her home empty—Bobby had refused to leave work early to come see 
her.  In essence, her time in prison (and certainly her time spent sober) has reconfigured 
that home as yet another sphere of disappointment.   
 In my analysis, then, the concrete spaces that Birkla travels through are nearly 
meaningless—more phatic in nature than important in their own right, they serve the 
narrative as a vehicle for movement56.  What is important is the way in which these 
spaces become a map of disappointment:  the absence of acceptance in school, the 
solitary spaces of self-mutilation, and the drug-infused spaces of a troubled marriage;  all 
of these point to Birkla’s identity, which is sadly one that sits on the fringe of any realm 
she enters.  We can understand these spaces best as a kind of ecosystem: denied entry to 
the most traditional spaces of fulfillment, Bikla ends up finding some measure of solace 
in a figurative location (her marriage) that shouldn’t feel comfortable at all (see Fig. 4.2). 
 In Fig. 4.2 then, we see the kind of mapping that Birkla’s text establishes; how 
she has located herself via narrative.  Two things should be noted:  first, that the 
addictions which Birkla sees as responsible for her alienation from typical locales create 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Just as phatic speech serves little purpose other than to force open, or keep open, channels of communication, 
Birkla’s attention to fairly predictable, largely institutional, spaces seems to simply provide merely the tracks for the 
train, rather than the locomotion.	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for her an outsider sphere; second, that this outsider sphere becomes concretized for 
Birkla when it is turned into a marriage.  Bobby’s abuse of Birkla serves as additional 
alienation, but not enough to overcome their connection via addiction.  For Nancy Birkla, 
then, both addiction and marriage are spaces of disappointment; of lack.  These are the 
spaces which she inhabits, and influenced very rarely by her own choices. 
 In my analysis, I have to read such lack, as well as its subsequent spaces of 
disappointment—as a long wind-up towards eventual fulfillment.  Useful nevertheless for 
allowing Birkla to observe her own alienation, I would claim these moves as chiefly 
narrative in design, promising a conclusion that will not only bring our protagonist into 
acceptance, but will concurrently reauthor the narrative of incarceration that has been 
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Fig. 4.2 – “Birkla’s Conception of Marriage:  A Location as Product of Alienation.” 
 
written onto her by the state.  For if Birkla can eventually find acceptance through her 
prison narrative, perhaps she can also reconfigure the terms of her criminality.  
 
Part Two:  Towards a Theory of the “Intimate Public” 
 But we have moved a bit afield of the genre conventions that were established as 
a focal point early on in this chapter.  Ceratinly we see Nancy Birkla working with quite 
figurative spaces as she attempts to redress her identity, but these spaces have yet to be 
informed by an attention to genre.  I do find Birkla’s inscription of herself via a network 
of alienated experiences informative for considering rhetorical cartography, but it is 
important at this point to consider how such moves connect with other authors.  For while 
Birkla offers an unique example of spatial inventory, none of this speaks, at this point, to 
the process I’ve been calling recalculation.  In large part I believe that process to be 
working concurrently with her inventorying, so let us consider what these spaces of 
disappointment establish for her narrative. 
 In her 2008 book The Female Complaint:  The Unfinished Business of 
Sentimentality in American Culture, popular culture theorist Lauren Berlant proposes a 
rather subtle spatiality (what she would term connectivity) to female and feminist 
literature—both that authored by females, and that authored for them.  Using the 
seemingly contradictory term “intimate public,” Berlant posits that female consumers of 
text—and perhaps other similarly-marginalized groups—feel connections in text via a 
host of assumptions about the world they share with the author: 
 By “intimate public” I do not mean a public sphere organized by autobiographical 
 confession and chest-baring, althought there is often a significant amount of first-
 person narrative in an intimate public.  What makes a public sphere intimate is an 
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 expectation that the consumers of its particular stuff already share a worldview 
 and emotional knowledge that they have derived from a broadly common 
 historical experience.  A certain circularity sturctures an intimate public, 
 therefore:  its consumer participants are perceived to be marked by a commonly 
 lived history; its narratives and things are deemed expressive of that history while 
 also shaping its conventions of belonging [ . . .] (Berlant viii, emphasis in 
 original) 
 
In large measure, I find Berlant to be gesturing towards genre conventions which unite 
certain readers and writers.  However, as she continues, Berlant find the notion of 
intimate public useful, specifically, for considering the agency of women in oppressive 
situations: 
 Their [females engaged in texts of “women’s culture”] participation seems to 
 confirm the sense that even before there was a market addressed to them, there 
 existed a world of strangers who would be emotionally literate in each other’s 
 experience of power, intimacy, desire, and discontent, with all that entails:  
 varieties of suffering and fantasies of transcendence; longing for reciprocity with 
 other humans and the world; irrational and rational attachments to the way things 
 are; special styles of ferocity and refusal; and a creative will to survive that 
 attends to everyday situations while imagining conditions of flourishing within 
 and beyond them. (Berlant 5, emphasis added) 
 
At least two things are striking about this passage:  the first is that narratives such as 
those found in mass-market women’s literature are so familiar that they establish 
themselves nearly as a genre of “coping.”  And while we may be tempted to discourage 
such familiarity, the larger point made here by Berlant is that of “emotional literacy”:  it’s 
not that these narratives are repeating the same moves over and over, but rather that their 
consumers read through the lens of something approaching collective experience—
perhaps just as much about feeling as it is reading.  But as Berlant suggests, such 
experiences are not useful solely for the consumers themselves, but for the producers as 
well. 
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 Secondly, Berlant’s list of female experience strikes me as fairly congruent to the 
experiences of female prisoners, specifically.  I’m not prepared to comment on the global 
nature of “varieties of suffering and fantasies of transcendance,” nor the female 
“experience of power, intimacy, desire, and discontent,” yet these emotions and themes 
are easily encapsulated by the prison experience.  I don’t want to trouble this overlap too 
much, for anything sufficiently abstracted can feel as though it is a prison.  But I do wish 
to suggest that there is an emotional currency in circulation in the body of literature 
discussed by Berlant, and that it certainly holds value in the writings of the incarcerated. 
 While Berlant is working to understand the consumer culture that emerges around 
popular women’s culture, her speculation on the intimate public may provide us with a 
useful lens for considering the authorial decisions of the writers behind such works.  In 
considering further the dimensions of women’s culture, Berlant’s idea of the intimate 
public takes on a distinctly spatial feel: 
 The works of “women’s culture” enact a fantasy that my life is not just mine, but 
 an experience understood by other women, even when it is not shared by many or 
 any.  Commodified genres of intimacy, such as Oprah-esque chat shows and 
 “chick lit,” circulate among strangers, enabling insider self-help talk such as “girl 
 talk” to flourish in an intimate public.  These genres claim to reflect a kernel of 
 common experience and provide frames for encountering the impacts of living as 
 a woman in the world.  (Berlant x) 
 
I believe we see this “kernel of common experience” enacted in the narrative of Birkla, 
who writes of her troubled relationship with Bobby and the path that it set her on not to 
advocate reform or to reveal some kind of surprising truth about women placed in 
corrections. We are not even left with a new understanding of the prison system—a stark 
contrast to some of the writers who we’ve looked at previously.  The only revelation 
offered in “Three Steps Past the Monkeys” is that recovered memory of sexual abuse as a 
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young girl, which is too personal an epiphany to be overtly political, as we would see in a 
writer like X or Carter. 
 I don’t believe Birkla to be advocating anything, save the experience of dealing 
with alienation and disappointment, which is an important point for Berlant on the subject 
of intimate publics:  they are not overtly political.  They are, rather, juxtapolitical, and 
they “[thrive] in proximity to the political,” but rarely attempt to advocate change.  In 
Berlant’s reading, the texts of women’s culture understand themselves to be lacking 
access to the political, and though they may occasionally create political alliances, such 
works are more frequently interested in managing the status quo rather than altering it 
(Berlant x; 2-3). 
 I commented at the top of this chapter that the texts explored here felt, on the 
whole, less “connected” to each other than did the texts previously explored.  Perhaps, in 
light of the intimate public, that thesis needs revison:  it is not that these female-authored 
texts are “less connected” (in fact they may be more inherently congruent than others), 
but that, because of their experiential nature, they need not be concerned with calling on 
connections available to other writers.  Perhaps Birkla’s prison experience is not 
connected with others because she understands herself to be writing about “varieties of 
suffering and fantasies of transcendence” in a way that makes it common for all women.  
As an intimate public, mobility may be of secondary concern; coping would seem the 
priority. 
 However, this does not mean that these female authors are unconcerned with 
issues of distance and alienation—the issues that have driven the identity-based 
cartographic rhetoric of this study. We’ve already seen these preoccupations addressed in 
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Birkla’s narrative, as she becomes locked into a cycle of alienation in all spheres of 
contact save those that feed her addicitons.  As we will see ahead, the absence of political 
motivation does not endanger the cartographic impulse to map one’s self in the service of 
identity. 
 
Part Three:  Disappointment and Fulfillment in Theory and Practice 
 One characteristic truly separates the male authors discussed previously in this 
study and the female authors under discussion now:  the proclivity to build maps of 
identity over maps of romantic relationships.  Much has been written about the changing 
nature of incarceration over the past three decades—a period of time roughly congruent 
with the United States’ tougher stance on the “War on Drugs,” and in which we’ve seen 
an exploding female prison population in this country (see “Incarceration”; Kerman 299; 
Kirby).  Though statistics vary greatly, most researchers of this trend seem to agree that 
between 1980 and 2012, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons witnessed a 600% increase in female 
prisoners57 (see “Women in the Justice System”; Kirby).  
 And the reasons for this rise are similarly shocking:  as the Reagan administration 
moved to double down on the battle with illicit drugs, prison sentences for accomplices to 
drug crime became more common, and the definitions of “accomplice” more lax.  This 
meant that anyone harboring, giving aid, or merely transporting a drug dealer could end 
up with a sentence nearly as stiff as the dealer his or herself.  Moreso than any other 
group, this change seems to have targeted women:  the wives or girlfriends of drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Some	  statistics	  claim	  this	  number	  to	  be	  as	  high	  as	  800%,	  though	  the	  numbers	  above	  are	  the	  most	  commonly	  
accepted.	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offenders, who began to enter prison more frequently whether they were complicit in the 
crime or not. 
 So when we note that romantic relationships become more foundational for our 
female prison authors, it is not without contextual explanation:  often, these women enter 
prison as a direct result of their relationships58.  Yet beyond this, the inclination to build a 
map of identity atop a map of romantic involvement seems to be a particularly useful 
cartographic tool for these writers—one borne of experience with the intimate public, and 
predicated on revealing distance and alienation. 
 One such example is the story of Brenda Medina, one of Wally Lamb’s workshop 
participants at York Correctional Institute, and the only author in Couldn’t Keep it to 
Myself to be allowed to discuss the crime that placed her in prison59.  Like Birkla, 
Medina’s essay, “Hell, and How I Got Here,” feels at once exemplary of the intimate 
public narrative strategy; yet at the same time, its author is perhaps more influenced by 
the spatial politics avoided by the previous text. 
 Raised by a family of Puerto Rican immigrants in Hartford, Connecticut, 
Medina’s very linear narrative60 seems geared towards alternating between two distinct, 
though similarly abstracted, spaces:  that of a troubled home (a space of disappointment), 
and the “gang space” that offered a much-needed escape.  At home, Medina and her 
siblings share a mutual fear of their mother, whose clear psychological illness is read by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Kerman	  is	  certainly	  an	  example	  of	  this,	  having	  been	  arrested	  and	  convicted	  on	  a	  decade-­‐old	  charge	  of	  
transporting	  money	  for	  her	  then-­‐girlfriend	  Nora,	  an	  international	  drug	  dealer.	  
59	  As Wally Lamb indicates in his introduction, Brenda Medina’s early drafts were thick with “self-censoring” for fear 
of reproach by the York authorities.  Upon mentioning this to Dale Griffith, special permission was secured for Medina 
to directly address her gang activities as long as they did not glorify gang life (Lamb 6-7).  As such, Medina’s narrative 
offers a deeper portrait of prison reflection, and offers us a more concrete, “gang space” to consider.	  
60	  It is worth mentioning that Medina’s narrative is entirely chronological, rather than thematic, like Birkla’s.  While 
we again have to question the editors’ hands in this strategy, the two contrasting attitudes toward temporal narrative 
development do reflect different intentions for constructing space.	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the strict Catholic family as demonic possession.  Medina, one of the youngest, seems 
targeted early on for the kind of strict upbringing that her mother believes will keep 
young Brenda away from the demons that plague the family.  As a result, Medina finds 
herself in a private Catholic school that her family can barely afford, and surrounded by 
classmates that make her visible signs of “outsiderness” very problematic: 
 I hated Saint Margaret’s. Most of my classmates were white kids from wealthy 
 families and I was the skinny little Puerto Rican girl whose family was poor.  The 
 others were dropped off each morning in their expensive new shoes, their crisp 
 white button-down shirts to match our plaid uniforms.  I’d show up in a Kmart 
 shirt with frayed cuffs and my sister’s hand-me-down Mary Janes.  “Nice shoes, 
 Brenda,” snobby Monica Bradley noted once, running past me at recess with her 
 giggly friends.  Everyone in my class knew as well that I didn’t belong at Saint 
 Margaret’s—that I was the odd girl out.  (Medina, in Lamb 147-8, emphasis 
 added) 
 
But such alienation, familiar from Birkla, is not exclusive to the terrain of school.  At 
home, Brenda is often terrified of her mother, who swings wildly between attentive 
caregiver and out-of-control abuse.  And these swings seem to keep Medina constantly on 
edge, as they could occur at a moment’s notice—in one instance, Medina’s mother stops 
brushing her hair to begin violently choking the young girl (Medina, in Lamb 151).  And 
at school, she is verbally tormented by the upper-class children who find her presence 
inappropriate, and have no problem sharing their rejection.  Both of these spaces, then, 
can be seen as spaces of disappointment.  Perhaps more concretely conceived in Medina 
than in Birkla, these spaces constantly reject the young Brenda and set her up for a quest 
towards fulfillment. 
 Fig. 4.3 indicates the nature of Medina’s removal from the two primary spaces of 
childhood:  home and school.  Unlike Birkla, however, there is no behavior (like 
addiction) to frame her “outsiderness.”  The spaces of disappointment from which she has 
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been alienated are established as having a rather arbitrary agency, casting her out for 
reasons beyond her control (her mother’s psychosis; her poor/Latina image at a wealthy, 
white school).  In contrast to Birkla, then, with Brenda Medina we see a young girl cast 
out from important locations of belonging with no sense of what true fulfillment might 
look like. 
 So when Medina meets Manny, the charismatic lieutenant of the local gang 
known as “The Unidad,” Medina is perhaps already primed for an encounter with a 
connection that will deliver her the fulfillment she seeks.  Although, like disappointment, 
this seems to be beyond her control.  Fig. 4.3 shows Medina’s sense of belonging 
determined by others (the dashed lines sending her out of “home” and “school”), until the 
point that she meets Manny.  Manny seems to understand this waywardness in Medina, 
and begins to craft the space of his gang as one of fulfillment, so that her only chosen 
step (note the solid line from “Manny” to “fulfillment”) in this map is the one that she 
takes with Manny.  Ironically, Medina’s initial distrust of gang life is used by Manny to 
establish that space as yet another sphere of disappointment: 
 I’d given up trying to pry information out of [two friends who were also 
members of The Unidad], but if Manny was going to give me an opening, I’d take 
it.  “So what’s [that] about?” I asked, pointing to his necklace. 
He fingered the beads.  “It’s what we wear.  They represent our family.”  
They looked like the beads I’d strung from a kit when I was a little girl. 
  “Stitch and Green Eyes wear those same white and mustard colors.” 
  He paused, took a sip of his beer.  “We all do,” he said. 
  “Who’s ‘we’?” 
“The Unidad.  Don’t ask me anything more, okay?  That’s all I can say 
because you’re not one of us.” 
There it was again: that same old “left out” feeling of mine. (Medina, in 
Lamb 156, emphasis added) 
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Fig. 4.3 – “Brenda Medina’s Quest for Fulfillment.” 
 
 
 We should immediately note the distance Manny constructs between them—this 
time, likely more mysterious flirtation than outright alienation.  Though still not 
interested in joining The Unidad, Medina is interested in Manny, and their romance 
initially thrives without much interruption from the gang world.  Medina remains 
steadfast against joining, even when she finds out that her older brother David is also part 
of the gang.  But when Manny is arrested for selling drugs, Brenda is caught up in the 
excitement of her friends’ attempts to secure bail for Manny’s release.  In the course of 
meeting up with fellow Unidad members to raise funds, Medina meets childhood friend 
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Erika, now also a member, who presses the issue of membership along the lines of 
fulfillment:  Erika tells Medina, “For the first time in my life, I feel like I have a family” 
(Medina, in Lamb 163).  Measured against the alienation achieved by her home and 
school (and even that flirtatious distance created by Manny himself), I believe it is at this 
point we see “The Unidad” constructed as discrete thirdspace which disrupts the 
uncomfortable binary of her life: what we can call “gang space.” 
 
Fig. 4.4 – “Medina’s Exploration of Gang Space.” 
 
 Fig. 4.4 explores the idea of gang space as it relates to a young Brenda Medina on 
that specific night.  Unsure of what such a space entails, Medina knows at least that it 
contains people important to her:  her brother, David; her friend, Erika; and Manny.  
When she meets with both disappointment (when Manny and others refuse her quesitons 
about The Unidad) and fulfillment (Manny’s affection; Erika’s idea of “family”), Medina 
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is offered a distinct choice, and it perhaps unsurprising when she joins the gang before 
the night is over.  
 Initiation into The Unidad (at least for women, as we are only priviliged with 
Medina’s subjectivity) involves either being “beaten in” (literally attacked by members of 
the gang until they reward the victim with membership), or being tasked with doing a 
“job” for the gang.  Medina chooses the latter, and is involved in a murder when she and 
three other initiates beat an elderly lady to death61 (Medina, in Lamb 163).  Unaware of 
the death, Medina is quickly accepted into the gang, and eager to turn this new 
acceptance into fulfillment with Manny:  when she appears at his trial, she reveals her 
new black and yellow necklace to him from the audience, and he flashes her the Unidad 
sign as he is lead away to prison (Medina, in Lamb 175). 
 For Medina, this physical separation from Manny (now sentenced to prison time 
himself) seems to mean nothing.  As established above, this “gang space” has been 
established as thirdspace, and so even though they may be separated by distance and 
bars, Medina still feels herself to be with Manny.  This is worth focusing on, for 
Medina’s constructions of space (the school, her family) have never before been a 
challenge to her in terms of literal distance; disappointment for her has always been a 
product of perceived distance—alienation—based on visual markers of diffence like skin 
color or clothing.  So for the first time, Medina is challenged with actual, physical 
separation, and it seems to mean nothing to her.  Reinforcing our conception of “gang 
space as thirdspace,” then, is the understanding that her acceptance into The Unidad is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  The	  murder	  is	  established	  by	  Medina	  as	  an	  accident:	  	  The	  victim	  lived	  near	  a	  Unidad	  hangout,	  and	  had	  been	  
mocking	  their	  gang	  signs	  for	  weeks.	  	  Medina	  and	  her	  associates	  were	  asked	  to	  attack	  the	  woman	  as	  revenge	  for	  
this	  behavior,	  and	  they	  unintentionally	  (if	  we	  believe	  Medina’s	  narrative)	  beat	  her	  to	  death	  (Medina,	  in	  Lamb	  
163-­‐5).	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immediately seen as unquestioned fulfillment, despite the fact that it is, at nearly the same 
instant, the start of her separation from Manny.  Put another way:  Medina is far more 
interested in spaces of belonging (or fulfillment) than she is in people to whom she can 
belong. 
 But like Carter and the thirdspatial “Tubbs” before her, this gang space is 
ultimately disrupted quite easily.  Medina’s narrative, following the trial of Manny, 
quickly jumps to her own arrest and prosecution for murder.  The four Unidad initiates 
(Medina and her three companions) are sentenced to York Correctional Institution, a 
physical location that immediately challenges her concept of the gang space.  Despite 
having no further access to Manny (who is simply dropped from the narrative at this 
point), as well as having fairly limited access to the co-defendants in her case, we find 
Medina still hanging on to the gang identity she had crafted on the streets, and which 
brought her a sudden surfeit of fulfillment.  In York, Medina claims she was seen as a 
tough murderer, and found herself all too willing to play that part.  Dubbed “Ms. 
Respect” by a guard who tries to mock her identity, Medina spends five years taking 
pride in shirking the rules and earning disciplinary actions—including a “level five 
orange card,” which marks her as one of the most dangerous convicts at the institution.  
Medina, used to being judged by such visible markers of difference, has learned to 
embrace the alienation, which she now reads as connection to her gang: 
  “Congrats,” the CO said as he handed me my level five orange card.  
 “You’re only the fourth inmate at this compound who’s earned one of these.” 
  “It’s an honor,” I said, smirking back.  If they wanted to name me to the 
 troublemakers’ all-star team, I’d be happy to play the game. (Medina, in Lamb 
 171) 
 
	   170	  
So it is that Medina stubbornly sticks to the identity forged by her membership to a 
thirdspace—now not only the “gang space” of The Unidad, but coupled with 
membership to a “troublemakers’ all-star team,” which feels like a privileged space 
within that thirdspace.  Here, Medina seems to be applying the lesson learned on the 
streets (that bad spaces promise fulfillment) to the logic of the prison, and so spatially, 
she’s still seeking to define herself based on a removal from mainstream locations.  Level 
five orange card holders must be restrained any time they go out into the yard, though 
they have the choice between handcuffs or leg chains.  Rigidly standing by her 
“gangster” identity, Medina always chooses the more difficult of the two—the leg 
chains—and flaunts her persona on the yard by learning to dance while wearing them. 
  At the time of writing, Brenda Medina has dropped this identity after a prison 
councelor finally gets her to admit the disappointment of The Unidad.  Left once again 
without a space to feel her own, Lamb’s concluding notes on the author make it clear that 
it is writing itself which finally helped Medina “remap” herself: 
 While at York prison, Brenda Medina has obtained her high school general 
 equivalency degree and has earned thirty-six credits towards an associate’s 
 degree.  A bilingual tutor registered with Literacy Volunteers of America, she has 
 taught fellow Hispanic inmates to read, speak, and write English.  In addition, 
 Medina serves as a reporter, photographer, and editor for the York Voice, an 
 inmate newsletter.  In 2002, she designed, organized, and implemented York 
 prison’s first-ever Latino Appreciation Week. (Lamb 175) 
 
Calling her writing a way “to keep my sanity in this place of confusion” (Medina, in 
Lamb 175), we are invited at last to see her literacy efforts as perhaps the formation of a 
community, and a space of fulfillment, that has been so absent from her earlier inventory. 
 Let us unpack this, for a host of terms and ideas have been included in the 
discussion of Medina so far.  Writing an essay titled “Hell, And How I Got Here,” I 
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believe we are invited to read Medina’s narrative as one predicated on space, but also on 
transformations inherent to such spaces.  As I have said above, I believe Medina (at least 
the narrative Medina) to be constructing the “gang space” of The Unidad as a 
thirdspace—a location that disrupts a traditional binary (belonging/not belonging) by 
creating a space whose ability to offer feelings of belonging is dependant upon its 
members being chased away from other spheres of influence.  Yet perhaps more 
important is the way that the romantic relationship with Manny fits into this construction, 
for it once again connects back to Berlant’s ideas regarding the intimate public: 
  [In literature from women’s culture] there is likely to be a tension between the 
rhetorical or aesthetic representation of accumulated emotional experience (as in 
a plot) and the surfacing of sexual conventionality as a process, topic, and 
seeming inevitablility in a text [ . . .] Usually, though, in narratives of feminine 
expressivity, the load of detail eventuates not in disaster but in the emergence or 
agency of genre to provide the logic of rescue or amelioration.  Blockage is 
central to any genre’s successful execution:  the threat that x might not happen 
(love in a love plot, poetic justice in a thriller, death in a tragedy) allows 
absorbing but not shocking anxieties to be stimulated and vanquished.  How eles 
would narratives represent femininity as what does not or must not change 
fundamentally, if the whole thrust of a narrative wree to invest its specific details 
with meaningful instability and transformative potential?  In women’s culture, 
normative femininity and aesthetic conventionality constitute the real central 
couple, with the love plot as the vehicle for and the object of desire.  (Berlant 18-
9, original emphasis) 
 
Consider this, then:  we might usefully understand love and relationships as a trope so 
familiar to consumers of women’s culture that they create their own kind of rhetorical 
gravity; the ruminations of female prisoners such as Brenda Medina do not stand merely 
for the failed relationships of the individual, but for the denial of fulfillment that is so 
often promised by the literature of women’s culture.  In my understanding, then, the 
intimate public becomes inherently spatial as it takes on the figurative locations of 
fulfillment and disappointment, as seen in Fig. 4.5, below. 
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 Notably similar to the map of Merle Haggard’s postionality (see Chapter Two), in 
Fig. 4.5 we find a frame which offers its subject a choice between two binary positions, 
and in which access is determined by an outsider (or “gatekeeper,” as I have called it 
before).  References to “love” or “lost love,” then, serve us as two sides of the same coin:  
one that Berlant would call disappointment/fulfillment (terms which I have applied 
liberally here), and which she reads as measures of distance and proximity (Berlant 13).  
Disappointment, expressed as rumination over a relationship that has led to incarceration, 
can be seen as an expression of alienation, as mediated through a third-party (usually a 
male love interest). 
 Such is certainly the case in both the narratives of Birkla and Medina.  In each 
narrative, the narrator finds herself incarcerated as the effect of a lifetime of denied 
fulfillment; an alienation that drives them to pursue that fulfillment in problematic spaces.  
So it is that the rhetorical features of the intimate public allow for an inherently spatial 
preoccupation as one commits to turning their life story into narrative.  This is to suggest 
that for female prisoners the condition of incarceration is not merely a removal from 
society—a lack of agency which is clearly pressing for male prisoners—but a denial of 
proximity to the connections of fulfillment on the outside; a denial which feels embodied 
by a significant other in ways that sets it apart from a narrative such as Carter’s. 
 Wally Lamb comments on the durability of this spatial binary in the opening 
pages of his anthology:  “To imprison a woman is to remove her voice from the world, 
but many female inmates have been silenced by life long before the transport van carries 
them from the courthouse to the correctional facility” (Lamb 9).  As one interested in the 
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Fig. 4.5 – “The Spatiality of Fulfillment/Disappointment.” 
 
analysis of spatiality, I find it interesting that Lamb picks this moment to juxtapose 
spaces like “the world,” “the transport van,” “the courthouse,” and “the correctional 
facility” along a similar point:  that these spaces are merely literal referents for a much 
larger problem of silencing and marginalization.  This, I believe, is the promise of the 
enthymematic argument discussed previously—it allows us to use spatial referents in 
ways that make larger arguments via precise narratives.  For a writer such as Carter, 
making these arguments is a matter of connection via allusion, or connection to other 
similarly-marginalized persons.  For writers such as Birkla and Medina, it is a matter of 
writing oneself into an intimate public.  Both are necessarily enthymematic, as they, to 
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recall Walker, exploit both a “web of oppositions” and “the kairos of the moment” as 
they make arguments which the reader is given “rational and passional reasons to 
identify” with (Walker 58).  The point being advanced here is simply that different 
groups have different ways of making this happen. 
 
Part Four:  “Female” is the New “Criminal” 
 Recently popularized by the hit Netflix series of the same name, Piper Kerman’s 
2010 prison memoir, Orange is the New Black:  My Year in a Women’s Prison, is 
perhaps the most prominent female prison narrative in recent history.  Central to the 
book’s reception is its unlikely narrator:  Kerman, a young, middle-class, white woman 
who is sentenced to 15 months in FCI Danbury in 2004 on drug trafficking charges which 
were nearly a decade old.  Accused of carrying money for her drug-dealing former 
girlfriend (a charge for which she readily admits guilt), the intrigue of Orange is that a 
fairly privileged white woman is somewhat arbitrarily62 plucked out of a plush 
metropolitan lifestyle and dropped into a minimum security federal prison where she 
finds herself forced to experience the kind of punishment typically reserved for lower-
class, predominantly minority citizens.   
 Embracing the “fish-out-of-water” narrative strategy (giving us an innate sense of 
alienation in and of itself), what Kerman produces in Orange is what many in our field 
might call ethnographic research:  for over a year, Kerman finds herself utilizing an emic 
perspective (not unlike Ted Conover) to view and report the culture she finds inside 
Danbury—a culture which is understandably different from her own.  Encountering for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Kerman	  was	  charged	  nearly	  a	  decade	  after	  commission	  of	  the	  crime, which confounds most mainstream 
assumptions of an expedient, omniscient justice system.  I use the term “arbitrary” not because the law here has 
arbitrarily selected her, but because chance has played such an obvious role in her identification as a criminal.	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the first time a “tribalism” that creates distinct groups within the prison population, the 
arbitrariness of prison codes and procedures, and the disturbing lack of preparation for 
life outside prison walls, Kerman’s understanding of prison is understandably changed; 
following publication, Kerman herself has become an outspoken proponent for criminal 
justice—specifically, prison reform. 
 Orange is the New Black, then, provides us with an interesting alternative look at 
female prison writing, as her purpose in writing is made clear almost immediately:  
Kerman wants to take the reader with her into Danbury, and to share her revelations with 
a largely ignorant (in terms of prison life) mainstream public.  Unlike Carter, Kerman is 
not pleading for release—a quick scan of the book jacket would reveal that her sentence 
has ended, in the case one hadn’t gleaned as much from the book’s title itself.  What we 
get with Orange is the opportunity to slip inside a federal prison and see for ourselves 
what it might be like to experience these spaces of disappointment from a majority 
viewpoint—a position that is typically not the focal point of prison literature (though 
often an ancillary purpose). 
 Of immediate interest to me is the space of the book itself:  formatted as a book, 
Orange allows Kerman ample time to construct, textually, the types of concrete prison 
spaces we’ve seen in works by Conover and Carter.  In contrast to the shorter narratives 
of Lamb’s anthology, Kerman’s memoir is able to do more than motion toward the more 
abstract environments that make up spaces of disappointment.  Yet despite this, readers 
of Orange is the New Black may be startled to see that these real, lived-in spaces are 
more frequently rendered through a similarly abstracted strategy, where fulfillment and 
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disappointment still largely function as the driving force behind each real space 
developed. 
 For our analysis, such rhetorical features find a comfortable home in Lauren 
Berlant’s notion of the intimate public—this is to say that even as Kerman is able to 
move us as readers through the actual spaces she encounters at Danbury, she is still 
largely drawing on the conventions and assumptions popularized by the literature studied 
by Berlant, resulting in more abstract, emotionally-charged spaces that concrete ones (as 
the quote that opens this chapter will attest). 
 However, we must understand Kerman’s goal of prison reform as quite political 
as well.  In the paperback edition of the book, which features a new afterward, Kerman 
calls attention to her memoir’s unambiguous message: 
 What happens within our prisons is completely within the community’s control.  
 The public expects sentences to be punitive but also rehabilitative; however, what 
 we expect and what we get from our prisons are very different things.  The lesson 
 that our prison system teaches its residents how to survive as a prisoner, not as a 
 citizen—not a very constructive body of knowledge for us or the communities to 
 which we return. (Kerman 298) 
 
Already clear to those who have read this far into the book, what Kerman makes plain in 
her final plea to readers is the alienation that prison renders through its lived experience:  
that those incarcerated are further removed from the spaces to which they belong, making 
an eventual return very problematic, if not predictably momentary.  Prison is thus 
abstracted based not upon its physical separation from the outside world (though this is 
certainly a problem for Kerman), but more in terms of the refusal to allow psychological 
or emotional connections to the outside—connections we might identify with fulfillment. 
 Such a plea calls the narrative strategy of the memoir into sharp relief, and we 
might see more easily the rhetorical moves that Kerman uses in a push towards that final 
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call for reform.  In my analysis, Kerman’s rhetorical cartography is established in a three-
part construction:  (1) her entry into the “tribal” atmosphere of FCI Danbury, which is 
part of her spatial inventory; (2) her realization of the alienation from the “real world” 
outside of Danbury, and (3) her further realization that the “ghetto” of Danbury is not 
meant to encourage reconnection, but further isolation.  Both moves two and three would 
be part of a recalculation, though one aimed not at recalculating her own identity (for her 
privileged position is never in doubt), but that of the institution itself.  Unlike Birkla and 
Medina, then, the spatial revelation of prison does not simply allow for a degree of 
personal reclamation, but rather encourages the reader to become political along with her. 
 So conceived, the spatial inventory of Orange is relatively simple, despite its 
attention to a number of discrete and concrete locations within her story:  Kerman focuses 
on the prison, reconceives the prison as separation, and extends that separation to run 
longer than any individual prison sentence might indicate.  Our task here is to understand 
the psychological space of the prison as Kerman has established it—what I call the 
intimate politic, for it needs distinction from Berlant’s terminology.  Unlike an intimate 
public, where extremely personal realizations are offered up to a public that can easily 
internalize them, the intimate politic would base itself in the same personal realizations 
(forging connections to its audience) with the purpose not of collecting experience, but of 
motivating its readers.  To explore this, we will start as Kerman does, with her arrival at 
Danbury. 
 As Kerman begins her narrative trek into Danbury, the descriptive tendency she 
adopts is one clearly aligned with that of a good ethnographer:  describe the foreign space 
in terms of more familiar spaces.  This comparative strategy immediately immerses the 
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reader into an understanding of the real spaces based largely on their emotional weight—
a move that abstracts even as it seeks to concretize.  It also, I believe, invites the reader 
into a consideration of group identity in a way that Birkla and Medina do not. 
 From her arrival at Danbury we see the strong desire to conform; to find 
acceptance within the ranks of her new neighbors.  Upon first entering the shared, dorm-
like space that all new inmates find themselves in, Kerman is taught how to make her bed 
so as to pass the daily inspection.  When her neighbor insists that Danbury inmates sleep 
on top of their sheets, so that their beds are always ready for inspection, Kerman laughes 
the practice off, finding the first of many encounters with an inmate body that is fast to 
practice rejection: 
  Annette [Kerman’s bunk mate] looked at me with the complete 
 exasperation a  mom shows a recalcitrant six-year-old.  “Look, if you wanna [sleep 
 under the sheets], go ahead—you’ll be the only one in the whole prison!” 
  This sort of social pressure was irresistible; getting between the sheets 
 wasn’t  going to happen for the next fifteen months.  (Kerman 44, emphasis 
 added) 
 
Picking up on this perceived distance, the author quickly relents and begins sleeping, as 
the other inmates, on top of her sheets.  So it is that Kerman quickly learns that prison is 
largely an ordering of space (not just human beings), being a site built on a specific set of 
practices, and learns to look past the strange, arbitrary rules and tactics for coping.  In 
Fig. 4.6, I offer a map based on Kerman’s observations of the prison behavior she often 
finds confusing.  
 Within the largest sphere, prison, Kerman exists in a kind of “no man’s land,” 
where she cannot connect with the behavioral practices of the mainstream world-at-large.  
Given no other option, Kerman must accept the sponsorship of “Annette” to move into an 
acceptable, established, prison society (or be pushed to the fringes with no support).  In 
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this instance, prison society demands a bed is made, above all else, for the purpose of 
passing inspection—not for sleeping in.  By accepting Annette’s advice, Kerman is 
allowed entry (by admittedly superficial means) into a mainstream prison society63. 
 As she continues to probe the prison environment, the realization that she’s been 
placed in the midst of an exaggerated politics becomes increasingly obvious.  Kerman 
 
Fig. 4.6 – “Piper Kerman’s Mapping of Prison Acceptance.” 
 
speculates on the makeup of her minimum-security camp, which is estimated to be about 
50% Latina, 24% White, 24% African-American, and a “random smattering” of outsiders 
who didn’t fit in with the expected, tripartite breakdown (Kerman 66).  And along with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  While Fig. 4.8 depicts Kerman’s entry with regard to the matter of making a bed, it should be seen as merely one 
step towards that eventual acceptance she seeks—a series of other practices will be taught to her, and her acceptance of 
these moves her farther and farther into the prison culture.	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such divisions come quite obvious boundaries between ethnic groups, leading Kerman to 
reflect on the “tribal” nature of her new home.  As a white woman, she finds little trouble 
establishing her own “clique” of belonging, but she immediately calls attention to those 
who don’t find their genetics helpful in establishing a sense of belonging: 
I always wondered how it felt to be there if you lacked a tribe.  It was all so very 
West Side Story—stick to your own kind, Maria! 
The racialism was unabashed; the three main Dorms had organizing principles 
allegedly instituted by the counselors, who assigned housing.  A Dorm was 
known as “the Suburbs,” B Dorm was dubbed “the Ghetto,” and C Dorm was 
“Spanish Harlem.” (Kerman 67) 
 
Of striking interest here is the attention to spatial metaphor that Kerman picks up.  
Considered as a “map,” Kerman’s description of the tribalism at Danbury is seen in Fig. 
4.7.  In this map, we see the three main “tribes” of Danbury (Latina, White, and African-
American), concretized into space via the locational names of “Spanish Harlem,” “The 
Suburbs,” and “The Ghetto,” respectively.  Important to note is that before Kerman had 
ever stepped inside Danbury, inmates had already begun to spatialize their terrain with 
these real-world locational metaphors.  In some areas, the ethnic make-up may overlap, 
but such overlaps do not result in the denial of membership into “prison culture.”  
 Those that are denied membership are those who don’t fit into the pre-established 
ethnic makeup—those who find themselves without a tribe.  As in the previous figure, the 
map revealed in Fig. 4.7 shows us the tendency of inmates to desire a move inward, 
towards the center point of “prison culture” and, as will become important to Kerman’s 
political argument later on, away from the behaviors deemed acceptable on the outside. 
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Fig. 4.7 – “The Tribalism of FCI Danbury.” 
 
 Perhaps following through on Danbury’s impetus to map the prison via external 
spatial metaphors, Kerman’s early chapters seek to connect with readers by borrowing 
the emotions of other institutional spheres.  The Danbury camp, beset by “distinct 
rhythms of frenzied action,” is compared early on to a high school and an ER ward 
(Kerman 61).  By the time she is more settled within Danbury, its rhythms have evoked, 
for the author, a startling comparison to her undergrad years at Smith College, where 
obsessions with food and community are the same, even if those obsessions find different 
results: 
There was less bulimia and more fights than I had known as an undergrad, but the 
same feminine ethos was present—empathetic camaraderie and bawdy humor on 
good days, and histrionic dramas coupled with meddling, malicious gossip on bad 
days. (Kerman 100, emphasis added) 
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As Kerman continues, the facility is also compared to a youthful summer camp, and to a 
military barracks, and eventually, a psych ward (see Kerman 100; 107; 273), yet always 
these institutions are compared with an over-arching attention to the inevitably feminine 
coping mechanisms that unite those places—a strategy very much in line with Berlant’s 
intimate public.  We might take the women out of women’s literature, but the culture 
created therein will continue to be a guiding light. 
 Fig. 4.8 speaks to these “coping mechanisms,” which we might more productively 
think of as spatial obsessions developing in response to institutional distress.  As a map, 
this figure represents overlapping institutional locations, and the resulting obsessions that 
Kerman believes link female subjectivity across them.  Invoking this mapping most 
directly with her comparison of Danbury to Smith College, Kerman indicates a familiar 
obsession with food—stealing and microwaving food late at night in the former; weekly 
candlelight dinners at the latter.  We might take such comparisons as something of an 
awkward grasping for some semblance of analogue, and as Kerman is still early in her 
experience at Danbury (as well as in her narrative), such a read likely bears consideration.  
But in a very essential manner, I believe we see here an attempt by Kerman to begin 
making some use of her spatial inventory.  Still largely operating in “ethnographer” 
mode, to a large extent these comparisons seem to be made for an assumed audience of 
people like Kerman—middle/upper-class women of some privilege.  But moreover, I 
think we can consider the comparisons to “outside world” spaces (all notably institutional 
spaces) in an effort to reveal the behavior affected by such locations.  Here we would be 
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Fig. 4.8 – “Overlapping Maps of Feminine Obsessions, with Attention to Institutions.” 
 
well-served to recall Goffman, whose text Asylums concerns itself with the effects of 
institutional spaces upon their inhabitants (especially in terms of stripping subject 
identity, which he calls mortification): 
 Mortification or curtailment of the self is very likely to involve acute 
psychological stress for the individual, but for an individual sick with his world or guilt-
ridden in it mortification may bring psychological relief.  Further, the psychological 
stress often created by assaults on the self can also be produced by matters not perceived 
as related to the territories of the self—such as loss of sleep, insufficient food, or 
protracted decision-making.  (Goffman 48) 
 
 If prison time can be said to produce “curtailment of the self,” here, I think we see 
Kerman grasping at the receding image of her self.  It is not that Danbury and Smith 
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College share a great deal in common64, but that they both produce a mortification 
process with similar results.  The effect in Kerman’s text is two-fold:  such comparisons 
serve to recall the her self being similarly curtailed in other institutional environments; as 
well as to offer a female-centric list of experience through which she may enter an 
intimate public. 
 As Kerman finds herself more or less “at home” in Danbury, her thoughts turn 
first to those absent in her own life, and then quickly to the absences felt by those around 
her, who are less-fortunate in their longer sentences.  Towards the book’s midsection, 
with her spatial inventory more or less developed (intimately tied as it is with 
mortification), Kerman begins to explore not only the alienation she observes, but its 
effects upon those who must deal with it over prolonged sentences.  In a chapter titled 
“The Hours,” she specifically focuses on the issue of prison visits—a privilege Kerman is 
able to take advantage of, but whose social support is not afforded to all inmates: 
Some women never got visits because they had effectively said goodbye to the 
outside world.  No children, no parents, no friends, nobody.  Some of them were 
halfway around the world from home, and some of them didn’t have a home.  
Some women stated flatly that they did not want their people to see them in a 
place like this.  In general, the longer you were down, the fewer and farther 
between were your visits.  I worried about my bunkie, Natalie, finishing her eight-
year bid; she spoke to her young son on the phone every night and received many 
letters but didn’t have a single visit in the year we lived together.  I observed the 
unspoken privacy wall we erected between us in our seven-by-ten-foot space, and 
never asked.  (Kerman 111, emphasis added) 
 
For the most part, such alienation seems to function in self-perpetuating ways, in 
Kerman’s view.  So it is that her bunkmate Natalie’s separation from family seems to 
reinforce a determination in her not to talk about it with others—what we could view as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  At	  least,	  we	  hope	  not.	  	  Goffman’s	  work	  points	  out	  that	  mortification	  is	  a	  process	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  prison,	  but	  a	  
process	  that	  occurs	  at	  all	  institutions,	  as	  they	  work	  to	  separate	  inhabitants	  from	  the	  outside	  world	  (see	  Goffman	  
14-­‐74).	  	  We	  need	  not	  read	  more	  into	  these	  comparisons.	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self-inflicted alienation.  Or, put another way, an avoidance of recalculation.  For 
Kerman, the short stint of just fifteen months likely makes recalculation an unnecessary 
step—she knows that she will be headed back to her family and her job, and that her life 
will largely go on as it had already been established. 
 I find it interesting, however, that this part of our rhetorical cartography 
framework is not left out entirely in Kerman’s narrative.  Though she doesn’t seem to feel 
the need to engage in recalculation of her own, excerpts like that above seem to suggest 
that she is upset when others don’t.  Consider too a passage which follows: 
 [S]ome people were way too comfortable in prison.  They seemed to have 
 forgotten the world that exists on the outside.  You try to adjust and acclimate, yet 
 remain ready to go home every single day.  It’s not easy to do.  The truth is, the 
 prison and its residents fill your thoughts, and it’s hard to remember what it’s like 
 to be free, even after a few short months.  You spent a lot of time thinking about 
 how awful prison is rather than envisioning your future.  (Kerman 124, emphasis 
 added) 
 
Not needing to work towards recalculation herself, then, Kerman still sees the value of 
the process, and seems quite concerned that those with longer sentences might give in to 
mortification so easily.   Recalculation, then, while largely absent from Kerman’s own 
narrative, becomes of great importance to the book as a whole, for it is on this point that 
the work’s argument will hinge.  Looking around herself and seeing acquaintances lose 
themselves to the order of the prison, Kerman begins to mount a political argument. 
 And when, only a short time later, the inmate Levy publically announces Danbury 
to be “Club Fed,” we see Kerman’s argument become of pressing concern. 
 This project has previously made points on prison logic using astronomical 
metaphors and here I feel it fitting to return to such figurative language, for the attention 
to physics reveals a very subtle spatiality.  Fig. 4.9 is a thematic mapping of prison’s 
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power to alienate or mortify, and is not unlike a theoretical black hole:  once the inmate 
finds a sponsor (or sponsors) to help them through that boundary of “accepted prison 
behaviors,” the inmate ultimately finds some measure of acceptance or fulfillment; 
unfortunately, once they cross that threshold, Kerman believes they are increasingly 
likely to be unable to function outside of it.  Much like the “event horizon” of a black 
hole, then, the acceptance of prison culture seems to suggest a firmness in the trajectory 
of an inmate. 
 
Fig. 4.9 – “The Gravity of Prison Logic.” 
  
 One specific memory stands out within the context of this argument—a 
conversation Kerman has with her Latina friend “Carlotta.”  Carlotta, engaged to a man 
on the outside prior to Kerman’s arrival at Danbury, shares her wedding plans with 
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Kerman only to reveal that her instincts towards fulfillment have been eroded by her time 
in prison.  For Carlotta, the more typical fulfillment of love has been replaced by a form 
of fulfillment Kerman connects directly to the prison environment:  jealousy.  As Carlotta 
confides to Kerman: 
“That’s right.  I’m going back to my neighborhood, and I’m going to get married, 
and that will show all those bitches who talk about me.  I’ll be married, with my 
man, and you know what they’ll have?  No man.  A bunch of babies by a bunch of 
guys.  I cannot wait to get married, so those bitches can just hate on me!” 
(Kerman 123, emphasis added) 
 
After concluding her thoughts on Carlotta’s future, Kerman breaks the narrative as 
though to punctuate her main point in this chapter:  that prison’s assumed goal of 
rehabilitation for the real world is perhaps, at best, an illusion.  At its worst, it is an 
outright lie.  Based on her year at Danbury, Kerman’s spatial logic reveals that the 
institution does nothing to prepare inmates for release; in fact, it seems to destroy any 
ability to function outside of prison walls.  Carlotta is going back to her neighborhood, 
but she will not be, necessarily, going back without the prison’s lessons in mind.  She 
will, in essence, carry the prison with her.  Kerman is repeatedly surprised at the 
recidivism rates at Danbury, where released acquaintances are nearly certain to be seen 
again.  One inmate, refered to as “Coco,” is so warped by her time spent “down the hill” 
at the maximum-security facility that when she is moved to Kerman’s camp (the 
minimum-security facility, for non-violent offenders and those with “good time,”) she 
immediately marches to her counselor’s office and demands to go back to max lockup.  
She can’t, as she claims, “handle the freedom” (Kerman 126). 
 Explained as alienation, predicated on self-directed mortification, the stories of 
Carlotta and Coco reveal to us the spatial weight of Kerman’s thesis:  not only are 
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inmates kept distant from the real world (this by force), but their time inside the prison 
serves to instill in its inmates a preference for such distance, so that individuals who have 
been alienated from the mainstream begin to behave in ways that ensure they remain 
separate.  It is compound alienation:  once by mortification, and once more by 
internalization of that mortification (what recalculation could potentially redress).  So it 
is that even if Carlotta is going back to her neighborhood to get married (an attempted 
erasure of distance from the real world, we might say), she is still doing so with an 
attitude enhanced by the prison that will keep her at some removal. 
 So while Kerman herself does not recalculate in the ways we’ve come to expect 
of inmates like Birkla and Medina, she does attempt to reveal the spatiality of the prison, 
and the resulting gravity of its logic, in a way that changes our view of the prison (and 
thereby the individuals inside).  What starts as an example par excellance of the intimate 
public becomes something more, indicating that spatiality offers a wealth of opportunities 
to those who utilize it rhetorically. 
 
Conclusion 
 As this chapter has told a story of female prisoner narratives and the spaces from 
which they spring, let us consider the impact of Kerman’s argument along the lines of a 
traditional narrative arc.  Where the intimate public served us initially much like “rising 
action” (and served the writer as an important exercise in reclaiming identity), at the 
point at which such “inmate” discoveries became expanded onto a larger population, they 
swing towards a larger utility.  The “climax” of our story is the formation of what I call 
intimate politic, at which point the type of enthymematic argument  (such as we’ve seen 
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in Carter) becomes possible.  Following Kerman’s development of the “prison as ghetto” 
claim, it becomes possible for her to share larger, more inherently political, expressions 
of inmate identity.  And so that community that Berlant labels “women’s culture” is 
perhaps drawn in by the shared, common experiences of female subjectivity, and then 
asked to consider action.  Berlant’s definition of the intimate public relies on its 
postionality as “juxtapolitical,” and yet with Kerman, we see such work becoming overtly 
political:  the intimate politic.   
 Such a revelation should serve as an important extension of the analysis already 
completed in this volume.  For Kerman, I’d suggest that such an operation was not 
intuitive.  Kerman truly had to engage in an understanding of her own identity as an 
unlikely prisoner before she could end on a larger message.  And due to her unusual 
condition as a short-term prisoner (with a large degree of certainty about where she 
would go after prison), the tendency we’ve been calling recalculation was directed not 
inward, but outward, at the entire prison community. 
 The implications of this project thus far have been, in simple terms, that a 
personal desire to resist mortification, such as we see in institutional settings, frequently 
leads individuals to attempt “remapping” themselves.  They become spatial in order to 
exercise greater control over their spatiality.  But when such spatiality is not of 
considerable detriment to the individual (as in Kerman), such awareness can still be 
found to influence attempts at remapping—if not the individual, then the institution itself. 
 But regardless of the outcome, the texts considered above reveal that a very 
simple set of processes become activated in each case:  first, writers take part in a process 
of spatial inventory, in which they conceive of space for its effect upon identity; 
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secondly, by utilizing enthymeme, these writers use their inventories to recalibrate the 
space they are a part of—if not their own agency within it, then the space itself.   
 Such processes are most readily apparent when we look into institutional spaces 
that serve to challenge (or mortify) identity.  But I suspect such cartographic impulses are 
not limited to institutional spaces alone.  Each of us argues for his or her identity on a 
daily basis, be it through appearance, through action, or more directly, through language.  






















A young white man, barely at the age of his majority, walks into Charleston’s most 
storied Black church and, before he leaves, a new history is written (Abu-Jamal, 
“Charleston”). 
 
 So begins a meditation from Mumia Abu-Jamal on the shooting at Emanuel AME 
of nine church-goers in June of 2015—the month in which I sat down to finalize the draft 
that would become this document.  Though a tragic event, it is also inherently spatial, as 
the public outcry that has followed in the weeks since has impacted the way many of us 
think about racism and location:  we’ve seen Emanuel AME become a synecdoche for 
thinking about Charleston, about South Carolina; indeed, about the Southern United 
States in general.  And these discussions have had spatial impact:  within a week of the 
shootings, state legislators across the South began a very real discussion on the 
appropriateness of the “Stars and Bars” flag of the former Confederate States of America 
in public spaces, particularly in regards to governmental buildings.   
 Yet for our purposes here, I want to focus, first, on the thoughts of Abu-Jamal 
alone.  This project began with an investigation into the spatial rhetoric of Abu-Jamal’s 
1995 Live From Death Row, and we have, now 20 years removed from that publication, 
yet another text from the author which reveals his spatial rhetoric is very much still a 
pressing concern.  The text of “Charleston,” a short essay published on Free Speech 
Radio News, is important enough to be quoted here in its entirety; I pick up immediately 
after the opening paragraph, quoted above: 
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  Attending the Wednesday night Bible study, he sits for nearly an hour, 
 but his mind isn’t on the life of Jesus nor his disciples.  It’s on murder, mass 
 murder.  When the door shuts behind him, nine Black souls, elders mostly, 
 had been slain, Bibles in hand. 
  The man, or boy more than man really, hadn’t come to learn about 
 religion, for he had a belief, white supremacy, or the profound hatred of Black 
 people. 
  White supremacy is the mother’s milk of Charleston, of South 
 Carolina, of the South, of America.  For surely as slavery funded and built 
 America, the underlying principle was the devaluation, exploitation, and 
 oppression of Black life.  It’s the only thing that makes the church massacre in 
 Charleston even remotely intelligible. 
  Nine Black people were sacrificed to the blind idol of white supremacy 
 for the same reason that thousands of Black men and women were lynched 
 on American elms and pines:  as sacrifices to an idea, to perpetuate a system 
 of economic injustice. 
  Dylan Roof, the 21 year old accused of this massacre, had no friends to 
 speak of, no place to stay other than an associate’s couch, no job, and a 
 tenuous relationship with his parents.  Isolated, alienated, alone in the world, 
 his sole remaining possession was his whiteness, the only thing that gave his 
 existence meaning.  That was the energy that fueled the massacre in 
 Charleston, South Carolina. 
  It now sits like an incubus in the American soul, seething hatred and 
 fear, waiting for more Black lives to consume.  (Abu-Jamal, “Charleston,” 
 emphasis added) 
 
Here, then, I believe we have the ingredients necessary to recall the most salient points of 
this project (indeed, it is my hope that the reader will beat me to the identification of 
these ingredients). 
 We have, of course, a spatial inventory which works to expand its original 
location onto a national consciousness:  “White supremacy is the mother’s milk of 
Charleston, of South Carolina, of the South, of America.”  Growing exponentially with 
each successive location, we see here an exetastic buildup—in line with Walker’s 
thoughts on modern enthymeme—which serves to point out the inconsistencies of justice 
on an increasingly terrifying scale.  It is an inventory which speaks clearly to the 
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recurrent theme seen in Rubin Carter’s work:  To be Black in America is, necessarily, to 
be something less than a citizen. 
 Abu-Jamal, then, as Carter and X before him, has begun a succinct remapping of 
America itself, revealing through the microcosm of Charleston a latent, though all-too-
well-known characteristic of the United States:  racist intention.  Significantly, however, 
this “racist space” sits within America (it is, metaphorically, both an “incubus” in the 
soul, and an “energy that fueled the massacre”) making Abu-Jamal’s cartographic efforts 
primarily interested in invoking a spatiality that is entirely new to the map, rather than 
merely revising the distances perceived. 
 And in its invoked spatiality, I find it necessarily quite focused on recalculation, 
though we might notice immediately that it is not the author who is being “remapped.”  
Rather, the object of recalculation here is the nation as a whole.  That this type of action 
would reconfigure Abu-Jamal’s placement within (he is, after all, one of the black lives 
“consumed” by the “American soul’) is certainly a given, and yet I don’t believe that type 
of cartography to be of primary concern here.  
 For Abu-Jamal, the cartographic work being done here is interested in reframing 
the United States of 2015 around a space which might rarely be called into question.  
Conceived as such, America becomes a nation not to be praised for its move toward 
something that has been called “post-racism” (a claim contentiously offered after the 
election of Barack Obama), but to be called out for its rather obvious disavowal of racist 
actions and intentions.  In short, America’s identity should be determined by the spaces it 
encompasses, and as Abu-Jamal points out, few want to make that connection when it 
comes to racism. 
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 The point, I believe, is worthy of emphasis here:  where 20 years ago, Abu-Jamal 
seemed more focused on a type of personal recalculation (recall his work to frame his 
prison as a “dog pen” or “warehouse” from Chapter One—a move that, as we saw, 
necessarily reconfigured his own identity), the Abu-Jamal of 2015 seems more focused 
on a type of national recalculation; an attempt to map the nation as he sees it.  It is a 
recalculation less interested in his own placement within (which he has written about at 
great length), and more interested in the dimensions which exist around him.  And to 
large extent, his remapping connects with a host of voices emerging in the aftermath of 
the Charleston shooting (most notably, those looking to remove the Confederate flag 
from government buildings). 
 We should note that Abu-Jamal does not avoid recalculating individuals 
altogether, though.  He is quite clearly caught up in an effort to recalculate Dylan Roof—
making sure that we understand him as a young man (or “boy,” here) rather than as a 
fully-grown citizen; he is nearly as quick to explain Roof’s alienation from his peers and 
family alike.  Such asides feel first like a rush to claim vengeance on the shooter himself 
(we might compare Abu-Jamal’s recalculation of Roof to Goffman’s mortification, as 
both look to strip the individual of an identity), but I think that in “Charleston,” they are 
operating at the same time on a larger scale.  Preoccupied with defining this “racist 
space” within America, Abu-Jamal seems to be utilizing a tactic we first saw in Live 
From Death Row, in which spaces can be defined through those who inhabit them.  Roof, 
then, is not the focal point of even the paragraphs in which he is featured; rather, his 
young (read as naïve) and alienated (read as out-of-touch) characteristics serve to define 
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this racist space that Abu-Jamal wants to map for us; the spatiality he wants to draw our 
attention to. 
 In this regard, “Charleston” serves us nicely as an example of the power of 
rhetorical cartography as it can exist beyond the carceral, a point which has been 
suggested throughout this document, but which necessarily falls to the wayside as our 
corpus of texts comes exclusively from that setting.  Make no mistake, Abu-Jamal is still 
a prisoner, but in “Charleston,” the prison has nothing to do with his “mapping.”  As I 
mentioned at the outset, my selection of “prison texts” as the focal point of analysis was 
one made largely out of convenience:  in looking for a reliance on spatiality in textual 
compositions, I stated that identifying those whose spatiality is most rigidly defined 
allowed us greater, more obvious, entry.  Here again, I think that point is made with 
attention to Mumia Abu-Jamal. 
 As I close, however, I want to make clear that the motivation to define one’s self 
(and the world that encompasses that subjectivity) via rhetorical cartography is not 
limited to those who simply want to challenge their incarceration.  Abu-Jamal is not 
looking to say anything about prison or himself as a prisoner in this text.  Yet still, I think 
his marginality as a prisoner has something to do with his cartographic instinct.  Moving 
forward, we would be wise to consider the larger spheres of influence in which such 
cartographic actions take place.   
 We might consider the rhetorical flourish of rapper and actor Common, who 
invoked the bridge at Selma, Alabama (to which Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and 
supporters famously marched in protest in 1965) as a symbol of connection in his 
acceptance speech at the 2015 Academy Awards: 
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 This bridge [at Selma] was once a landmark of a divided nation, but now is a 
 symbol for change.  The spirit of this bridge transcends race, gender, religion, 
 sexual orientation, and social status.  The spirit of the bridge connects the kid 
 from the South side of Chicago, dreaming of a better life, to those in France 
 standing up for their freedom of expression to the people in Hong Kong 
 protesting for democracy.  (see Rullo, emphasis added) 
 
 In much the same way that we see Abu-Jamal move from one church in 
Charleston, South Carolina to offer a map of America as a whole, here we see Common 
move from a bridge in the town of Selma, Alabama to work towards a map of power 
struggles on a global level.  Working to inventory spaces of injustice, Common finds 
connection between the poor side of Chicago, the Muslim community in France65, and 
those seeking a democratic government in China, thus connecting a series of 
marginalized individuals under the metaphorical space of the Selma bridge.   
 Comparing Abu-Jamal and Common—two African-American males, but of quite 
different positions—I think we might conclude that rhetorical cartography, with its 
emphasis on spatial inventories (which work, like enthymeme, to reveal a collection of 
inconsistencies or injustices) and recalculation of identity would seem to be a very useful 
strategy for marginalized individuals and communities.  The limits of my study keep me 
from speculating too widely on this characteristic, but I believe the lens of rhetorical 
cartography can help us understand why some marginalized voices get heard. 
 We might too consider the work of historian Edward Baptist, whose spatial 
arguments in his recent book on American slavery, The Half Has Never Been Told, have 
become oft-repeated recalculations in light of the events of June 2015.  In a recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Here, I readily admit I might be stretching things a bit.  In all honesty, the comparison of those killed in the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks to Chicago’s poor and Hong Kong’s un-represented feels a little mismanaged, and so I read the 
comparison as one not invoking those attacked for a cartoon, but those of the Muslim community in France who came 
under rhetorical attack later.  An acceptance speech—at the Academy Awards, no less—seems likely to be an intense, 
emotional experience, and rather than criticize Common for making a silly comparison, I’d like to give him the benefit 
of the doubt, and look for ways the spaces do line up.	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opinion piece by Harold Meyerson for The Washington Post, the author comments on 
Baptist’s “remappings” in a way that reveals such cartographic work is no longer merely 
taken as emphatic amplifications or metaphors, but as something approaching truthful 
reflection (or perhaps, “revision”): 
 Baptist acknowledges that “torture” is not a word we usually associate with 
 American slavery, but he makes a convincing case that we should.  His other 
 neologistic innovation is in his substitution for the word “plantations.”  He 
 calls them “slave labor camps,” and on a moment’s reflection, it’s hard to see 
 why his usage shouldn’t become ours as well.  What’s a plantation, after all, but 
 a slave labor camp with a big house built by slave labor? (Meyerson, 
 emphasis added) 
 
 Here, just as we’ve seen authors like Conover, Abu-Jamal, Carter, and Kerman 
reach for spatial metaphors to help them explain the space of prison (“warehouse,” “dog 
pen,” “ghetto,” etc.) to those uninitiated, we see Edward Baptist attempt the same move 
with plantations—a move that, as Meyerson suggests, is particularly persuasive.  I 
commented before that rendering prison as a “dog pen” or “warehouse” does not 
accurately reflect the surroundings of the prison to those unfamiliar with the environment 
as much as it tends to encourage a vision of those who reside within.  This, I would 
argue, is exactly where Baptist seems to be headed with his recalculation of 
“plantations”—a word which seems to hide the truth of the space behind it.  For a word 
like “plantation” could conjure up images of Scarlett O’Hara and noblesse oblige just as 
readily as it could of slaves and torture.  For Baptist, that lack of firmness is an issue, and 
so “slave labor camps” becomes a way to frame the inhabitants more concretely. 
 In moving from writers like Abu-Jamal and Kerman to Baptist, then, we see a 
preoccupation with rhetorical cartography inherent to activism and civil rights work as 
well.  This connection, I believe, suggests something about the marginalized:  they are 
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aware of the “othering” done to them by majority power structures.  And more than this, 
they are united—in rhetoric, at least—to the fight to overcome that “othering.”  As our 
field continues to work with the marginalized to overcome the label of “other,” so too 
should we work with a concept of rhetorical cartography in mind. 
 Each of these examples suggest something along the lines of Jameson’s argument 
in “Cognitive Mapping”:  that the modern (or “postmodern”) world tends to fragment as a 
function of the fragility of our obvious connections to power.  For those whose distance 
from power is the most pressing—those marginalized persons, who have been explored, 
in part, in this document through a focus on African-Americans and American females—
I believe the tendency to turn to rhetorical cartography in order to argue for the self is 
the strongest.  This country’s current debates over race surely exemplify this.  And as we 
move closer to the 2016 Presidential election—in which we have candidates on both 
sides of the party line advocating reform of our carceral system—I believe we will see an 
even stronger preoccupation with the way words can create identity through space (and, 
of course, vice-versa). 
 And when we realize that marginalized groups may actually encourage a 
transformation of their relationship with power (think again of the Confederate flag, now 
on its way to obscurity; or the eight police officers charged in the murder of Freddie 
Gray, especially in comparison to those who went free after the deaths of Michael Brown, 
Eric Garner, and others), I believe we see clearly an urgency behind the drive to 
inventory spaces, and then recalculate identity.  Such rhetorical action holds the potential 
to affect change, and on an increasingly large scale. 
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 In this dissertation, I hope to have revealed the power of rhetorical cartography to 
give power to the powerless; not just those trapped within the barred walls of our justice 
system, but to those pushed into the margins within their own neighborhoods, or within 
their own histories.  The field of Rhetoric and Composition has much to learn from those 
who have successfully reclaimed some purchase on power through their renegotiations of 
identity and space.  I hope that, here, I have contributed to a conversation that will 
continue to develop as we work to chart the ways those marginalized by rhetorical action 
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EDUCATION	  
	  
University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  KY	   	   	   	   	   	   2015	  
Ph.D	  in	  English,	  emphasis	  in	  Rhetoric	  and	  Composition	  
Dissertation:	  	  “Doing	  Time	  by	  Conceiving	  Space:	  	  The	  Rhetorical	  Cartographies	  of	  Imprisoned	  
Writers”	  	  
Director:	  	  Stephen	  Schneider	  
Committee:	  	  Tim	  Johnson,	  Kiki	  Petrosino,	  Bronwyn	  Williams,	  John	  Gibson	  
	  
Missouri	  State	  University,	  Springfield,	  MO	   	   	   	   	   	   2011	  
M.A.	  in	  Writing,	  emphasis	  in	  Composition	  and	  Rhetoric	  
Degree	  Papers:	  	  “The	  Writer’s	  Audience	  is	  Never	  a	  Reality,”	  and	  “I’ll	  Text	  If	  You’ll	  Text:	  	  
Reclaiming	  Text-­‐Messaging	  for	  the	  Composition	  and	  Rhetoric	  Classroom.”	  
	   Advisors:	  	  Margaret	  Weaver	  and	  Marianthe	  Karanikas	  
	  
Missouri	  State	  University,	  Springfield,	  MO	   	   	   	   	   	   2010	  
M.A.	  in	  English,	  emphasis	  in	  Creative	  Writing	  
	   Creative	  Thesis:	  	  Bomb,	  a	  Novel	  (Three	  Chapters)	  
	   Advisor:	  	  Richard	  Neumann	  
	  
Missouri	  State	  University,	  Springfield,	  MO	   	   	   	   	   	   2007	  
B.A.	  in	  English,	  emphasis	  in	  Creative	  Writing	  





University	  of	  Louisville	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2011-­‐2015	  
Graduate	  Teaching	  Assistant	  
	  
Missouri	  State	  University	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2011	  
Per-­‐Course	  Faculty	  
	  
Missouri	  State	  University	   	   	   	   	   	   	   2008-­‐2011	  
Graduate	  Teaching	  Assistant	  
	  
	  




ORIGINAL	  CREATIVE	  WORKS	  
“Unity	  in	  Pitchforks”	  (Original	  Non-­‐Fiction	  Essay)	  
	   Flywheel	  Magazine.	  	  Louisville,	  KY:	  	  Flywheel	  Press,	  2012.	  
	  
	  
“Sundays”	  (Original	  Poetry)	  
	   Moon	  City	  Review.	  	  Fayetteville,	  AR:	  	  University	  of	  Arkansas	  Press,	  2011.	  
	  
“Cormac	  McCarthy”	  and	  “Funeral	  Bells”	  (Original	  Poetry)	  
	   Moon	  City	  Review.	  	  Fayetteville,	  AR:	  	  University	  of	  Arkansas	  Press,	  2010.	  
	  
“Nekkid,”	  “Angel	  of	  Death	  in	  the	  Henhouse,”	  and	  “Welding	  License”	  (Original	  Poetry)	  




CONFERENCE	  PRESENTATIONS	  	  
	  
“Which	  Came	  First,	  the	  Prisoner	  of	  the	  Prisoner	  Stereotype?:	  Assessing	  the	  Critical	  Reception	  of	  
Orange	  is	  the	  New	  Black.”	  
	   PCA/ACA	  National	  Conference,	  2014,	  Chicago,	  IL.	   	   	   April	  2014	  
	  
“What	  We	  Have	  Here	  is	  a	  Failure	  to	  Negotiate:	  	  New	  Strategies	  for	  Teaching	  Responsible	  
Reading	  and	  Productive	  Responding	  in	  the	  Writing	  Classroom.”	  
	   CCCC,	  2013,	  Las	  Vegas,	  NV.	   	   	   	   	   	   March	  2013	  
	  
“The	  Rhetorical	  Mission	  of	  Omission:	  	  Analyzing	  the	  Economies	   	   	   	  
of	  Walker	  Evans’	  Photography.”	  
	   Thomas	  R.	  Watson	  Conference,	  2012,	  Louisville,	  KY.	  	   	   	   October	  2012	  
	  
“You	  Think	  I	  Just	  Write	  to	  See	  Myself	  Talk?:	  	  Adapting	  the	  Workshop	  Model’s	  Successes	  for	  Use	  
in	  the	  Composition	  Class.”	  
	   CCCC,	  2012,	  St.	  Louis,	  MO.	   	   	   	   	   	   March	  2012	  
	  
“Bouncing	  Off	  Satellites	  and	  Cell	  Towers:	  	  Exploring	  the	  Materiality	  and	  Hybridity	  of	  Text	  
Messaging.”	  




	   	   	   	  
University	  of	  Louisville	  
	   English	  101	  –	  “Introduction	  to	  College	  Writing”	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2011	  (0ne	  Section)	  
	   208	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2012	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2013	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2014	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2015	  (One	  Section)	  
	  
	   English	  102	  –	  “Intermediate	  College	  Writing”	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2012	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2013	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2015	  (One	  Section)	  
	  
	   English	  202	  –	  “Introduction	  to	  Creative	  Writing”	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2014	  (One	  Section)	  
	  
Missouri	  State	  University	  
	   English	  110	  –	  “Writing	  I:	  	  Introduction	  to	  Composition”	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2008	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2009	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	  
	   English	  215	  –	  “Introduction	  to	  Creative	  Writing:	  	  Short	  Fiction”	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2009	  (One	  Section)	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2010	  (One	  Section)	  
	   	   	   Fall	  2010	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	   	   	   Spring	  2011	  (Two	  Sections)	  
	  
	   English	  210	  –	  “Writing	  II:	  	  Writing	  in	  the	  Disciplines”	  
	   	   	   Summer	  2011	  (One	  Section)	  
	  
*As	  the	  instructor	  of	  record	  for	  these	  courses,	  I	  developed	  my	  own	  syllabi	  and	  assignments,	  and	  
administered	  grades.	  





Department	  of	  English,	  University	  of	  Louisville	   	   	   	   	   2013-­‐2014	  
	   Assistant	  Director	  of	  Creative	  Writing	  (Dir.,	  Brian	  Leung)	  
In	  this	  position	  I	  served	  as	  coordinator	  for	  the	  department’s	  Axton	  Reading	  Series,	  which	  
brings	  published	  authors	  to	  campus	  for	  readings	  and	  “Master	  Class”	  workshops;	  I	  also	  
coordinated	  the	  Creative	  Writing	  program’s	  annual	  Italo	  Calvino	  Prize—working	  closely	  
with	  the	  judges—which	  is	  awarded	  each	  year	  to	  an	  outstanding	  work	  of	  speculative	  
fiction.	  	  	  
	  
Department	  of	  English,	  Missouri	  State	  University	   	   	   	   2009-­‐2010	  
	   Assistant	  Director	  of	  Composition	  (Dir.,	  Ken	  Gillam)	  
In	  this	  position	  I	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  Director	  of	  Composition	  to	  facilitate	  the	  first-­‐
year	  writing	  program,	  and	  served	  as	  liaison	  to	  MA	  composition	  instructors.	  	  I	  also	  aided	  
in	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  online	  database	  of	  graduate	  student	  work,	  and	  co-­‐authored	  an	  in-­‐
	   209	  
house	  publication	  on	  MLA	  documentation	  style	  (a	  required	  text	  for	  all	  FYC	  courses	  at	  









Writing	  Consultant,	  University	  Writing	  Center	   	   	   	   2013-­‐2014	  
	   University	  of	  Louisville	  
	  
Writing	  Consultant,	  Dissertation	  Writing	  Retreat	   	   	   	   Summer	  2014	  
	   University	  of	  Louisville	  
	  
Fiction	  Editor,	  Moon	  City	  Review	   	   	   	   	   	   2010-­‐2011	  
	   Missouri	  State	  University	  
	  
Graduate	  Student	  Member,	  Recruitment	  Initiative	   	   	   	   Spring	  2010	  
	   Missouri	  State	  University	  
	  
Graduate	  Student	  Member,	  Composition	  Committee	   	   	   2009-­‐2010	  
	   Missouri	  State	  University	  
	  
Graduate	  Student	  Member,	  Textbook	  Selection	  Committee	   	   Spring	  2009	  
	   Missouri	  State	  University	  
	  
 
